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American Economie Sanctions against Britain, 1806-1812.
Summary of Thesis
As the most important neutral maritime nation in the wars of the French 
Revolution and Napoleon, the United States endured much abuse of its 
neutral rights as Britain arid France tried to Use the considerable 
commercial power of the United States as a weapon against each other. The 
failure of American diplomacy and the lack off a strong navy caused Thomas 
Jefferson to impose economic sanctions, using American commercial strength 
in order to win their respect for American neutrality and independence.
The first efforts at coercion apparently failed. The weak Non-Import- 
—ation Abt of 1806 and the much more radical Embargo Act of 1807 were 
swept away in 1809 as a result of American mercantile protests against the 
effects of sanctions upon the American economy. The Embargo Act also 
seemed to have failed against Britain. Though some economic dislocation 
was caused, this was overcome by the British development of the Latin 
American market. The failurefof the Embargo Act increased the scorn with 
which the British government viewed the American position. In 1809, an 
even weaker measure, the Non-Intercourse Act, was imposed but it was re- 
—voked in 1810.
In the long-term, however, these early efforts at sanctions had a 
cumulâtiveeffeet which laid the foundàtions of future success. The Bibargci 
and Non-Importation Acts had encouraged British trade with Latin America: 
a market less able to sustain a growth of British exports and much more 
speculative than the North American market. The repercussions of this 
weakening of the base of British trade were not felt until the summer of 
1810 when the losses sustained in Latin America precipitated a depression. 
The actual and potential effects of sanctions helped to create a Whig 
opposition movement against the government * s maritime policies. Though 
unsuccessful, the basis for a stronger movement was laid. In addition, 
the Non-Intercourse Act, together with the Continental System and inflatior 
created a general uncertainty in British international trade which made iff 
more difficult to weather the depression of 1810,
This slump was essential for the ultimate success of sanctions. The 
cumulative effect of earlier sanctions had helped cause the depression, 
the imposition of an effective Non-Importation Act earlybin 1811 lessened 
the possibility of a quick recovery, and in the consequent Whig canjpaign 
against the gritlsh government sanctions become linked politically with
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the restoration of prosperity. The Whigs argued that the re-opening of 
the American market would restore prosperity and that the only way to 
achieve this was to end sanctions by revoking the Orders in Council, the 
essential and controversial part of the government’s maritime jpolicies. 
With this argument, against a background of growing economic and social 
distress, the opposition to the Orders in Council policy grew rapidly in 
the early months of 1812, The movement became strong enoughjpto force the 
govemmmnt to agree to a parliamentary inquiry on the subject.
This concession was the first major indication that the British govern- 
-ment was responding to the pressures created by sanctions. Until then 
the government had remained contemptuous of the United States, had not 
been overly cohcerned about the economic dislocations cauded by danctions, 
and was little moved by the possibility of war with the United States if 
sanctions were to fail. The belief that the sanctions were more damaging 
to the American economy, and that the war against Napbleon^must take 
priority dominated government thinking. Only the growth of opposition, 
combined with the increasing parliamentary weakness of the government in 
1812 led to concessions being made in order to keep the government in 
power. The parliamentary inquiry, the assassination of Spencer Perceval, 
and the consequent emergence of a weak administration under Lord Liverpool 
after a month-long arisis, anxious to avoid futther crises and achieve 
popularity, produced the atmosphere in which concessions to American 
economic pressure were possible. To remain in power, Liverpool revoked 
the Orders in Council in June 1812. One of the main aims of sanctions had 
•been achieved, but, coincidentally, despairing of success from sanctions, 
the Americans declared war on Britain to protect their neutrali1;y.
Sanctions were a qualified success. Directed widely against the whole 
British economy for limited periods, instead of being directed in strent$h 
against points of greatest vulnerability, sudh as the Peninsular campaign, 
sanctions achieved a success comensurate with the effort involved.
PREFACE
ï*he object of this thealG le to study the political azid eeonomlo 
affects cm Britain of the various measures of economic sanctions 
passed by the United States government between 1806 and 1812, 
Previous work on Anglo-American relations In these years has 
tended to concentrate upon the formulation of American policy 
the details of the diplomacy of the United States, and the 
effects of these same sanctions upon the United States. The 
treatment of the political and economic effects of these 
sanctions upon Britain has been scanty, with little discussion 
of any details of the effects of specific sanctions* The general 
discussion of sanctions has been confined to sweeping 
observations which reflect contemporary Aineriean opinion that 
sanctions were an abysmal failure* A® there has been no 
detailed examination of Anglo-American commerce in the 
Napoleonic period, an analysis of the economic consequences of 
sanctions has been lacking. Without this essential basis no 
discussion of the political effects of sanctions upon Britain 
is possible, The principal aim of the thesis is to fill these 
gaps by establishing the basic pattern of American and British 
trade and then the specific economic and political effects of 
the sanctions which were directed against Anglc-American trade.
As a result of this, the degree of success attained by sanctions 
can be estimated.
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While the subject of the thesis has been neglected, much of 
the material has been used previously by historians, but only 
in the course of writing on more general themes or on other 
Qspecte of Anglo-American relations# In this thesis, sources 
used previously ( such as the Pore ign Office records) have been 
brought together with others not used to any great extent 
before ( such as the Board of Trade records) to obtain 
information on the economic and political effects of sanctions. 
Most of the material employed was found in Great Britain; in 
the records of government {departments at the Public Record 
Office; in the papers of leading political figures at the 
British Museum; and in a wide range of contemporary newspapers 
and journals. One leading American source has been used to 
obtain insight into conditions in Britain? the despatches of 
American ministers and consuls in London, Two new efforts have 
been made in the use of sources: to make use of much statistical 
material, from oontemporary and near oontemporary sources, to 
build up the patterns and changes in Anglo*American commerce; 
and, as regards the more general economic and political effects 
of sanctions g to employ a broader range of materials, such as 
American sources, end journalistic opinion outside London, to 
obtain a broader knowledge of political events in Britain,
This thesis, therefore, attempts to study a neglected aspect of 
Anglo-American relations, not so much by using a vast range of 
new sources, but by looking at accessible sources in a new way, 
with different questions to be answered#
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INTRODUCTION
In the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Ware, the United 
Statee wae the moet Important neutral nation, principally 
beoauee of Ite extensive commerce. The preservation of Its 
neutrality and etatue ae an Independent nation was the 
foundation of American foreign policy from 1793, Although 
this position vms maintained until the r@oipration of war on 
Britain in 1812, the United States found it increasingly 
difficult to remain aloof from the hostilities in Europe.
The tvm maritime belligerents, Britain and France, adopted 
pollclee designed to use the trade of the United States as a 
tool in the world-wide struggle against each other. The 
Americans wanted to remain neutral because of their v/ealmess 
as a new republic, and to protect their trade. This commerce, 
however, made the American task much more difficult because 
of its siae, prosperity and utility#
Until 1806, the government of the United States tried to 
protect American rights and ships by diplomacy. The military 
stalemate in Europe and the intensification of economic 
warfare betv;eon Britain and France, combined with the 
continued disrespect for American neutral rights, brought 
about the imposition of economic sanctions between 1 8 0 6 end 
1812» This effort to turn the cause of the dispute, the 
neutral American commerce, into the means by which neutral 
rigidité were to be upheld, was directed particularly against 
Britain, In several forms and for variable periods, sanctions 
were imposed on Britain in an effort to bring about a change 
in British policy by causing much economic hardship to that 
trading nation. By 1812, the Amorioane could not detect any 
such policy change. 8o they abandoned their neutrality to
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fight a war to proserve their rights as an Independent nation*, 
Inoludlng the rights to he neutral and to trade freely on the 
high eeae.
The purpose of this thesis is to study the economic and political 
effects of the series of sanctions against British commerce*
Both the particular commercial and the more general economic 
effects of the American actions will be studied* In turn this 
will provide a sound basis for an examination of their political 
impact and especially the degree to which they influenced the 
position and policies of the British government* From this study 
some Indication of the general effectiveness of this American 
effort to use economic sanctions as am alternative to war will he 
obtained* In turn, this should shed light upon the necessity for 
war in 1612*
Superficially, sanctions were regarded by the Americans as a 
failure because they did not cause any apparent change of British 
policy, and in conséquence they resorted to war* Yet, in the 
same month as the declaration of war, Britain removed one of the 
major American grievances the Orders in Council* This coincldenc 
suggests that the United States was too hasty in abandoning 
sanctions, and that the sanctions came close to success*
Therefore, one major objective will be to determine what part the 
economic and political impact of economic coercion ployed in the 
decision to repeal the Orders in Council, If they played an 
Important paz't, than sanctions were more successful than realised 
by the Americans, and it was not the failure of sanctions, but 
American impatience which caused the War of 1812* This war 
produced few tangible results, apart from a new national pride in 
the United States, end the peace which followed did not resolve 
the maritime issues over which it was fought* This lack of
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positive results easts doubt on the necessity of the American 
declaration of war in June 1812, and, if It can be shown that 
oanotlons were eucoeeoful, then the case for war will be even 
weaker* While this thesis will concentrate upon the eeonomio 
and political effecto of sanctions upon Britain# the results 
should be of value for answering more general questions about th 
War of 1812, like the reasons for the failure to observe the 
suooess of their alternative to war and for their deolsion to 
fight rather than wait any longer for the desired changes in 
Bz'itlsh policy* More generally, perhaps this case study of the 
employment of sanctions by the United States will give some 
indication of the requirements for the suooeseful pursuit of any 
sanctions policy.
Students of American foreign policy have given little attention 
the question of the effectiveness of sanctions. Most have 
adopted the beliefs of the American government in 1812 about the 
failure of coercion, and concentrated on other aspects of foreign 
policy* They have tended to restrict their vision to events 
which directly affected the United States, such as the 
formulation of American foreign policy, the details of 
diplomatic negotiations, and the effects of American internal 
politics upon foreign affairs* In consequence, for example, 
the effects of the ia&bargo Act of 1807y on New England are 
better known than the effects of the same measure on Britain.
One of the few exceptions has been Bradford Perkins who has made 
extensive une of British sources# however, the scope of his worl 
has been too broad to permit him to make any detailed treatment 
of economic sanctions.
In contrast to the need for a wider vision and a greater range oi 
sources on the part of American historians, from the British
t i l  fa i  cs n f *  '1 A A l  P!'h 1 O n  _ T h  A  f â f f s û t S  O f
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eanctione have to be found in the maes of material available 
on British poll ties and économie development in the age of the 
Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution and Napoleon.
The years 1806-12 are not a distinguishable segment of the 
history of Induatriallaatlon in Britain and the effects of 
eanctione W v e  to be discerned in an eoonomy which was eubjeot 
not only to the upheavala of the growth of industry but also 
those created by ivar and by the Oontlnental System of 
Napoleon. Similarly the effects on politics have to be 
isolated from the multitude of ieeues v/hich influenoed party 
polltiOG and government in Britain.
After a diecuGBlon of the American desire for neutrality, the 
international importance of American commerce in the European 
ware, the dispute® over American neutral riglite at eea, and 
the general development of economic warfare up to 1 8 0 7, the 
economic baela of the study of sanctions will be aet out. Thle 
will be done by setting out the ^normal* pattemo of Britieh 
and American commerce, with the emi>ha8l8 on the traneatlantio 
trade between the two countries. Since the pei'iod 1 7 8 3 -1 7 9 3  
is too short and is affected by the need to readjust commerce 
aft^r the War of independence, the period 1793-1603 has been 
taken as the basic period for establishing the *normal* or 
pre-sanotions patterns of trade. Of course, this is not as 
satisfactory as any comparison between %3eacetlme trade and 
commerce 1 8 0 7-1 2 , but, despite the war, a pattern can be 
established from wn.ch the deviations caused by sanctions can Ix 
traced.
The ecoziomic effects of the American coercion can be traced in 
four stages. Firstly, the direct Impact of each measure
«a» ^
adopted by the American government on the commeroe of Great 
Britain, whether it be in terme of imports,escports or shipping 
requirements, will be set down. Secondly, the- wider effects of 
a disruption of trade upon the economy of Britain, and especially
in the new industries, will be examined^ Thirdly, these economic 
effects of each effort at Imposing sanctions must be placed
alongside the effects of war, the Continental System and
indtis trial! sat ion* After this, a broad assessment of the overall
economic effect of sanctions can be made*
The political impact of sanctions can be dealt with in two stages 
It must be determined to what extent the sanctions, and the 
ooonomio effects of them, stirred up British public interest In 
American neutral rights and whether they encouraged criticism and 
opposition to the maritime policies of the British government.
In particular the role of sanctions In encouraging a political 
movement against the Orders in Council will be examined. As the 
ultimate aim of sanctions was to bring about a reversal of Britid 
policies on American neutral rights, the influence of sanctions 
upon the British government Is of considerable importance. The 
views of the government on the imposition, and on the actual 
and potential effects of sanctions will be ascertained. Such an 
analysis will help to supply answers to questions such as the 
degree to which economic coercion induced a greater respect for 
the United State© as an independent nation, as a neutral with an 
extensive trade? whether they brought about any changes in the 
operation of British maritime policies, and especially, whether 
they contributed to the decision to repeal the Orders in Council 
in 1812. The answers will enable conclusions to be drawn about 
the succès© or failure of these sanction© a© an effort to 
redress American grievances against Great Britain*
OHÆPTRR O m
EOONOMIC WARFARE 1793-1807
The policy of economic coercion, ee devleed and carried out by 
Jefferson and Madieon, warn the result of the need of a weakly 
armed neition to uphold its rights and protect its trade from 
the restrictions imposed by British and French maritime 
policies* Although a sovereign nation since 1783, the integrity 
and the independence of the United States were not secure. In 
spite of !:he geographic distance from Europe, the United States 
was a weak and exposed nation on a continent in which Britain 
and Spain had extensive possessions* A democratic republic in 
a world of hostile monarchies, the United States lacked the 
wealth, strong government and armed forces necessary to 
maintain its security. In consequence, preservation of 
American freedom meant neutrality in European ware where the 
United States would be exposed to the ambitions of the major 
powers. This neutrality# which was declared in 1793# required 
constant diplomatic effort to maintain.
The existence of a growing overseae commerce# which became 
increasingly prosperous after the outbreak of war in Europe, 
brought both wealth and problems. Wealth cam© from the 
advantages of being a neutral trader because of increased 
demand for American produce and vessels, from the comparative 
freedom of movement accorded to neutrals, from the inability 
of the belligerents to trade normally or use their own ships. 
This commercial wealth constituted a vital part of the 
American economy, but the acquisition of profits could not be 
separated from the problem of neutral rights* The desire of 
Britain and France to use American shipping for their own
M * ^  tt»
advantage and the Indefinite nature of international law on 
neutral rights at eea were the main causes of these problems.
To the British and the French, the United Stat'js was a weak 
nation with a valuable oommeroe and merohant fleet whoee 
neutrality was to be reepected only when it did not ourta11 the 
war effort of one side or the other. Amer loan goodwill and 
trade were to be employed by each side In the Anglo-Frencli 
struggle. As neither aide accorded the American® the respect 
for their neutrality which they demanded# the United Statee 
felt its rights were being abused and its independence as a 
republic endangered. Only constant diplomacy and then sanctions 
could alleviate the situation.
This chapter will trace the emergence of this difficult poeltioK 
by analyelng the deficiencies in international law, and the 
reepootive positlone of the United States,Prance and Britain, ar 
then outline the early development of the aanotions policy.
The evolution of a doctrine of naval power %me an essential 
part of the rise of Great Britain to maritime eupreaaoy in the 
eighteenth century. This was a ®big navy* doctrine which 
envisaged the extensive use of that power to achieve several 
important war alme; the defeat and deetruetion of an enemy 
fleet: support of military forces and allies in Europe; the 
protection of British shipping and the destruction of enemy 
oommei'oe. Britain liked to employ her naval power to the 
maximum in order to achieve these alms and did not look with 
favour upon any efforts to restrict Its power, such as reliance 
on international law, Ooncurrently with the rise of British 
seapower, international law was being developed to meet the 
needs of the now frequent maritime warfare between the major 
powers of Europe. In spite of this, by the end of the
#BhOs
eighteenth century# this law was no more than a set of 
principles subject to conflicting interpretations. The law 
tried to lay down the rights of both belligei'entB and neutrals# 
with the aim of protecting the rights of the latter by imposing 
Gome reetralntB on the exercise of ©eapower by the belligerent 
country. Ae a result of the vagueneee of the law and the lack of 
general agreement on many pointa, two general interpretations of 
the law were extant by the end ol the eighteenth century. The 
strict interpretation of the law which favoured and was accepted 
by potential or actual neutrals# and by the weaker naval powers, 
was that adopted by the United States. The sti'ong naval powez^  of 
Great Britain favoured and used an interpretation which would 
impose the least restrictions on the use of seapower, evezi though 
this required the denial of the rights olaimed by neutrals.
Though France was a subetantlal naval powe^ r until Trafalgar in 
1803* its poBition varied between the two extremes of Britain and 
the united States: the French view was more opportimist and 
dependant on the relative strengthe of British and French seapower 
As French power diminished, the American position wee favoured but 
not always practised by Napoleon,
The lack of agreement on the terme of international law wae most 
crucial for two areas of dispute between Britain and the United 
states. These involved not only the legal rights of the two 
powers but also the methods by which seapowar was exercised. In 
dispute were the right of the American neutral to trade with the 
enemies of Britain# and the British right to use its sempower to 
destroy the commerce of an enemy: France and her dependencies. On 
the latter point, the methods rather than the legal right were the 
subject of greater argument with the United States. The absence 
of an agreed legal basis for the employment of seapower
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aggravated Anglo-American relations and made the eolutlon of 
the maritime différences between the two oomtrlea much more 
dlffloult. This general difference in the interpretation of 
respective rights under international law lay behind the 
particular controveraiee which rroee after the outbreak of war 
in Europe in 1793*
The British use of eeapower rather than the size of American 
trade was the more important aouroo of difficulty in the early 
years of the European war.'*' Britain employed her naval strength 
in the 1790* e to destroy French ( and later Spanieh) trade with 
the French oversees posseeslonB and to prevent neutral shipping 
replacing French vessels in such commerce. Direct trade between, 
8 neutral# such as the United States, and France wae not banned 
but it was subjected to saver©restrictions which created 
opposition in the United States» Britain and the United States 
disagreed on such matters as contraband# the right of a 
belligerent warship to stop and search a neutral ship, the 
protection given to enemy personnel and property by the neutral 
flag, the type of blockades which a belligerent could impose# 
the Impressment of seamen Into British naval service, and the 
right of neutrals to trade witîi belligerent colonies normally 
closed to them in time of peace»
Britain acknowledged the right of neutral ships to trade with 
France# provided that this trade was carried on between the 
ports of the neutral country and France alone, and that this
1. The history of the rise of British seapower is treated full
in:-
A »T»Mahant The Influenqe of 8eapgwer upon History (1890).
A.T.Mahan; 3à£]âËQagasaj5aL^§JBSag£^ .Ppenoh
Revolution a M  Fiaplre, (189L).
G. J.Magnae s A .1 «. % e  Formfctlve
Yeara (1 9 6 1).
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trade did not Include eontrahand» Tims American vessels coxilcl 
trade between the United Statee end France but oould not 
participate In a more ceneral carrying trade between France and 
the reet of the world. For Britain# this would prevent France 
from taking advantage of neutz'al ships to circumvent the 
blockade imposed by the ^.rltlsh navy.
In permitting this direct trade# Britain demanded the right to 
control this tr^ ide as the price of this concession. In 
particular# Britain desired to regulate this trade through its 
own interpretation of contraband. All eides agreed that# under 
international law, the term * contraband* covered arms and other 
supplies of direct military value to an enemy. Legally Britain 
could use her seapower to prevent Finance from receiving euch 
cargoes# even if carried in neutral ships, Britain# however# 
tried to widen the range of contraband goods to cover navel 
stores and foodstuffs. Enforcement of this definition of 
contraband required the regulation of neutz^al trade through the 
imposition of blockades# and the employment of Bi^itish warships 
to stop and searoh neutral merchant vessels. Both were 
practised on a large scale by the British navy and caused much 
opposition in the United States, The ATaerioans based their case 
on two i^olnts; the restricted definition of contraband and the 
protection given to all other cargoes bound for France by the 
neutral flag of the United States, The British practice was 
regarded as an affront to the sovereignty of the United States, 
In addition to the principles Involved# the Americans took 
exception to the manne:? in which the British navy and the 
Admiralty courts enforced British policy, as these involved much 
financial loss# inconvenience and lengthy legal proceedings.
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Often American merolmnts were prepared to submit to euoh 
Inoonvenlenoes because of the high profit© from neutral trade# 
but the admlnlGtrntlon of president Thomas Jefferson# was 
unwilling to tolerate the extensive and continued abuse of the 
American flag* To Jeffei'son, the flag made the cargo neutral 
end not subject to seleure by Britain,
Internatione 1 lav/ was unolear on the types of blockade which 
could bo adopted by a belligerent. In practice# two tj^ pes of 
blookade were used by Britain; an# *open* and a * close* 
blockade, of whloh only the latter wns acceptable to the United 
States under the strict construction of the law, A ’close* 
blockade was defined as the complete closure of an enemy port 
by the physical presence of blockading warships outside it# 
thus physically preventing the flow of ships in and out of that 
port. This was an effective blockade and legal because It met 
the law’s requirement that the only permissible blockades were 
those which were effective. The complete blockade of the French 
coastline on this scale was beyond the capacity even of the 
Royal Navy, So Britain, wishing to achieve the effects of such 
a close blockade, but lacking the means to do so. Imposed an 
’open* or ’paper* blockade. Ships wcr© to be prevented from 
entering all French ports by a general system of patrols to 
intercept all vessels bound for Prance, and often long before 
reaching the vicinity of French ports, Britain justified this 
by saying that this type of ’open* blockade conformed to 
international law because the frequency of Dritleh patrols 
made interception of ships a strong possibility and, therefore, 
that such a blockade was effective„ The United States* 
position was that this was only an excuse to justify British 
abuses of American rights, and that such actions were illegal 
because of the lack of an effective ’close* blockade.
—  12 —
The main method by which France, and her European Lillies, tried 
to circumvent the Britioh ban on their colonial trade wag to 
allOT/ the entry of neutral ships into the carrying trade between 
the colonies and the mother country; a trade from which foreign 
©hips were banned In peacetime, under mercantilist doctrine.
This laaue had arisen in earlier war© in the eighteenth century 
and to counter thie# Britain had promulgated the ’Rule of 1756’, 
by which all trade© normally closed in peacetime could not be 
opened to neutral© in wartime. The absence of a ©iaeable neutral 
in previous war© had led to acquie©ence of the Brltieh doctrine. 
The colonial trade, however, wa© lucrative and brought in 
eeaential supplie© of tropical goods, such a© sugar, emd the 
United States had a large mercantile marine and an ambitious 
merchant clas©, geographically close to the principal French rnd 
Spanish colonies in the Carribean and South America. The outbrc'-fl? 
of war in 1793 permitted large-scale American entry into the 
oolonlal carrying trade against which Britain retaliated by 
Issuing severe Orders in Gouncil 1793-4. The Americar government 
did not accept the ’Rule of 1756’ and tried to overcome it# not 
00 much by trading directly between these colonies and Europe, 
but by exi3ortlng the colonial produce via American port© in 
American ships. Under this concept of a ’broken voyage*, French 
colonial goods would be made neutral by landing at and reshlpment 
from an American port. At first this practice we© reluctantly 
accepted by Britain and was even given legal ©uppcrt in the 
'Polly* decision In 1800,
The colonial carrying trade was an Important source of resentment 
on both sides between 1793 the Orders in Oounoll in 1807, 
not only because it involved interpretation© of international law 
and strategic needs, but also because of greed, envy and
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particular eoonomlo interests. The value of this trade# which
accounted for nearly one-third of all American exporte between 
1 7 9 0 and 1814* made American merchants very reluctant to give 
It up. The prosperity of the trade and the strong compétition 
which It gave vo the Brltiah West Indies created pressure on 
the British government to take a harsh view of this 
circumvention of the British blockade. Because of American 
pressure after 1794* the British government refi*alned from so 
doing until 1805 when internal pressure and the demands of the 
war led to a reversal in the 'Essex' decision. 8 0 # unlike 
other restrictions on American trade, this one was mitigated 
in practice for most of the early years of the war with prance.
Differences effecting American rights and property were 
embittered by what the United States regarded as an unwarranted 
interference with the liberties of it© oltisens: impressment. 
The British navy needed ships and crews in Increasing numbers 
as the war against Prance became more intense. This demand was 
not diminished by the victory in 1805 at Trafalgar: the navy 
had to be maintained and losses and wastage of manpower 
replaced. Most of the recruits for the harsh conditions of 
British naval service came from the press-gang and from the 
impressment of seamen from British merchant ships. The harsh 
conditions led to desertions which, together with the fear of 
impressment and the high wages on American ships# created a 
flow of British seamen into American employment. The need to 
block this drain of trained manpov/er led to tlie impressment 
of seamen# American as well as British, from ships flying the 
flag of the United States.
International law lacked a proper definition of oitisenship. A
large percentage of the citizen© of the United States were of
14 —
recent Brltleh origin. The American government ;^ ook the view 
that an Immigrant who became a citizen of the i^ epiiblic# ov/ed 
his allegiance to the United States, and that by so doing* he 
Bsvered all legal ties and obllgatlone with hla country of bMh, 
This view was not accepted by the British government which 
contended that e British subject could not renounce his 
allegiance to the Crown and, furthermore, that I'csldence In the 
United States, or employment on board an American ship did not 
give him protection from his obligations to the Grovm, As a 
new nation trying to establish Its sovereignty, and composed of 
oitlsens of many origins, the United States was determined to 
oppose the British doctrine and practice of impressment. 
Impressment, In American eyes, was a gross Infringement of 
sovereignty. The legal difficulties were com%)ounded by the 
widespread inability, in the absence of legal proof, to make a 
distinction between Americans and Britons. Indopendence hcd 
been too recent to permit the emergence of a man who was 
reoognisably American by his speech and imnnero. The practical 
effect of these difficulties was the forcible impressment of 
Americans into the British navy^ Britain justified her stand by 
pointing to the lack of proof of citizenship, the practical 
difficulties at sea, the British view of citizenship, and, abov< 
all, pleaded the necessity of maintaining a strong nnval power 
with which to fight Prance, whose power endangered both the 
United States and Britain.
The issue of impressment was brought constantly to the attentioi 
of the American public by the seemingly insatiable demands of tl 
British navy, and the fr'oquency with which this practice 
involved American ships and c/tlzens. This created much
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bitterness, especially when Americans were Impressed wlt3iln 
eight of the American coast: It was a visible abuse of American 
national sovereignty and llbertleSp whloh nearly led to war 
over the 'Ghesapeake' Incident In 1807#
British policy on American commerce was not applied 
consistently between 1793 *^ nd 1807* because of the reaulremonte 
of the and the need to retain American friendship, and.
pressure from the United Btates over British regulation of the 
colonial carrying trade. A ipattem emerges of initial severity 
3.793-4, followed by a more tolerant policy after the Jay Sreaty 
The renewal of v/ar with PrEince In 1803 leads to new demands 
and a much harsher policy by 1803»
The colonial carrying trade followed this pattern most closely. 
The Initial American entry into the commerce of the French West 
Indies led to the savez*e British Orders in Cotmoil In June and 
November 1793 &:ind in January 1794# The strong manner in which 
these 0%'ders were implemented created American demands for actj^ 
against Bz*ltain# In March 1794 Congress passed ^ one month 
embargo on foreign shipping which was later extended by one 
month, mere were threats of even more serious reaction# but 
AleiS^nder Hamilton v;as able to oalm the Americans by bringing
p
aboizt the appointment of Jolm Jay as minister to Britain, " This 
reaction led to a relaxation of British policy, Thereafter, 
Great Britain tolerated American %)articipation in the rich 
carrying trade of the French F^ nd Spanish colonies,provided it 
conformed to the doctrine of the 'broken voyage'; an attitude 
A'hlch was given legal approval In the 'Polly' case in 1000,^
2, J.G.Miller. :mg.JMfa2ii§î_3£a (i960), 140-154.
3. B.Popîrlns; 2ÜeJl£iâ-J^2Ei£2Sfe^aLlL.(1555),88-89,183.
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This relaxatioxi had ®eve3?al Important effecte on American publie 
opinion wMoh influenced their views of the later trend back to 
more eevere measureB. Tolerance encouraged extensive American 
Involvement in the colonial trede# generating much wealth for 
Amf^rlcan marchante. In 1790* Amez'lcan exports to la tin American 
had amoimted to ^6*3 million* but by 1800, this had grown to 
^23*3 million: moat of these export© oonslated of foodstuffs 
required by all West Indian oolonlee# and some re-exports of 
Brltieh menufaoturea. More Important wae the American re-export 
trade in colonial goode to Europe. Americans had a financial 
stake in thie trade and an expectation of further growth under 
British tolerance; hence their bitternees at the reversal of 
Britiah policy from 1805# They claimed that British tolerance 
had undermined the moral and legal position of the 'Rule of 1756' 
w3iich they did not accept anyway,^ Thle American bltterneee v/ae 
paralleled by growing British enyy at American sucoeee. This 
was instrumental In reversing British policy from 1805,
American success in the colonial trade gave rise to demands by 
British shipping end West Indian intereots for the reimposition 
of the 'Rule of 1756'.'^ British shipowners feared' not only the 
loss of the colonial trade to the Americans* but also the trade 
with Europe itself. This trade was passing into the hands of 
American shipowners whose vessels were more economical to 
operate In spite of higher labour costs. American shipping was 
slowly establishing a virtual monopoly on the North Atlantic 
trade routes. All this created n demand for the British
4# J.H.Ooatesworth; 'American Trade with the European Golonles 
in the Ca 'ribean and Houth America 1790-1812' .William and 
Mary Quarterly.1967» 243-56,
5, E.Heokshor: The Continental System (1922). 101-110
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government to use los naval power to restrict American growth and 
redress the balance In favour of BritiBii shlpownere: mercantile 
Interests looked to n^val power to restrict American growth and 
redress the balance in favour of B'-itich shipowners: mercantile 
interests looked to n val poucr to overcome their own economic 
ineffioiency. An even more po^ferful and related preeeu]?e group 
in London ’.vas the 'West India interest’ composed of merchants 
and the owners of sugar plantations living in Britain, The 
American entry into the West Indian trade enabled the P »8iich 
and Spanish islands to export to Europe in competition with the 
inferior produce from the British West Indies. Closure of trade 
with their rivals at a time of a world glut of sugar would aid 
the British West Indian trade and enable them to counterbalenee 
their inefficiency. Therefore the 'West India interest’ also 
supported a reversion to the ’Rule of 1 7 5 6’* forgetting that 
the people actually producing: the sugar in the colonies were 
heavily dependant upon supplies of food from the United States# 
and who would be hurt by any American retaliation» Therefore 
British envy and self-interest combined to create a powerful 
pressure group which demanded that the B??ltish. government use 
its Boapower to restrict American trade for their benefit. They 
found an effective spokesman in James Stephen# who put the oese 
for restriction in more general terms in hie pamphlet ’War in 
D1Bgu 1 s0 \  pub 11 shad in 1805 »
6. J » B t eph an: War in Disguise (Bond on 1805),
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Stephen argued that American commercial activities aided France 
greatly hy bringing supplies and money to France and by saving 
French shipping from British attack. The American perticipatloh 
in the colonial trade, which was closed to them in peacetime, 
was an im«*neutml commerce which would cease at the and of the 
war. Therefore, the participants In this trade could not claim 
protection as neutrals. By conforming to the idea of a * broken 
voyage® the Americans had, in effect, acknowledged end submitted, 
to the ® Rule of 1756*, and could not object if that rule was 
enforced more strictly, Stephen did not demand the complete 
ban of this trade, rather he preferred it to continue under 
strict British regulation and inspection, bo that Britain 
could control #urope*8 imports. He dismissed the fears of 
giving offence to the United States by Imposing such severe 
controls, arguing th«t a quarrel was preferable to any 
sacrifice of British, maritime rights* Besides which, the 
American demand for British goods would prevent the United 
States taking this quarrel over principle too far. Correctly 
lie Interpreted the reaction of the American merchants but 
forgot President Jefferson. 8tephen* 8 work crystallised the 
views of the 'interests* and had some Influence on the 
government because of his friendship with Spencer Perceval*
British policy, under this domestic pressure and because of the 
needs of the war, had begun to change even before Trafalgar 
and the publication of Stephen's pamphlet. The .reversal of 
British policy began with the reversal of the 'Polly* decision 
in the ' '’sae^ x* case in May 1805# The court decided that trade 
from the foreign colonies in the West Indies via American ports 
to Europe constituted a 'continuous voyage' and was thus in 
contravention of the 'riA.e of 1756® which banned such commerce. 
This decision swept away the legal protection of the American
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re-export trade and subjected it to all the controls and haaarde 
which the Royal Havj could impose on neutral trade with France 
and her allies* The trade was controlled rather than banned and 
the controls were increased in the Orders in Oounoil of 1807*
This sudden reversal of policy and the consequent threat to their 
prosperity created much alarm in the Onltodistates end reactivate* 
all the American feax»8 for their neutral rights at a time when
the increased dimensions of the turonean wa^ was leading to
s
greater vigour In the use of British seepowjr against neutral
trade* This dramatic reversal of British pbllcy began a serious
' !
deterioration in relations between the United States and Greet 
Britain. The changes began in 180$, however, did not create a 
crisis until 1807 because of a change of government In Britain, 
and because Jefferson was still determined to negotiate a 
favourable treaty through his emissaries, James Monroe and Wllllai 
Pinkney*
The death of William Pitt In January 18o6 led to the formation of 
a Whig ministry in the following month, under lord Grenville, 
with Charles James Fox at the Foreign Office, This government,
and Fox In particular, was generally conciliatory but firm 
with the United States, slowing down British naval activity, 
only adopting new measures when necessary and conducting talks 
with Monroe and Plnlaiey for a treaty which would make some 
concessions on controls but none on impressment. Despite this 
favourable attitude, the Whigs were influenced by their weak 
political position and by the need to respond to the policies of 
Hapoleon. All this only delayed tfc brec^ with the United States,
After the renewal of war, Britain had imposed blookadee on the 
81be and Weser in 1803 and on French ports in 180h* Now,in May 
1806, Fox declared an open blockade which would cover all the 
Channel ports from Oetend to the mouth of the Seine: neutral
k» 2 0  **
7.vesselG were permitted to trade outside thle coastline. This 
blockade was In retaliation for the Prussian sel&ure of Hanover 
and the Prussian ban on Imports from Britain, adopted under 
pressure from Napoleon. The effect, however, Aas to employ 
British aeapower in a manner considered objeotlopable by the 
United States: namely an# *open* blockade. After the death of 
Fox In August I8O6 attitudes hardened, Napoleon replied with 
the Berlin Decree, In November I8 0 6 , which alarmed British 
Merchants because It put Britain in a state of blockade by 
France, Ignoring the French inability to make the decree 
effective, they pushed Grenville into replying with an Order In 
Council in January 1807, which was aimed against the colonial 
trade and against European ooast&l shipping. In both trades
A
American vessels were employed extensively," The Order,together 
with earlier measures, had a cumulative effect on American 
trade which provoked American retaliation and might have 
nullified the Monroe-Pinknoy Tre&#yhad not Jefferson rejected it 
anyway# So the Whig administration, in spite of its good 
intentions, extended British power at the expense of American 
goodwill. The Whig actions tended to restrict their l^ter 
opposition to Tory policies on American trade. The Whigs fell 
from power in February 1807 and %ere replaced by a Tory or 
Pittite government under the nominal leadership of the Duke of 
Portland,
The ultimate infringement of American neutrality, the full 
operation of British maritime policies to control trade, and the 
beginnings of a large-scale sanctions policy followed In the wak* 
of this transfer of power. Dedicated to victory over France, 
the Tory administration was much less conscious of American
I: system (1922),108.
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feelings than Its predecessors It was the author of the 
Orders in Council of November 1807 which, were the most stringent 
efforts to use American trade for British vr-r and commercial 
purposes. It was the gov^ rnment in power at the time of the 
'Chesapeake* incident in which, under the nolicy of impress-ent, 
an American frigate was fired upon and boarded off the 
American coast.
The campaign for stronger measures against neutral trade arose 
partly from the need to provide effective retaliation against 
the Berlin Decree but mostly because of domestic pressure to 
regulate the obviously profitable neutral trade. The former 
remained the official reaeon, in spite of the ineffectiveness 
of that decree, end the real reason was the desire to control 
and use American shipping as an aid to the British war effort# 
British interests who resented American competition were 
placated, American neutral rights were disregarded and the 
United States made into a de facto ally#
The principal author of the November Orders in Council was the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer,Spencer Perceval, who accepted the 
advice of James Stephen and London business interests#^
Perceval presented his views to the Cabinet on October 12th,
He justified the new regulations as retaliation for the French 
action, and, although he admitted that neutrals would be harmed, 
he argued that their complaints should be directed against 
France; the neutrals* acquiescence over the Berlin Decree gave
9e PeroevaA MSS, BM Add#MSS 49,177: Writer believed to toe
Stephen, from the handwriting, to Perceval $th October 1807,
10,Perceval MSEUBM Add.MSS 49*177: Memo to Cabinet,12th October
1807.
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Britain the right to expect forbesranee of her own policy# 
Perceval's plan did not constitute a complété ban on neutral 
trade. He was aware of the undesirable poeelblllty of war 
with the United States and only wanted to use neutral commerce 
to further the economic end Btrategic interests of Britain, 
Advantage was to be taken of neutral ehlprin# to convey Brltleh 
goods into the markets of Europe by forcing neutral vessels 
to call at British norts where they would load cargoes of 
British manufactures. Perceval summed up:
"Therefore as Prance says no nation shall trade with
Great Britain,Great Britain might retaliate toy saying
1 'ithat no nation shall trade but with Great Britain,"
This meant the complete British control of American participa tien 
in the carrying trade: only direct trade between a neutral and 
France in a narrowly defined range of non-contraband goods 
would be left relatively uncontrolled.
The Oablnct*8 response revealed a range of opinion regarding
the Orders in Council. While all favoured some measure of 
retaliation, only a tew showed any regard for possible 
American reaction,  ^ Lords Hawkesbury (later Earl of 
Liverpool) and Westmorland were advocates of strong action and 
betrayed no respect for neutrals, while Lord Gastlereagh and 
George Canning a more limited policy which would show respect 
for neutral rights. But even Gastlereagh demanded control of 
the neutral participation in the carrying trade. In these 
discussions, as in all later developments of British policy, 
the abrl Bathurst as President of the Board of Trade,adopted
11, Perceval MSSpBV Add.MGB 49,177: Memo to Cabinet,12th 
0ctober,1807.
12, Papers accompanying the above Memo to the Cabinet,October
and November 1807,
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the views which were the most conciliatory to the United States, 
Bathurst wanted less use of the r ig h t  of search o f neutral 
cargoes and, after Initially favouring the Orders in Council, he 
concluded that they would not harm Napoleon and only would 
provoke quarre ls  with the Americans, He felt that the main 
object of the Orders in Council was American neutral trade since 
the retaliation against Prance was p a rt of the reasoning behind 
the Order in Council of January 1807. He beared that the 
United States would declare war and that this would harm British 
industry. However, his views were not accepted by his colleagueE 
and the Orders in Council were issued on November 11th.
So by the end of 1607# B r ita in  was applying its aeapower w ith  
vigour against American shipping, and by the practices of 
impressment blockade and control had made American shipping a 
valuable weapon in the struggle against Napoleon at the cost of 
disregarding American neutrality and sovereignty. The war made 
this justifiable in the eyes of the British government, but the 
cost was a deterioration in relations with the United States 
whose resentment and humiliation was increased. Both Britain 
and the United States recognised the strategic importance of 
American trade, British efforts to use it as a weapon led the 
United States to use that same rower against Britain in order to 
retain its prosperity, neutral rights and self-respect.
As British maritime policy was being formulated, Napoleon was 
developing his own policy with which to fight British commercial 
and maritime power: the 'Continental System*. Earlier French 
p o lic y , together with the actions taken by the French Emperor 
1806-7# suggests that his main aim was to weaken the B r it is h  
economy, and thus the war effort, ra the r than retaliation. The 
imposition of import duties on cotton goods pn 1803, the
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oon fisoa tlon  o f B r i t is h  goods in  Holland in  January 180U, and 
the c o d if ic a t io n  o f p ro h ib it iv e  auetome dutlee  in  e a rly  1806, 
a l l  ind ica ted  a French a tta ck  on the e n try  o f B r i t is h  goods
into the European markets. The B e r lin  Decree, by Imposing an 
unenforceable blockade on the British Isles, set up a self—
13
Imroeed French blockade designed to exclude B r it is h  commerce# '
Napoleon's reasons f o r  setting up the Continental System have
been the subject of some d ispu te . A fte r  Trafalgar,French
seepower could no longer threaten Britain,. Economic warfare
was the only way in which the military master of Europe could
harm Britain and thereby cause the removal of the British
blockade against France. In  a d d itio n , the French economy would
be urotacted against British competition in Europe. Napoleon
d id  not Intend to starve B r ita in  in to  surrender; hie sales
la te r  o f French g ra in  to  B r ita in  and h is  lack  o f seapower and
hie concentration of re s tr ic t io n s  upon British exports suggest 
litthis. Nor was i t  a mere theatrical gesture designed to reduce
IK
the British policy of a paper blockade to an a bsu rd ity . The
mercantilist idea of inducing a. drain of bullion from Britain 
by cutting off her export markets had some basis but it was 
not the hard core o f French p o lic y ; Europe was not B rita in *B  
solo market. Support for this view comes from the harsh 
f is c a l  measures which Napoleon o ften  imposed as p a rt o f the
C ontinenta l System, The reason I'or this la y  in  his need for
money to finance h is  campaigns ra the r than in economic doctrine. 
B u llio n  wuB flo w in g  out of B r ita in  a f te r  1806 but th is  ^as the
- - - - - - - - 1 II,I I ,   ...........................MIIIJ]! . . . I  , 1  . „  M
13, The history of the Continental Bystem can be found In; 
i.HeckGher; The Continental System (1922)
F.Melvin; Napoleon's Navigation System (1919)
14, J.n.lose; Napoleonic studies (1904),
15, E.EecksherïThe Continental System (1922), 92
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result of the requirements of thl| Peninsular War. Therefore,
Napoleon*B basic aim was to turn the British export markets In 
Europe into a weapon for substantially weakening the British war 
effort. Such a nolioy was based on two false assumptions: 
firstly, Britain’s absolute dependence on European markets for 
her exports? and secondly, Napoleon*s ability to keep the ports 
of Europe closed. The latter was achieved rarely and Napoleon’s 
efforts In Spain,Russia and elsewhere to enforce the Bystem 
contributed to his ultimate downfall*
In 1807, the Berlin Decree was reinforced, by the Warsaw Decree 
and the Milan Decree* From the Polish city. In January, the 
French leader ordered the confiscation of all British goods In 
northern Germany while the decree Issued in Milan in November 
and December a recognition of the extended boundaries of the
French Empire and a retaliation for the Orders In Oounoil, The 
latter tried to control American shipping in order to force 
British goods into Europe. The second ^il&n decree unleashed 
French privateers and declared th t any neutral ship which 
conformed to the British regulations was "denationalised" and, as 
a consequence* subject to capture and confiscation by the French. 
All this wee part of Napoleon*8 main aim of stopping British
exports, and in this task the French Cmperor was not prepared to
1 6respect the rights of the United Btates,"'
The french efforts at economic warfare involved the abuse of the
rights of the United Otates just as much as the British exercise 
of seapower, but the uffacta on American opinion were different.
16* E.Recksher: The C ontinenta l ByBtem (1922). 122-126,
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France d id  not p ra c tice  Impreasment o f Amei*lcan aeamen end many 
o f her decrees could he enforced on ly  % lth ln  French co n tro lle d  
porte  where ships were norm ally subject to  French m unicipal laws 
ra th e r than the In te rn  t io n a l l&ü which app lied  on the high aeae. 
The United Ut&tee government o ften  chose to  regard French actions 
In  th is  l ig h t  w hile  demanding her f u l l  in te rn a tio n a l r ig h ts  from 
B r ita in ,  Nevertheless* the M ilan Decree posed a th re a t to  
American n e u tra l i ty  toy denylyig the p ro te c tio n  %lilch the American 
f la g  gave to  American sh ips, While o ther abuses such as d en ia l o f 
en try  in to  porta  could be to le ra te d  th is  la t t e r  could no t. In  
theory, th e re fo re , French d isregard o f .American r ig h ts  was the sami 
aa th a t o f B r ita in :  n eu tra l r ig h ta  were to be Ignored and n e u tra l 
commerce used as r to o l o f economic w arfare . In p u rs u it o f th is  
p o lic y , French v io la tio n s  o f American n e u tra l i ty  and the number 
o f seizures o f ships were as g rea t, i f  not g reater than those by 
A r l ts ln ,  Between 1803 and 1812, B r ita in  seized a to ta l o f 917 
American sh ips: but o f these on ly 389 were coatured a f te r  November 
1807. France, on the o ther hand, took 558 in  the same period o f 
which no fewer than 352 were seized a f te r  the B e r lin  Decree, 
B r i t is h  actions had greater Impwct on the United States than those 
o f France. French a c tio n , although capric ious , was less frequent 
and under a m unicipal law which the United Ftates rcoepted. In 
co n tra s t, B r i t is h  abuses o f American sovereignty had been frequen t, 
widespread, and in  American eyes, g ross ly  arrogant and h ig h ly  
v is ib le ;  B r it is h  in te rce n tio n s  and impressments had taken place
17. B.P.:.):>kina: fgolQSHe %o .VJar ,(1961)„ 72; aom-oo to Congress,
6th  J u ly ,1812, quoted from American S tate papers.
Z a ro iis ^ e le t lo ito , v o l . I l l , 583-585
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within sight of the American coast, culminating in the 
*Chesapeake* incident,
British trade with the United States was valu.hie to American 
merchants and the United States government had employed patient 
diplomacy to counter the increasing pressure from British 
maritime power. The failure of tha t diplomacy, the British 
actions in 1807 and the b e lie f  in British vulnerability to 
economic coercion led to demands fo r  action on the part of the 
United States government. This had been forecast already in 
the unenforced Non-Importation Act of 1806 against Britain,
Since both belligerents had been acting in a cavalier fashion 
against American shipp ing, President Jefferson decided in 
December 1807 to turn the economic power which both coveted and 
abused against B r ita in  and Prance in order to protect and uphold 
American n e u tra l rights. He put forward the proposal for an 
embargo. Intended to be an impartial measure o f protection and 
coercion, the Embargo Act, together v/ith the re-activated 
Non-Im portation A ct, was an anti-British measure. The power 
whose policy had been more constant and visible and who was the 
more vu lnerable  to sanctions was the main target of th is  
positive American entry into the growing economic struggle 
between the two .powers in Europe,
In 1793 Washington's administration decided upon a policy of 
strict neutrality in order to protect and preserve the 
independence and the se cu rity  o f the United States. The 
Americans relied on the European préoccupation with the war 
and on their own diplomacy to exploit that situation in the
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In te rc a ts  o f Amerloanj and, from 1793 the dlplomsits o f tho
IfiUnited States achieved some Important GUCceeaeG*' By 1807# 
however, diplomacy aeemed Inadequate to  meet the new ecale o f 
economic w arfare. The United States had kept out o f the war hut 
had fa i le d  to  prevent the constant v io la t io n s  o f her n e u tra l i ty .  
The n e u tra l i ty  which wac designed to  p ro te c t independence had 
fa i le d .  The succoGGes achieved' by American Gtatesmen wore o f 
great long-torm  Importance fo r  the United s ta tes  but were 
unre la ted to  the Immediate problems poaed by the war In  Europe* 
Jay’ e Treaty had led to  the B r it is h  m il i ta r y  withdrawal from the 
North West and Pinckney*8 Treaty had c la r i f ie d  r ig h te  o f
paaaage on the MiaslGGlppl. Most spectacular o f a l l ,  wa& the 
purchase o f Louisiana In  1803 from Napoleon. Adm itted ly Jay’ e 
Treaty had achieved some minor B r i t is h  oanceseiona and a more 
to le ra n t a tt itu d e  on the p a rt o f B r ita in ,  but I t  had taken an 
undeclared naval war 1797*99 to  obta in  s im ila r  resoect from 
France, N e ither step had solved the problems created by 
American n e u tra l i ty  and n e ith e r had Induced any basic changes In  
the m aritime p o lic ie s  o f the b e llig e re n ts . The new outbreak o f 
war in  1803 and the in te n s if ic a t io n  o f economic warfare on ly  
served to  underline the fa i lu r e  of American diplomacy* This lack 
o f success culminated in  the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty*
James Monroe and William Pinkney were instructed to obtain a 
treaty in which Britain would promise to respect American rights
18, The d ip lom atic  h is to ry  o f the United States in  th is  period  
is described best in;*
B. Perkins : (1855 )
B.Porklns; Prologue to  War (1961)*: Bïa^ ô Ji iap® iJô-savÆftt>iaa  ^ •*
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by doGlGtlng from employing maritime p ractloea  euel 86 
blookedes, seiaureB and impressment* N egotia tions %lth 
f r ie n d ly  Whig adm in is tra tio n  fa ile d  to  ob ta in  anything more 
than some B r i t is h  oan#@s8lon8 on the opera tion  of the 
blockade, B r ita in  made no concesslona on ImprcBament or on 
the ba&lo p r in c ip le s  of her maritime p o lic y , and said nothing 
on Impressment. JefferBon* the re fo re , refuoed to  submit the 
tre a ty  fo r  r a t i f ic a t io n  by the Senate, S h o rtly  th e re a fte r 
the Tories returned to  po^er* This fa i lu r e  o f diplomacy 
contributed to a combination o f feelings ; of nationalism, 
resentment, f ro e tre t io n  and h u m ilia tio n * In  thio type o f 
atmosphere there wa8 a demand fo r  a new type o f p o lic y  to  
uphold United States* in te re s ts , Je ffe rson  chose economic 
annotions ra th e r than war which most AmericanG were c a ll in g  
for* in 160?!'^
The United States had need both sanctions and naval fo rce  
before but In  1807 e&nctione were the on ly n lL e rn rt iv e  to 
continued n a tio n a l h u m ilia tio n . This cas th^ i :G u lt  o f 
the vIewG o f Thomas Je ffe rson . An id e a lis t  dedicated to  
the ore&tion o f a new democratic repub lic  in  Forth  America, 
fre e  from a l l  but commercial lln k e  w ith  the Old World, 
Je ffe rson  t r ie d  to  transform  h ie  idea le  in to  p o l i t ic a l  
r e a lity *  In  domestic a f fa ir s  th is  meant minimal government, 
power in  the hands o f the m a jo rity * low taxes and no 
permanent m il i ta r y  establishm ent. In  th is  fash ion the
19$ fo r  Lhe background on the development o f the idea o f
economic sanctions In  the United S tates, see -
h ,r , fe a rs :  JeffePGpn &nd tne ümberao (1927)
W. Jem lags;  (1921)
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the l ib e r t ie s  o f the in d iv id u a l could be a tta in e d  by a 
democratic system, To p ro te c t th ie  growing democracy, 
Je ffe reon wanted peace, n e u tra l i ty  and no entangling 
a lliances# He was very conscious o f the experimental nature 
o f American democracy* Facing the clamour o f war a f te r  the 
fa i lu r e  of diplomacy in  1007, Je ffe rson  chooe a course o f 
a c tion  more su ita b le  to  h\8 ide a ls  and the cne moat su itab le  
to  the r e a l i t ie s  o f the American s itu a t io n . RubmiaGlon was 
unthinkable mo th i#  would throw away a l l  the gains o f 
Independence and war was re jec ted  by the p res iden t who 
abhorred h o s t i l i t ie s  which would be equa lly  dangerous by 
em bro iling the United Gtatcs in  the ambitions o f Europe*
War was not poss ib le  in  1807 anyway because o f American naval
weakness and the maritime strength  o f B r ita in *  Je ffe rson  had 
been responsible fo r  th is  lack  o f naval s trength* The strong 
naval fo rce  b u i l t  by President Adame to  uphold American r ig h ts  
aga inst France had been reduced to  a p o s it io n  o f Impotence* 
Je ffe rson  feared the dangers to  democracy o f a permanent 
navel establishm ent, and had been anxious to  out the tax 
burden and pay o f f  the N ational Debt and so reduced the navy 
to  the few ships necessary to  p ro te c t American vessele from 
the depredations o f the Barbary B tates, Instead o f a f le e t ,  
the United CLates wac to  be protected by a la rge  f le e t  o f 
coasta l gunboats. As a re s u lt  the United s ta tes d id  not have 
the naval power e ith e r  to  p ro te c t trade or to  harm B r ita in ,  
Naval weakness, th e re fo re , ru led  out war as a p ra c t ic a l 
a lte rn a tiv e  to  n e u tra l i ty  by law and diplom&eyp
\
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ThG use of ooonomle power was not entirely now to Amerlo&ns* 
Both Jefferson and Madison, his Secretary of State, had been
early advocates of this type of policy.' After 1783 the United 
States, to Its commercial disadvantage, h^d found Itself outside 
the British navigation laws. Consequently)' in 1789 and 1791
MMdison had r u t  forward plans fo r  dlBcrlm^n to ry  du ties against 
B r i t is h  ships and /oods In  order to  fo rco  ^com m ercia l tre a ty  
on B r ita in ,  ob ta in  B r it is h  compliance w ith  thq^l7#3 peace 
tre a ty , and ob lige  B r ita in  to  e s ta b lish  normal d ip lom atic  
re l& tio n s  w ith  the United r t& te c , Although su ccess fu lly  opposed 
by Alexander Hamilton, Secretary c f the Treasury, these 
proposals d id  in flu e nce  B r ita in  to send r m in is te r to  the
United s ta tes in  17S1, ^nd helped to  croate apprehension amongst
\
B r it is h  morchantSp which the growing commercial s treng th  o f the 
United States d id  noth ing to  eb^te. In 1793? In  & rep o rt on 
fo re ig n  trade , Je ffe rson  expressed support fo r  the idea o f 
commercial r e ta l ia t io n  to  p ro te c t American r ig h ts *
The successful th re a t o f sanction# played a p e rt in  the decis ion  
to  send John Jay to  B r ita in  in  1794. This created an im portant 
precedent fo r  Je ffe rson  W t the im position  of a one month 
embargo had been too short fo r  i t s  p ra c t ic a l e ffe c ts  to  be 
known* F a m ilia r ity  w ith  the Idea and ^ i th  pi a t successes were 
kept e llv e  in  the years a f te r  1794 when Je ffe rson  repeated h is  
vlewe in  1801* In  180$, Madison resta ted  h is  fa i th  in  the use 
o f commercial r e ta l ia t io n  as #n "In term edia te  between
submission and wao-r^îf
20. I.B^ant: James Madison, Secretary of State (1933)397-399
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)mpt "I
the Non-Imnortatlon Act of 1806,
The first major attem to put eoonomi# preeaurG on Britain was
21
Thia WB8 a reeponee to the
’ Esaex* decis ion  and Po%*8 blockade o f Ma^ 1806* Pasaed in  
November 1606, it was in operation fo r  on ly  one month before 
being Bueponded as & re s u lt c f preneure frcM  American merchanta 
who had suffered from the abrupt lose o f trade* They objected 
a lso  to  the am bigu ities In  the a c t. The measure was limited in 
In te n tio n  "a . e l l  as In  e ffe c t.  I t  d id  not co n s titu te  a to ta l  
ban on importe from B r ita in ,  Only a se le c tio n  o f goods* such as 
woollens were invo lved* Other commodities, Guch.ee cotton  
te x t i lc a ,  metal goods and tro p ic a l produce, were s t i l l  admitted* 
The se t a recogn ition  o f the importance o f the American 
ezuort market fo r  the B r lt le h  economy* but th is  re a lis a t io n  was 
tempered by the American need fo r  B r i t is h  manufactured goods.
The act remained in suspension until December 1807 when it was 
put in to  operation along w ith  the Embargo Act, Even so, a 
revised vers ion  d id  no t pass u n t i l  February 1606, and th is  d id  
not become effective until June o f that year. Its commercial 
effects tended to be obscured by the operation o f the Embargo 
Act, I t  did not nrevont the attack on the 'Chesapeake* and I t  
seems to have pleyad no nnrt in  deterring the Issue o f the 
orders in Council In November 1807,
Je ffe rso n 's  p r in r l r a l  e f fo r t  a t sanctions was the Embargo Act 
which was enacted In  180? and remained in  fo rce  u n t i l
March 1809. In  alms, scale and dura tion  th is  was the greatest 
s ing le  e f fo r t  o f the ^hcle sanctions p o lic y . In  a d d itio n
21, H,Heaton: "H on-Im porte tlon ,1806*1812" In Journal o f Economic
Milt^.MoTGrnber 1941,176-198.
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to the failure of diplomaoy* and the desire to avoid war, 
Je ffe rson  was Influenoed by repoi'te from London newspapers which 
ind ica ted  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f new B r lt le h  a c tio n  egalnat neu tra l
trade , and ^he concurrent news from Prance th a t the United States
2*:/
was not exempt from the operation o f the B e r lin  Decree, ^ On 
December 12th, newe o f the Orders in  Council reached New York 
end this nows, when It reached Washington, enabled Jefferson 
to  decide on an embargo, H1& proposal was accepted with 
e l& o r lty  by Congresa and the Embargo Act took e ffe c t on December 
2 1 s t,1807.
Je ffe rson  honed to  rchleve American eime by co n fin ing  the 
American merchant f le e t  to  po rt* This would nerve two aurpoeee; 
p ro te c t the shlpe o f the United Stmteo from fu r th e r  v io la tio n s *  
and fo rce  the two maritime b e llig e re n ts  to  change th e ir  p o lic ie s  
by dep riv ing  them of American shipping and trade . P rim a rily  
defensive In I te  aims, as Jefferson had intended, it proved to 
be coercive end a n t l- B r i t ls h .  I t  was defensive and coercive 
in  a negative mamier, Withdrawal o f American ohlpplng would 
p ro te c t vessels and n e u tra l r ig h ts , but th is  was to  be achieved 
through the Im p l ic i t  renuncia tion  o f one major n e u tra l r ig h t :  
the l ib e r ty  o f a n e u tra l to  trade f re e ly  anywhere. As B r ita in  
and. France had wanted to  use Amorlc&n sh ipp ing, the ac t would 
operate n eg a tive ly  to  p ro te c t American shipping D&m th e ir  
actions by w ithdraw a l. A t the same time pressure would be
oo I.Brant; James Madison,Secretary of State (1953),393-395.
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put on the b e llig e re n ts  by depriving  them of th e ir  Intended
weapon*
The effect of this negative coercion was more harmful to 
Britain than to Prance* The French would loce the benefit of 
uGing American vessels In the colonial carrying trade* but the 
value of this hid bcon diminishing elnco the 'Eosex* daclelon* 
British naval power now had the French host Indies at its meroy 
also. The Borlln Deere# hod been an essentially negative 
effort to frighten American merchants Into non-co-operation 
with Britain, rather than an attempt by France to employ 
American shipping for mere positive ends. The -mbargo achieved 
the same French aims more effectively. As ' coercive measure, 
the Cmborgo would effect Fritrin negrtively positively. 
Brltoi# had intended to use American shlpninp to force DrltisA 
goods into European markets. Withdrawal of American ships would 
mrhe this task more difficult end less profitable. Trade 
bet.een the United ftates and Britain was dominated by American 
vessels. Hero the Embargo would have  ^positive effect for 
Britain, In /rder &o maintain trading links? would have to 
supply ships from her ^Iready over-stretched resources,It 
was hoped that the loss of Forth Am'riemn trade would h a m  the 
Britlrh economy .-and so create pressure within Britain for the 
government to change its maritime policies In favour of the 
Unltrd States* This positive action was limited by practical 
considerations which tend to sho^ the basically defensive 
noture of the Embargo, Only American ships were withdrawn,
Trade did not cease ccr.Eetely ci British shine could still 
bring In those eommcdlticQ not banned by the Non^lmportatlon
Act.
However, enforcement of the embargo aae defendant upon the 
a b i l i t y  o f the American government to keep American veoaele in  
p o rt and to  convince American morchanto th a t th e ir  loss o f 
p ro f i ts  would be made worthwhile by the expected B r it is h  
concessions. This wrs to  prove tc be the "A c h ille s  H e l"  or the 
embargo p o lic y . For domestic p o l i t ic a l  reamers the p o s it iv e  
ra th e r than the defensive aspects of the Embargo Act were tressed 
by Je ffe rso n , g iv ing  r io e  to  hopes o f m speedy e ffe c t on the 
B r it lo h  government. The economic losGeo, the fa i lu r e  o f any 
change o f B r i t is h  p o lic y  to  m anifest i t a e l f ,  and tha coercion 
which Je ffe rson  had to  use to  enforce the hmbargo, to r t th e r  w ith  
the v i r tu a l  abd ica tion  o f leadership by Je ffe rson  In  the w in te r 
o f 1808*9, led to  the repeal o f the Act In  Esrch 1809. American 
pressuros ra the r than la c :  o f success aga inst B r ita in  hrd ended 
the most extensive experiment in  économie sanctions. Before a 
study o f the p o l i t ic a l  and economic e ffe c ts  of' the embargo on 
B r ita in  Is  made, the commercial p o s itio n  o f both the United 
Qtates and Great B r ita in  w i l l  be examined to  determine the tra d in g  
pattex%e, strengths and waaknesses o f each.
Thus, by the end o f 1807, a l l  three coun tries sere using measures 
o f economic re g u la tio n  and coercion, B r ita in  and France as p a r t 
o f th e ir  respective  war e f f o r t , and the United States to  p ro te c t 
I t s  r ig h ts  and Independence. The l in k  betv.een a l l  three p o lic ie s  
was the le g a l and p ra c t ic a l s ta tus , value and u t i l i t y ,  oY the 
m ercantile  marine r.nd fo re ig n  tredc o f the United States o f 
America.
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OHAPTEH TWO
THE PATTERN OF AMERICAN TRADE
From the e a r ly  1790*8 the fo re ig n  trade of the United States grew 
rapidly in value of exports, imports and in tonnage employed. The 
requirements of the war in Europe created a demand for American 
ships and produce v/hich the enterprising American merchants were 
eager to  provide. American domestic produce# colonial re-exports# 
and ships to carry the increased trade and replace belligerent 
vessels, were in heavy demand. Furthermore# neutrality gave 
businessmen the incentive and opportunity to invest money and effort 
to obtain the profits of wartime trade. This growth was encouraged 
toy the demand from the growing population of the United States, s t i l l  
largely agrarian, for manufactured goods, especially from Britain#
In turn, the needs of British industry for cotton continued to grow 
and war© met from American sources* Independence had left the 
United States with empty shipyards and the need for a merchant navy* 
Investment, especially after 1793» created this fleet. Thus 
American commerce wa«r of growing national and in te rn a tio n a l 
importance. In addition to growth, the two most obvious features of 
American commerce were the continued links with Britain and the 
normally adverse balance of visible tra d e . This latter was more 
than balanced by high •invisible earnings*. In much greater detail 
th is  chapter will outline the general pattern of American trade so
1
that the potential and actual impact of sanctions can be assessed.
1* The most useful treatments of American economic history in the 
early nineteenth century are:
O.Hettele: The Emergence of a National Economy 1775-1615, (1962), 
B.C.North: The Economic Growth of the United States 1790-1660.
(1961)
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The Balance of American Trade 1790-1815.
The normally adverse trading balance, with the exceptions of 1813 
and 1813; can be seen in the fo llo w in g  table#
f a b l e T h e  Aiaerloan Trading Balance 1790*1815^
( all values expressed In millions of dollars).
Exp^orte Imports Balance
1790 0 20.20 m 0 23.00 m - 2*60 m
1791 If.00 2f#20 - 10*20
1792 20*75 31.50 - 10.75
1793 26.11 31.10 - 4,99
17% 33.03 34.60 - 1,57
1796 6 7I0 6 ail# I 1 4 138
i:li 11:11 : '?:li
1 7 9 9 78.66 79.06 - 0.41%
I Z  I I Û Î  I t M  : i:l?
1804 77.69 85.00 - 7.31
1805 95.56 1 2 0 .6 0  - 25.0/4.
1806 101.53 129./+0 - 27.87
1807 108.34 138.50 - 30.16
1808 22.43 56.99 - 34.56
1809 52.20 59.40 » 7.20
1810 66,75 -89^#«fit» • ÔS540 «if
1811 61.32 53.40 7.92
itil i?:i B:?S * 1:S|
1814 &#SA 12,97 — 6*05
1815 52.55 113.00 - 60,45
The changes In the balance of trade genemlly compris© periods 
of small imbalances interspersed with a few years of substantial 
deficits* The years before 1807 show a much more favourable 
situation than that which prevailed during the years of 
sanctions and regulations. The large deficits of 1791-2 of
2* Export data from A8PGW 1 , Import data from Hecksher,
The^Oontinejatal 8ymtem.l46, and from NettelaTmergencG of a 
mamonal Economy, A different set of import"figures'"I's 
in North, loonomic growth of the United States,228-9. but 
this shows the same variations in the''haïahce "of trade*
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about eleven m illio n  d o lla rs  In  each year are fo llow ed by much 
sm aller d e f ic i ts  1793*^ because o f the upsurge o f exports a t the 
time o f the outbreak o f war and the inven tion  o f the co tton  g in . 
The American en try  In to  the co lo n ia l trade would have l i t t l e  
e f fe c t  on the balance as re-exports  would cancel out Imports*
A tim e-lag  o f two years takes place before the p r o f i ts  from the 
h igher le v e l o f exports are trans la ted  in to  a s im ila r  upward 
surge o f imports* The three years fo llo w in g  the Jay T rea ty, 
1793-7» are poor years In  s p ite  o f the continued growth o f 
exports , w ith  the g rea test d e f ic i t  in  1793* The sluggishness 
o f trade 1797-99 is  probably a re f le c t io n  o f the u n ce rta in tie s  
o f the navel war w ith  France* From 1798 to  1004 the adverse 
balance is  r e la t iv e ly  sm all, except in  1800-1 when the r is e  in  
exports is  matched by an even greater r is e  in  Im ports, 
co in c id in g  w ith  the settlem ent o f d i f f i c u l t ie s  w ith  France and 
the B r it is h  approval o f the c o lo n ia l trade in  the 'P o lly *  case. 
The re la tio n s h ip  between commercial growth and war is  seen in  the 
f a l l  in  exports and import© in  1802-3» the b r ie f  period o f peace 
in  Europe, which a lso  sees a re turn  to  sm all d e f ic its *
There was u su a lly  a la rge  adverse balance of trade 1803-13, 
except in  1009,1011, and 1813-14. This would in d ica te  th a t 
economic warfare a ffe c te d  exports more than imports* The data 
fo r  the years of the Embargo Act in d ica te  th a t sanctions probably 
made a negative co n trib u tio n  to the balance by fo s te r in g  the 
considerable improvement in  1809* The sanctions would be f e l t  
f i r s t  in  exports, which dropped by e ig h ty -s ix  m ill io n  d o lla rs  in  
1800 and rose by t h i r t y  m ill io n s  in  1009* Imports d id  not 
Improve by any n oticeab le  amount in  1009; the Embargo Act was 
repealed half-w ay  through the f is c a l year and time must be 
allowed fo r  B r it is h  exporters to  react to  the news. The small
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favourable balances o f 1811 and 1813 are a lso  the re s u lt  o f 
sanctions and war. In  1811 the Non-Im portation Act was in  fo rce  
during the l a t t e r  h a lf  o f the f is c a l  year and th is  would account 
fo r  the drop o f th ir ty -o n e  m ill io n s  in  imports w ith  no 
corresponding drop in  exports# In  1813» the favourable balance 
means l i t t l e  because o f the d ra s tic  drop in  trade which fo llow ed 
the outbreak o f war w ith  B r ita in *
This tab le  shows th a t the greater the u n c e rta in tie s  o f war, the 
la rg e r  the adverse tra d in g  balance, and ind ica tes  the grea ter 
impact of war on American exports* In  spit©  o f the adverse balance 
and the war, and perhaps because o f the war, American trade 
increased considerably between 1790 and 161$, i l lu s t r a t in g  the 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f American e f fo r ts  to  meet the demands fo r  trad© 
and shipping* W ithout the p r o f its  from ' in v is ib le  earnings* the 
adverse balance might have discouraged th is  expansion.
.American Exporta*
The gradual r is e  in  exports in  the e a rly  1790*8 was fo llow ed by a 
su b s ta n tia l r is e  in  the export o f domestic produce in  1795 and a 
very s im ila r  r is e  in  re -exports  in  1796* This suggests th a t the 
demand fo r  co tton  and th© inve n tion  of the co tton  g in  in  1793, 
together w ith  the new B r it is h  to lerance o f American p a r t ic ip a t io n  
in  the c o lo n ia l ca rry ing  trade a f te r  Jay 's  Treaty  had a considerable 
impact on American exports. This increased flo w  o f goods is  
maintained, except in  1797 when there is  a reduction  o f ten 
m il l io n  d o lla rs , and in  1798 when the recovery is  email* As 
re-exports  maintained a h igh le v e l and domestic exports f a l l ,  a 
g lu t  o r a shortage o f a commodity such as co tton  is  suggested, 
ra the r than any in te rru p tio n  as a re s u lt o f the naval war w ith  
France* W hile re -exports  played a small p a r t in  American exports
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in 1790# by 1800 they were more valuable than the export of 
Amer loan goods: the result of war and a profitable neutral trade*
The annual variation© in exports are illustrated in Table 2 below*
American Export© 1790*3.815^
(all values in millions of dollars)
Year T o ta l Exports HawJSxportB Domestic Exports
1790 j& 20.20 m 0 0.54 m 0 1 9 .6 7  m
1791 Ijf.OO 0.50 18,50
1 7 9s 20,75 1.75 1 9 .0 0
1 7 9 3 26.11 2,11 2 4 .0 0  '
1 7 9 4 33.03 6.50 26.50
1 7 9 5 47.99 8,49 3 9 .5 0
1796 67.07 26,30 4 0 ,7 6
1 7 9 7 56.85 2 7 .0 0 29.85
1798 61.53 33.00 26.53
1 7 9 9 7 8 ,6 6 4 2 .2 5 33.14
1800 70.97 39.13 31.84
1801 94.12 46.64 47.47
1802 72.48 35,76 3 6 .7 1
1803 55.80 1 3 .5 9 4 2 ,2 1
1804 77.69 36.23 41.47
1805 95.56 53.18 4 2 .3 9
1606 101.53 60,28 4 1 .2 5
1807 108,34 59.64 48.70
1808 22.43 13.00 9.43
1809 5 2 .2 0 20.80 3 1 .4 1
1810 66.75 2 4 .3 9 4 2 .3 7
1811 6 1 ,3 2 16.02 ii.5 .2 9
1812 3 8 .5 2 8.50 3 0 .0 3
1813 27. &: 2.85 2 5 .0 1
1814 0 .1 5 6.78
1815 6.58 h5.97
Thei"8 'was much more variation in exports after 1800, The large
fall In total exports In 1802 can be attributed to the temporary
poaoe in a*ropa, which hit both types of exports equally. The
export of Amsploan gooâa recovered q u lck ly  W t the re-export trade
dia not pick up until after 1803, further illustrating the
relationship of that trade to war. The renewal of war is reflected
In the doubling of total exports between 1803 and 1807. After this
2. g W J L * pp.502.%5#566#590-l,$71-2#696-7,721-3,738-9*815-6# 
9^/0# 892-3f9 6 5 - 6 . 
north* 2 2 1 .
Heckeher. Thel3bntinehtal Bystem. 146
Seybert# sia'iYatÆ 
MaegregorVQommer^ ^^  os* vol 3# 76?
Pitkin, atatietieal View. $0-56
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there le  a much stronger relationehip between variations of export 
totals and economic controls* Relaxation of sanctions in. 1609*10 
produced a r is e  in exporte w h ils t the embargo of 1807*9» sanctions 
1811-12# and war 1812-lA all coincide with decreases* Re-exports 
continued to be very valuable u n t i l  the impact of British controls# 
sanctions# and# more important# mm th© decline continued after 1808# 
the loss of French colonies to Britain, end the alliance o f Spain# 
Portugal and Britain eliminated much o f this once prosperous trade* 
That the re-export trade was a wartime phenomenon ia. seen in its 
failure to recover in 181$# when domestic exjports were restored 
to their pre-lSl2 level#
Is  there a general upward trend in exports 1790-181$? Averaged out 
for ©tioceseive f iv e  year periods, the annual f ig u re s  show an inoreaai 
which is dramatic in  the 1790*s and then slows down considerably 
between 1800 and 1810 # and then drops by AO per cent during 
1811-lA before peace begins a recovery in  181$*
M
SâÈ3iâ*,5 
1790-9A 0 23*82 m illio n s
1798*99 "
1800-0A 74*21 "
1809-09 76*01 "
1810-13 44.27 **
On the whole# the export of American produced goods is less prone to 
drastic variation than the re-export trade: indicating greater 
freedom from wartime influences and a more permanent basis for 
growth# This is  seen in the comparative smallness o f the annual 
changes* in the 1790*s there are only two period© of sharp change: 
the rise in 179$# possibly the re s u lt  of the demand fo r  cotton, 
and the fall in 1797# possibly due to an oversupply of cotton#
After this a slow recovery Is made until 1801 when the dispute
4# Tables 3 - 9  are based on the figures in Table 2#
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w ith  France ends* The e ffe c ts  are n u l l i f ie d  by the Peace o f 
Amiens# Therea fte r there is  a period o f growth and s ta b i l i t y  
u n t i l  1607, a f te r  which the e ffe c ts  o f war and sanctions are 
more evident# Peace brings a su b s ta n tia l recovery in  1613* 
This s te a d ie r p a tte rn  o f domestic exports is  i l lu s t r a te d  by 
the average annual exports fo r  f iv e  year periods# The r is e  
and dec line  o f the re -expo rt trade is  c le a r ly  i l lu s t ra te d  a lso* 
Table h Î Average Annual Domestic. Exports and Re-Exports#
Domestic Exporte Ra-Exoorts
1790-94 23*32 m #  2*23 m
1795-99 34*33 26*00
1800-04 39.94 34*27
1805-09 34.63 43.38
1810-14 29.89 10.38
The re -expo rt trade ?/as m ainly a flo w  o f c o lo n ia l goods to
Europe, bu t n ea rly  o n e -th ird  consisted o f B r i t is h  manufactures
a
bound fo r  the West Indies# In  1802-1804, out o f a to ta l  o f 
£6*4 m illio n s  re -exported , the United State© sent £2 .2  
m illio n s  o f B r it is h  manufactures to  the Garribean* Coffee, 
sugar, te a , peppers, cocoa and win© were a lso  very im portant 
items in  th is  tra d e .^
A geographical an a lys is  o f the d e s tin a tio n s  o f American 
exports shows the importance of Great B r ita in  and the B r it is h  
colonies as purchasers o f American exports. Except fo r  1809, 
which includes the la s t  s ix  months o f the Embargo A ct, B r ita in  
and her co lon ies were the most im portant customers o f the 
United S ta tes . However, several other countries were o f 
considerable importance. U n til the C ontinenta l System took
3# A ,Baring, In q u iry  in to  the Causes and Consequences o f the
Gruera in'"comicïï'. 140-1441
6* Pitkin, Statistical View. 131,
ii-3
took a ffe c t Im 1807, both Franca miû. the Hetharlands were 
major cuBtomars, w h ile  the Hans© Towns and Scandinavia were 
not im lKiportant* In  la te r  years, there was. a su b s ta n tia l 
r is e  In  exports to  Portugal and Spain, In  sp ite  o f the 
embargo, exports to  Spain in  1808 are m arg ina lly  grea te r than 
those to  B r ita in ,  w h ile  in  the years of the Peninsular War, 
exports to  the Ib e ria n  coun tries  were grea te r than those to  
the B r i t is h  empires but most o f these exports were to  support 
B r i t is h  a l l ie s  and B r it is h  troops. Attemps to  circumvent the 
O ontinenta l System and fo llo w  B r i t is h  regu la tions  are evident 
f o r  1809*10 in  the sudden r is e  of exports to  Scandinavia 
and Russia,
Table 6 ; American Reports by D estina tion  1802-18127
( in  m illio n s  o f d o lla rs )
Country m s . 1803 1804 1805 1806 M S I 1808
B r ita in  * 16.0 17.5 13.2 15.4 15.6 13.1. 3.2
B r i t is h  Bmp.' 23.9 25.3 21.8 23.0 23.2 31.0 5.1
France lk .5 8.2 12.7 21.0 16.5 19.2 4.5
Holland 5.9 5.5 16.4 17.8 20,5 17.6 2.7
Spain 11.2 4.5 6.7 12.6 14.8 18.2 5.9
Portugal 2.1 2,3 2.5 2.1 2.5 1.7 0.5
Denmark 1.7 1.9 3.3 4.0 4.1 4.5 0.4
Sweden 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.3 1.4 0.2
Hanse Towns 6.1 3.2 4.4 3.2 6.2 3.1 0.2
Russia 0.1 0.4
West Ind ies 1.2 1.7 3.3 3.5 1.7 1.5 0.4
China 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.2
Tota ls#* 72.5 55.8 77.7 95.5 101.5 108.3 22.4
 ^ includes exports to  B r ita in  as in  f i r s t  l in e ,  
îîifîî to ta l  d iffe re n t, from sum of the above countries since mlnoz 
nation© are om itted, European countries include th e ir  
colonies*
7 , A8FGB 1  pp 5 0 8 ,2 43 ,5 66 ,5 90 *1 ,6 71 *2 ,721 *3 ,7 38 -9 ,81 5 .6 ,
869*70 ,892-3 ,965-6
Macgregor ,Oommere-ial B ta t le t io s .V o l, 3,769
p.oimtCT
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IBM 18.10 mi. 1812
Britain 5*5 12.3 13 .7 6,1
B r it is h  Emp, 6 ,1 16.5 21.8 10*2
Prance ## 0 .1 2 .3 2,8
Holland 1 .3 0 .2
Spain 10,3 14 .9 12.5 9 .3
Portugal 8 .3 7 .7 11.4 9 .4
Denmark 4 .3 10.5 0 .4 0 .1
Sweden 9 .1 7 .9 1 .6 2.1
Hanse Towns 2 ,4 1 .1 m
Russia 0 ,8 3 .4 6,1 1 .7
West Indies 0 .1 0 .3 0 .3 1 .0
China 0 .9 0 .3 0 .6 0 ,2
Tota ls 52 .2 66 .7 61*3 38.1
The effects of the Continental System cam be seem also Im the 
exports to Denmark and the Hanseatio port© o f northern Germany 
which fell dmstloally after 1810 and 1806 respectively.
Dm the whole, Europe bought a much higher proportion o f America: 
re-exports than did  B r ita in  whose main in te re s t  was in American 
goods such as co tton , British supplies of tropical goods came
from her own colonies,
A
Table 7 ; Exports by T.vne and D estination  18X1
Domestic Exports Re-EXPorts
northern Europe 0 3#G5 m 0 5*34 m
B r it is h  Is le s  1*57
Ib e r ia  18*26 5 .77
France 1*19 1*72
Other countries 2,46 1*62
The minimal importance of re-exports to B r ita in  is  illustrated 
in  the data on American exports to B r ita in ,
8 , Monthly Kagaslns. v o l .33, 1st March 1812, 204,
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Table 8 ; American Exports to Britain 1B02-1§12^
Year Total Domestic Goods Re-exports
1602 0 1 6 .0 8  m #1 2 .0 6  m 0 4 .0 1  m
1803 17.50 16.45 1.34
1804 1 3 .2 0  1 1 .7 6  1.41
1805 15.41 13.93 1.47
1 8 0 6 15.59 12.73 2.85
1807 23.14 2 1 ,1 2  2 .0 2
1 8 0 8 3 .2 0  3.09 0 ,1 0
1609 5.56 5.32 0.23
1 8 1 0 12.26 1 1 .3 8  0 , 8 9
1811 13.73 13.18 0.55
1812 6 .0 8  6,05 0 . 0 3
During 1802-1812, American goods exported to Britain ranged
from 1 0 ,5  per cent in 1 8 0 9 to 3 1 .5  per cent of the total of
American exports in 1803. The average annual percentage of the
total American exports sent to Britain vme 27.4. The
importance of American supplies for the British lay in the
United States being the source of American produce rather than
re-exports of colonial goods. During each year of the decade,
an average of 0 15.85 millions of American goods were sent to
Great Britain out of a total of #18,66 millions of exports to
2.Ûthat country, Thus Britain was the most important customer 
for American exports in this decade, although the British lead 
over other countries was quite small, More important, the 
United States was more dependant on Britain as the major 
purchaser of American produce*
The generally adverse balance of American visible trade has been
discussed already* A major cause was the considerable deficit
11on trade between the United States and Britain*
9. ABPON 1, same references as not© 7 
Beybert, Btatisticdl Annals.223 
Pitkin, BtatIstical View."179-180
10* Seybert, Statistical Annals* 155
11* Official American ^figures do not give the value of total 
imports from Britain, only for those goods paying duty 
"ad valorem"* The,/deficit,therefore, will be greater than 
shown in Table 9 '
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Yeay IPA. American flata B. B r it is h  data 13
m illio n s )
Exports Im p o r ts ,a  , 
to  O.K. ox O .K .'oai^^ 'l"
X  s"m i'ilions)
Exports 
to  U .8 .A .
Imports 
ex U .S.A .
1802 16.08 25.73 5.32 1.92
1803 17.50 26.31 5 .2 7 1.91
1804 13.20 26.14 6.39 1.65
1805 15.41 31.87 7.14 1 .76
1806 15.49 35.78 8 .61 2,00
1808 3.20 15.81 3 .99 0 .8 3
1809 5.56 17.64 5 .18 2.20
1810 12,28 29.12 7.81 2 .61
1811 13.73 24.13 1 .43 2.30
1812 6.08 7 .66 4 .3 1 1 .29
A© the two co im triee  used d if fe re n t  f is c a l  years, i t  is  not 
poss ib le  to  make a d lre e t oomparison between the B r i t is h  and 
American data* The fo rm er, however, does show a small balance 
in  favour o f the United States in  1811, the year of the non­
im porta tion  A c t, as a re s u lt  of the f a l l  in  B r i t is h  exports*
This is  no t shown in  the American fig u re s  except perhaps, ae 
p a r t o f the narrowing balance in  1812* The American data shows 
th a t p ro p o rtio n ate ly  the gap between American exporta and 
imports was not as great as the gap revealed fey the B r it is h  data , 
but the omission of a l l  im ports from the American fig u re s  
ind icates th a t the B r i t is h  data is  a more accurate p o rtra ya l 
o f the re la t iv e  values o f eastfeound and westbound tra n s a tla n tic  
trade#
The bulk o f American produce sold oversea© came from the farms of 
the United States* The various sources o f American exports ware 
a ffected  d if fe r e n t ly  by war and sanctions* Although badly h u rt
12, compiled from A8P0H 1
13* Orouset* B*B:oonomle B ritann ique e t le  Blooue C on tinen ta l, 
appenâii W e s  1    * *
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by the Embargo Act, the farmer made a speedy recovery and his 
sale of goods only declined again in 1812# The fishing industry 
did not recover from that act, while the forester experienced 
the same pattern o f change as the farmer# In addition there 
was a small exoort trade in manufactured goods, but these were 
màtmly of foreign origin.
Table 10 : American Exports by Origin.1803-1812^^
Year From Sea From Forest From Farm
1803 0 2,63 m 0 4.85 m # 3 2 . 99 m
1804 3,48 4 . 6 3 30.89
1805 2.88 5.26 31.56
1606 3.11 4.86 3 0 .1 2
1807 2.80 5.47 37.83
1808 0.63 1.33 6.74
1809 1.71 4,58 23.23
1810 1.48 4.97 33.50
1811 1.41 5.28 35.55
1812 0.93 2 .7 0 24.55
The most important and most valuable commodity in the list of 
American agricultural exports was cotton. The export of cotton 
grew dramatically from 1793t with the invention of the cotton 
gin# Cotton eicports grew fairly steadily until 1807 after which 
it was as subject to the variations caused by war and sanctions 
as any other commodity. Britain was the major consumer of 
American cotton, and the cotton export trade was of much greater 
significance for Anglo-American trade than it was for the total 
export trade#
Table 11 : American Cotton Itoorta 1805-1812^^
Year Domestie Exports Farm Exports Cotton Exports
1803 0 42.39 m 0 31.56 m 0 9.44 m
1806 41.25 30.12 8.33
1807 48.70 37.83 14.23
1806 9.43 6.74 2.22
1809 31.41 23.23 8.51
1610 42.37 33.50 15.10
1811 54.29 35.55 9.65
1812 30,03 24.55 3.08
14. Pitkin, Statistieal VIew. 116-11?
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Table ,1,2 * Amerloam Cotton Exports by Volume 1791#1815
(data in  m illio n s of pounds)
1791 0.19m I t s léoo 17.78m lbs 1009 53.21m lbs
1792 0 .13 1801 20.91 1810 93.87
1793 0 .48 1802 27.50 1811 62.18
1794 1.60 1803 41.10 1812 28.95
1795 6.27 1804 38,11 1813 19.39
1796 6.10 1805 40.38 1814 17.80
1797 3.78 1806 37.49 1815 82.99
1798 9 .36 1807 66.21
1799 9.53 1808 11.06
Table 13 ; Volume of Cotton iznorts to Britain 1603-1612^^
 ' ' ' ( Sa ta in mill i ons of 'p'oums ) '
Year Total Exporta Exports to Britain
1803 lbs  2 7 7 ^  ïb©
1804 34.64 25.77
1805 38.22 32.57
1806 35.42 24.25
1807 63.70 53.1@
1808 10.58 7.99
1809 49 .22 13.36
1810 92 .46 26.17
1811 60.48 46 .87
1812 28.53 26.08
Note that the recovery of cotton exports to Britain after the 
embargo is slower than the recovery of total cotton exporte.
This may be the re s u lt  of difficulties in Britain, sanctions, a 
glut sufficiency of cotton in Britain after the good year of 
1807» o r of the development of new sources. By the outbreak of 
war British dominance was restored .
Of the other American agricultural exports , g ra in  is  second only 
to cotton for Anglo-American trad e . This was not so much the 
re s u lt  o f B r ita in  consuming American grain? B r it is h  purchases 
were very  variable* American grain was exported in significant 
quantities to  British colonies, in the West In d ie s, and to the 
Ib e ria n  Peninsula in the years of Wellington’s efforts in the
16* E.Baines, H is to ry  o f the Cotton Manufactures of Great 
B ?ro 'ïn  T lë 'g r .  P 302. .............. ...... ... ..... ..........
17. Pitkin, Statiatlcal View.136.
—  4 9  —
campaign there . American g ra in  v/as more im portant to  B r i t is h  
overseas in te re s ts  than to  B r ita in  i t s e l f *  Together B r ita in  
and these overseas in te re s ts  co ns titu te d  the most im portant 
market fo%* g ra in  in  the decade before 1812*
Table 14 : American Grain Exporte 1803-1812^^
( data In  thoueande o f b a rre ls )
Yeax- iS & a l To B r ita in To Br.Colonies To Spain To Portugal
1803 1,125 203 298 145 122
1804 759 7 251 n o 54
1805 736 36 199 103 22
1806 629 127 180 19 91
1807 1,186 323 295 39 761808 248 2 70 30 41
1809 738 159 71 40 63
1810 705 92 99 144 86
1811 1,385 38 237 306 529
1812 1,304 ? ? 381 337
Apart from tobacco, B r i ta in  d id  not consume la rge  q u a n tit ie s  
o f o the r American exports such as sugar and coffee as the 
B r i t is h  demand fo r  such tro p ic a l re -exports  was met from the 
exports o f the B r i t is h  colonies* The export o f tobacco,sugar 
and coffee  tend to  fo llo w  the  same p a tte rn  as other exports and 
l ik e  them, reveal a re la tio n s h ip  between the annual 
f lu c tu a tio n s  o f exports and the war and sanctions*
This completes the b r ie f  survey o f the American export trade 
Y/hioh has shown the o v e ra ll upward trend u n t i l  1810 and the 
much grea ter f lu c tu a tio n s  which mark the r is e  and f a l l  o f the 
re -exp o rt trade* In  an adversely balanced tra n s a tla n tic  
commerce, B r ita in  was the p r in c ip a l market fo r  American e%3ports 
and p a r t ic u la r ly  fo r  the produce o f the American farm er. The 
most va luable  s ing le  commodity fo r  the p ro s p e rity  o f American 
commerce and fo r  trade w ith  Great B r i ta in  v/as co tton , w hile  grdi 
vms o f considerable Importance also*
16# G*W*Galpin, "The American Grain Trade to  the Spanish 
Peninsula 1810-1814#" American H is to r ic a l Revlow.1922. 
22—Id^ *
P i t k in ,8 t a t is t io a l  View, 119-120*
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American Import©
Like exports, American imports rose rapidly in the middle and
late 1 7 9 0*8 * partly because of a short upward surge in
American demand for goods* but mainly a® a result of American
entry into the colonial trade and the consequent profits from
wartime commerce. Thereafter imports followed a pattern
similar to that of e:q)orts, responding to the war situation*
Table 15 : American Import® 1790-1815^^
^in millions of dollars)
Year Total importa For American Consumption.
1790 0 2 3 .0  m 0 22.4 m
1 7 9 1 29i2 28.1
1 7 9 2 3 1 .5 2 9 .7
1 7 9 3 3 1 .1 28.9
1 7 9 4 34,6 28.0
1 7 9 5 69.7 61.2
1 7 9 6 81,4 55.1
1 7 9 7 75.4 48.3
1 7 9a 68.5 35.5
1 7 9 9 79.0 33.5
1800 9 1 .2 5 2 .1
1801 111.3 64.7
1802 7 6 .3 40.5
1803 64.6 5 1 .0
1804 85.0 48.7
1605 120.6 6 7 .4
1806 129.4 6 9 .1
1807 138.5 78.8
1808 56.9 43.9
1809 59.4 36.6
1810 85.4 61.0
1811 53.4 37.3
1812 77.0 68.5
1813 22.0 1 9 .1
1814 12.9 12.8
1615 1 1 3 .0 1 0 6 ,4
The Peace of Amiens brought a reduction from II3 million 
dollars in 1801 to only 65 millions in 1803? most of the loss 
being the result of a return to peacetime conditions in the 
colonial trade* The renewal of war started a steady rise in
1 9 # E.Hocksher* The Continental System. 146
O.P.HettelE.FjBepgenco of a Rational Kconomy.396.
— 51 —
importe u n t i l  1808, the f i r s t  year o f sanctions, when the to ta l 
bill fell by 86 m il l io n  d o lla rs *  A f te r  this, there was © small 
increase in  1609-10 before the renewal o f sanctions*
S u rp ris in g ly  there was an increase o f 21 m ill io n s  in 1812, when 
sanctions were in fo rce  and war declared* This was p oss ib ly  a 
reflection o f the return o f American ships which had l e f t  before 
the Non-Im portation Act want Into effect, the in f lo w  of 
u n re s tr ic te d  goods under that Act, and the f l i g h t  o f American 
ships to  the United States under the n ine ty-day embargo before 
the outbreak of war*
Imports fo r  consumption v /lth in  the United States were a l l  
Important in  the early 1790*© but decline relatively as the 
re-export trade grew in  va lue. But the decline of th is  trade 
in the la te r  years restored the dominance o f imports for home 
consumption. For example, in 1790 almost all im ports were 
consumed within the United S tates, but by 1801 ju s t  over half 
were so used. By 1812, however, the o r ig in a l balance was 
evident w ith  on ly 8.4 m illion©  intended for the re-export 
trade*
There was a general upward trend in  imports u n t i l  1810 when the 
s ta r t  of renewed sanctions, then war, reversed the increase*
Table 1^ 6 t Average Annual Imports in to  United S tates.
z&ïml
1790-94 0 29#9 m 0 27.4 m
1795-99 74.8 48*5
1800-04 85.7 51,4
1805-09 100*9 59,7
1810-14 50.1 39,7
20e Based on data in  Table 15*
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Import© fo r  consumption w ith in  the United States fo llow ed a 
p a tte rn  s im ila r  to  th a t o f to ta l  Im ports, w ith  a r is e  to  
1810 and then a d ec line . This increase took place a t a lower 
ra te  than th a t fo r  to ta l  im ports, thus in d ic a tin g  the growing 
importance o f imports fo r  re-export which r is e  took up a 
la rge  percentage o f to ta l imports hut declined a t a much 
fa s te r  ra te  than domestic Imports a f te r  1810, This fu r th e r  
i l lu s t r a te s  the greater v u ln e ra b il i ty  o f the re -export trad© 
to  the changing; cond itions o f the war. In  1815 to ta l  
imports and Imports fo r  American oonsur£iption recovered but 
no t imports for re -e xp o rt. The general increase in  American 
imports which underlay a l l  thee© flu c tu a tio n s  was s im ila r  to  
the general rise in  exports but never s u f f ic ie n t  to  overcome 
the adverse tra d in g  balance,
A very la rge  percentage o f American Imports came from Great 
B r ita in ,  B r i ta in  was the p r in c ip a l source o f many goods, 
e sp e c ia lly  those which paid duty "ad valorem ": a term which 
covers manufactured goods ra th e r than tro p ic a l produce or 
temperata  commodities such as win© and s p ir i t s .  Important 
as a purchaser o f American exports, B r i ta in  was of much 
g rea ter importance as the su pp lie r o f American Im ports,
U n fo rttm a te ly , in form ation  on to ta l  Imports from B r ita in  is  
not a v a ila b le , as the o f f i c ia l  American fig u re s  on ly  give 
the f in a n c ia l value o f goods paying duty ■■ad valorem"; the 
re s t are in  volumes. The re s u lt  would tend to  overestimate 
the importance o f imports from Great Britain except, th a t
Hi jwnmüiaw M 'mi 'imM
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most o f the goods not paying du ty , apart from wine and 
sp ir itss , were tro p ic a l goods, the bu lk  o f which wore 
re-axportecU Tota ls a va ila b le  fo r  the r e la t iv e ly  stable  
years 1802-1804 reveal th a t n ea rly  h a lf  o f a l l  Imports 
came from B r i ta in  ( see Table 21), I t  w i l l  also be shown 
la te r  th a t a h igh p ropo rtion  o f imports consumed w ith in  
the United States were manuXaetured goods o f B r i t is h  
manufacture #
Table 17 £ American Imports by O rig in  1801-1812^^
Year T o ta l Imports ex B r i t is h  ihimire ex Great B r ita in  
"ad valorem" #b t5 'Jp eroent&^e^ 'ïo £ IÏ”'percen 'tS
1801 0 56.25 m 042.22m 75 037.67m 63.2
1802 43.92 29.30 66.6 23.73 58.3
1803 37.03 29.12 78 26.31 71
1804 40.36 30.37 75 26.14 64.4
1805 45.30 34.32 76.6 31.67 70.3
1806 34.39 39.95 74 35.78 66
1807 58,65 43.35 74 38.91 66.3
1808 29.01 20.29 70 15.81 54.5
1809 20.39 18.93 92.6 17.64 86.5
1810 43.57 32.89 75.7 29.12 66.8
1811 39.87 28.71 72 24.13 60.5
1812 16.97 6.94 50 7.66 45.1
percentage o f to ta l  imports "ed valorem"
The im portant p o s it io n  o f B r i ta in  as a su p p lie r o f imports 
remained r e la t iv e ly  unchanged until 1812* The Embargo 
Act g apparently , made l i t t l e  impression on im ports from 
the B r it is h  Empire, but d id  reduce the percentage from 
Great B r i ta in  a little, while both declined in  absolute 
terms. 'The greater v u ln e ra b il i ty  o f im ports from B r ita in  
to  sanctions is  shown in  the changes 1811-12 when trade 
from B r ita in  and her co lonies declined r e la t iv e ly  and 
abso lu te ly* Comparing the dec line  in  exports and imports 
In  16l2g the e ffe c t o f sanctions is  much more apparent on 
importa* i . e .  B r i t is h  exports to  America.
American Importers were dependent upon American shioping
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üinoe the bulk of all Importe and an even higher percentage 
of Imports from Great Britain, were carried In ahipe flying
the American f la g .  Except during  the embargo when the 
percentage dropped to  62.5 in  1809, the la t t e r  employment 
of ships in  trade from B r ita in  was s tead ie r than the use o f 
ships in  the to ta l im port trade . The American vessels in  
the trade w ith  Europe su ffe red  more from re s tr ic t io n s  than 
d id  the vessel© tra d in g  w ith  B r ita in  under the supposedly 
r e s t r ic t iv e  Orders in  Council.
Table 18 : American Shins and Imports 1801 •-1812^2
Year Imports in  US ships Imports ex B r ita in  in  US si
to ta l Bgrogatage to ta l EËESâUÏÊSÊ
1801 #50.90 m 91 0 36.16 m 95
1802 1+0.11 91 24.86 #7
1803 34.80 91+ 25.34 96
1801+ 38.37 94.8 25.85 98,8
1805 1+2.88 94.5 31.61 97
1806 52.50 96.5 35.57 99
1807 50.07 84.8 38.77 99
1808 20.65 71 15.66 99
1809 11.55 56.3 11.10 62,5
1810 1+0.03 98.7 28,90 99
1611 30.97 77.5 23.60 98
1812 12.68 74.4 7.66 99.5
In  con trast to  the wealth of informection on the composition 
o f exports th a t on American Imports is  ra th e r meagre. Imports 
paying duty "ad valorem ", which comprised a la rge  p a rt of the 
im port b i l l ,  consisted mainly o f manufactured goods from 
B r ita in .  In  1807, fo r  example, out o f to ta l imports o f 144 
m il l io n  d o lla rs , which is  the same sum given fo r  imports o f
manufactured goods in  th a t year. Of th is  la t t e r  sum about 
43.5 m il l io n  d o lla rs  worth came from B r ita in .  A more 
d e ta ile d  breakdown o f the o rig in s  o f imports in  1802-1804
22. ASPON 1 . same reference as note 21,
23. P itk in ,  S ta t is t ic a l View.151.
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shows the supremacy o f B r i ta in ,
pif
Table 19 s Averages Annual Imports o f Manufactures 1602-4
To ta l Imports of Manufactured Goods : £i 9.00 m illio n s  
o f which ; Ix  B r ita in  and Golonies ; 6*84 or 76 per ceni
Ex Russia Ï 0*20
Bx Germany à Scandinavia: 0*55
Ex Holland ; 0*2.5
Bx France : 0*27
Ex Spain,Portugal& Italy; 0*2?
and from a l l  other countries ; 0 * 5 2
As regards other commodities, the im port and export o f sugar
in  1807 i l lu s t r a te s  the ©iaa o f the re -exp o rt trade and the
OK
small domestic consumption o f a t le a s t one tro p ic a l product* 
The United States imported 215 m il l io n  pounds o f sugar, o f 
which some 200 m il l io n  pounds came from the West Indies, and 
out o f th is  137*5 m il l io n  pounds «ere re-exported. Information 
on other tro p ic a l products is  not a v a ila b le , but a comparison 
of to ta l  Imports fo r  American consumption w ith  imports of
manufactured goods shows the importance of the la t te r *
26Table 20 ; Manufacture© and Imports f o r  American Use.
Year
1801
Imports for U8 ConsumBtion, Imports of I
# 66,7 m # 5 6 .2 5  m
1802 4 2 .5 4 3 .9 2
I8 0 3 5 2 .0 37.05
1804 50.7 4 0 .5 6
1805 7 2 .3 45.30
1806 76.2 54.39
1807 85.0 58.65
1808 45.1 2 9 .0 1
1809 40.2 20.39
1810 44.9 43.57
1811 4 1 .8 39.87
1812 70.3 16.97
Thus imports of manufacture© were a su b s ta n tia l p ropo rtion  of 
American im ports, tending to  increase re la t iv e  to  other 
imports in  1810-11, but f a l l in g  d ra m a tica lly  in  1612 as
24* A.B&ring, Inquiry.* *. 139
2 5 . Pitkin, 8t/aiis¥ioa 1 ?i©w* 148-9
26. A8PQH 1 referenoee'lm ''Note 21 N orth , Economic Growth 
oF'lHe'ltJnitod States, 229,
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non-im porta tion  was imposed on B r ita in ,  the main supplier.
In fo rm ation  of the average annual Amerloan trade fo r  the
relatively stab le  years o f 1602-1604 reveals a geographical 
p a tte rn  which coîifirme the Importance o f Britain. Exports to  
B r ita in  were greater than those to  her nearest r iva ls ,F ra n ce , 
Holland end Spain. B r i t is h  importance as the supp lie r o f 
American importe v/a© even more marked, The cause o f the 
adverse trade balance was the inability of exports to  
countries other than B r ita in  to  o ffs e t the flow  of imports 
from B r i ta in ,
27Table 21 ; Average Annual American Commerce 1802-1804,
Exports
Totals: 0 68*47 m 074,84%
therefore adverse balance of: 06,37m
Britain and Colonies: 0 23,70 m 035,73%
Britain 15,69 27.40
India 0,01 3.53
Canada 1,00 0*54
British West Indies 6,48 4,75
therefore adverse balance o f; 012,03m
Rest of the Worlds 0 44.47 ffi 039*111
Russia 0.02 2,10
Prussia 0,55 0.12
Sweden 0.41 0.58
Denmark-Norway 2 ,3 2 2.39
Germany 4*66 1,77
Holland and Colonies 9,31 6,26
France and Colonies 11.33 12,35
Spain and Colonies 7.49 6,19
Portugal and Colonies 2.32 1.05
Italy and T rie s te 2.01 0.66
China & Asia 0.43 4*85
All other co u n tr ie s , 3.38 0,71
the re fo re  favourable balance of; 03,36m
27, Seybert,8tatlstical Annals. 252-235
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The overall increase in  imports and o f goods fo r  American 
consumption and the considerable flo w  of manufactured goods 
from Great B r ita in  have been noted in  this survey. The
importance o f B r ita in  as the main su p p lie r o f imports and the 
la rge  scale employment of American vessels in  th a t trade were 
established also*
American Shipping.
Before the War o f Independence, the commerce of the American 
co lon ies was co n tro lle d  by B r it is h  merchants, although many 
o f th e ir  ships were constructed in  North America, After 
independence, a f le e t  o f merchant ships had to  be created which
would meet the commercial needs o f the United States as well
28ae keeping American shipyards in  business. This growth was 
slow u n t i l  1793 because o f the post-war slump and exclusion 
from former markets and trade routes by the B r it is h  nav iga tion  
laws. This was overcome p a r t ia l ly  by the development of new 
trading links w ith  countries such as Germany and Ghina,, the 
p ro f i ts  o f which stim ula ted fu r th e r  expansion as w e ll a© work 
tor the shipyards,The outbreak o f war in  Europe was the 
p r in c ip a l cause o f the growth o f American commerce. As trade 
increased the size of the merchant f le e t  grew to meet the 
new demands* American n e u tra l i ty  was p a r t ia l ly  responsible 
for this, but the high p r o f i ts  of wartime trade and the
economic and te chn ica l superiority o f American vessels was 
Important a lso , Despite in d iv id u a l hardships, losses and 
controls by the two belligerents, American neutral trade was
28, J.G.B.Hutchins, The American M aritime Industry and Pub lic
policy 1789-19Î4Ti:î5W7TOT?r
29* W,li,Marvin, The American Merchant Marine. (1902),39-47, 
30, Hutchins * op c i t . 184,183#
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profitable because of the shortage of ships, and the 
additional dangers raised freight pates and. commodity prices 
while shipping costs remained low, Fven in colonial days 
American Shipyards had produced cargo vessels superior to 
those built in Britain, and because of this, insurance and 
depreciation chargea were low enough to offset the higher 
labour costs and reduce costs by as much as eiscty per cent 
below that of similar British s h i p s , T h e  obstacle of British 
and European navigation laws was overcome by similar American 
laws and by the needs of war, which brought the American 
entry into the colonial carrying trade. This produced a 
growth in tonnage which made the American shipping Industry 
important not only for the United States but also for world 
trade. In some trades such as the transatlantic trade with 
Britain, American vessels enjoyed a virtual monopoly.
m a :  Sagla^red
1800 972,000 669,000
1801 947,000 632,000
1802 872,000 560,000
1803 949,000 597,000
1804 1,042,000 672,000
1805 1,140,000 749,000
1806 1,208,000 808,000
1807 1,268,000 848,000
1808 1,242,000 808,000
1809 1,350,000 910,000
1810 1,424,000 984,000
1811 1,232,000 768,000
1812 1,269,000 760,000
1813 1,666,000 674,000
1814 1,159,000 674,000
1815 1,368,000 854,000
31. Hutchins, op olt. 170,186,221-223.
32* HtztchinSf, op clt, 221-223 
Marvin, o j)„„a it, 38
33.
Maogregor.Commercial Btatlstios. toI•3*740•
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Shipping tonnage grew s u b s ta n tia lly  over a f a i r l y  b r ie f  time-
scale and the comparative lack  o f v a r ia t io n  in  reg is te red  
tonnage shows th a t the ownership o f vessels was not g re a tly  
a ffec ted  by war and sanctions u n t i l  the war w ith  B rita in #  
Employment of these vessels in  overseas traûe was much more 
susceptib le  to  change, sh ipp ing tonnages are slower to  r e f le c t  
economic changes because o f the in e la s t ic i t y  o f c a p ita l goods 
such as sh ips, on ly th e ir  employment w i l l  r e f le c t  the s itu a tio n  
more immediately# A very high p ropo rtion  o f American vessels 
were employed in  the overseas trades j, as opposed to  the 
coasta l trad e , and as a re s u lt  the American merchant marine as 
a whole was in fluenced by the war and by contro ls#
In  ownership there was a long term trend upwards towards a 
la rg e r  merchant f le e t ,  but the growth in  the employment o f 
vessels in  overseas trade declined a f te r  1810, no doubt because 
o f the vmr w ith  B rita in #
Table 23 : Average Annual Tonnages 1800-1815^^ *'
Registered In  Fe^reirm Trade
1800-1804 956,000 623,000
1805-1809 1,241,000 822,000
1810-1815 1,550,000 772,000
The employment o f American vessels is  more im portant fo r  a 
study o f sanctions than the growth o f tonnage owned by 
American merchants#
34# Baaed on Table 22#
60
yable 24
Is m.
1789 134.000
1790 355,000
1791 364,000
1792 415,000
1793 448,000
1794 526,000
1795 580,000
1796 675,000
1797 608,000
1798 5 2 2 ,0 0 0
1799 626,000
1800 644,000
1801 799,000
1802 799,000
1803 707,000
1804 1133,000
1805 922,000
1806 958,000
1807 1020,000
1806 492,000
1809 576,000
1810 876,000
1811 922,000
1812 456,000
1813 234,000
1814 59,000
1815 700,000
.■AmgAo.an_Eogi§.lZ§2rl§ia^^
EoiEiSLXomiâSâ M§_2Êrog&^
110,000 
55 1 .0 0 0
241.000 
244,000 
164,000
83,000
57.000
47.000
77.000
86.000 
110,000
111,000
104,000
104,000
73.000
65.000 
69,000 
64,000
34.000
71.000 
52,000 
10,000
1,000
none
5,000
145,000
Others
35^055"
46,000
41,000
59.000
49.000
22.000 
22,000 
22,000
13,000 
28,000
28,000
2 3 ,0 0 0  
46*000
113,000
47.000
7 2 .0 0 0
53
59
60 
63 
73 
86 
91 
94 
88 
85 
85
81
83
84 
83
90
91
91
92 
91
85 
91 
96
93 
67 
55 
70
While the American vessels entering the ports of the United 
States would inolude those employed in the ooastal trade, as 
the hulk of American ship® were engaged in overseae trade, the 
dominance of such vessels in American foreign trade is apparent 
in the above table* Except in the earliest years and after 
the outbreak of war in 1812, American ships enjoyed a virtual 
monopoly of the trade of their own country.
Just as in numbers and tonnage, American maritime leadership 
was seen in the value of the cargoes carried In American
35* Hiitohins, American Maritime Industry# # > 250
hettels g Emergence or a National Economy,p99 (Taole 21)#
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vesasls. The figures for the percentage of American trade 
carried In American ships reveials a slightly greater 
superiority in the import trade than in the export trade.
Percentage Value of American Trade la H,8.Ships 
lapo.rt8 Exports TotajL _Trada
36
I S M
1790
1795
1800
1003
1810
1815
41,0
92.0
91.0
93.0
93.0
77.0
40.0
86.0
87.0
89.0 
90.0 
71.0
40.5
90.0
89.0
91.0
91.0
74.0
The employment of American vessels varied in a pattern similar 
to the other aspects of American trade, exiiorts and imports. 
Employment rose rapidly to a dominant iJOBition from the middle 
1790*8 to a peak in 1805-1807* Then the regulations and contrle 
and then war, cause a decline from which recovery is not 
complete until 1815. The sudden riea in the use of non- 
British foreign tonnage after 1812 to replace British and 
American vessels should he noted, as it suggests that this 
might toe American vessels in employment under false colours.
The changes in employment are confirmed toy Professor Horth's 
"shipping activity index".
TjiLble 26 Amerioan Shipping Activity Index. 37
Tear__ Index Tear Index
17??— 16o
1791 91 1798 87
1792 93 1799 96
1793 117 1800 105
1794 115 1801 115
1795 106 1802 125
1796 114 1803 120
Year Indëx Year
1805 114
1806 121
1607 125
1808 68
1809 64
1810 90
not ex
1812
1813
1814 
1015
36# lettale, imere^ enc© of a National Eponomv. 399.Table 21#
37. Worth. 6rmii.;ot^:tAg;irn^ { Base year ie 1797.
The inde£^?™*’STcuEFea tonnage entering the
United States porte into total registered tonnage#
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Although the aimnal ohangoa In Amorloan shipyard output bear 
little relation to the actual change© in tonnage* the pattern 
of change is similar, with a steady rl&e to 1807 &nd 
variations thereafter* New oonetruction 18 only one aepeot of 
tonnage changée; loBBGB, walea and the scrapping of ahipe all 
influence annual tonnage figures. A clear relationship 
between shipyard output and the war situation is seen in the 
table below#
■1815'^
2™SZ™»«,™™3'SS£Sê
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808 
1809
56,000
73.000
97.000
93.000 
71,000 
11,000 
72,000
1810
1811
1818
1813
1814
1815
102,000
108,000
58,000
18,000
13,000
106,000
The national and international slgnlflconce of Amsi'ican ships 
have been outlined briefly and this has shown the growth in 
tonnage and in employment, and. the susceptibility of the 
latter to changes arising from the war in Europe.
ConolualoHB
From the middle of the 1790’s there was a rapid increase in the 
siise of American commerce because of the demand for American 
ships, the entry into the colonial carrying trade, the demand 
for cotton, and the growth of the United states as a market 
for manufactured goods.
After a period of unoertainty, independence and the growth of 
trade aid not alter the close économie l.lnke with Britain.
38. Beytoert, S^tâMSHSSiiSî^iâ». P.33.0,
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The British supplied the United State® with most of her 
Imports and* In turn, bought a eubatantial proportion of 
American exports# The adverse trade balance with Britain 
made the overall balance of vialble trade unfavourable.
The deficiency was made up, not by trade with other 
oountrlee, but by the profits of American ahlpping*
Despite annual fluotuatlona there w&e a steady Increase In 
American exports between 1790 and 1815, Although the export 
of domestic goods increased steadily, the wartime re-export 
trade was subject to much greater variation, rising sharply 
after 1795 and declining beyond recovery after 1812# This 
trade was a phenomenon resulting from the neutrality of the 
United statesj, and consisted of a flow of tropical products 
to Europe and one of British manufactures to America’s 
southern neighbours*
Unlike Europe, Britain was the main market for American 
produce, of which cotton was the most important commodity.
The bulk of American cotton exports went to feed the mills of 
Britain# American re-exports went to Europe as Britain obtahsd
her supplies of tropical goods from her own colonies. Both 
trades Involved the extensive use of American vessels, which 
Increased British mercantile envy of the United States,
There was a similar growth of American imports which was 
halted only by the advent of sanctions and war# The bulk of 
American imports were consumed in the United St&tes.
Variations in Imports were the result of the needs of the 
re-export trade as imports for American use rose steadily* 
Britain was the most Important supplier of imported goods, 
especially manufactured goods. The United states was 
heavily dependent on Britain as a source of supplier.
— t'Mi «»
Almost all American trade waa carried in American ahlps, 
Amei’ican ownership of nhips rose steadily under the impetus 
Ox war and brought considerable prosperity to the United 
States* In the later years, this growth was modified by 
greater variations In the employment of this fleet. In the 
trade with Britain the rmpremacy of American vessels was even 
more apparent, thus .forging a third vital economic link 
between the two countries* The use of American vessels, 
American exports of cotton, and American Imports of British 
manafaehares are the most important aspects of American 
commerce in the years before 1812* together with the 
susceptibility of all to respond to the pressures of the 
.European war.
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THE PATTUm^ OP BRITI.8E TRADE
Zri contrast to the United Ststosy Britain did not emerge 
suddenly a© a great trading nower at the end of the eighteenth 
century. Britain had a substantial foreign trade whloh 
exeroised a oonslderable Influenoe on the formulation of British
policy and was the basis of the country’s wealth. The 
eighteenth eentury saw a steady growth in the value and 
Importance of British commerce.
The annual rate of growth of overseas trade was small but steady 
until the last decades of the century when that rate began to 
accelerate5 coinciding with the Industrial Revolution^ In 
1 7 0 1-1 7 3 0# the annual rate of growth of overseas trade of 
England and Wales was only 1.2 per cent; in 1730-1780# the rate 
was slightly lower at 1.1 per cent, but by 1770-1800 it had risen
to 2.3 per cent and it continued to rise during the nineteenth
1
century." In value British trade more than doubled between 1730
and the end of the century.
^3-.e „28 :
(average amiuaJL trade in B millions)
England & Wales Great Britain
SSlLiiSESriS, SS££lS* M a°£ l
1 7 5 0 -5 9 a 8 .25m & 8,75m 1 7 7 5-8)', 812.47m S 9.24m
1755-61+ 9.27 9.62 1780-89 15.76 10.08
1760-09 10.63 10,04 1785-94 19.52 14.20
1 7 6 5 -7 4 1 1 .8 9  9.84 1 7 9 0 -9 9 2 1 .1 9  1 7 .6 8
1 7 7 0 -7 9 11.81 9.28 1 7 9 5-
1804 2 4 .3 0  21.93
Exports of British produce only*
1 . Deene ft Cole.
2* Deane & Oole»op^ q^ t. u4%,TaD.ie^ .,
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An analysis can ho mad© of* British trade in this period
similar to that on American trade to reveal the main features
of that commerce and the importance of the United States and 
the degree of vulnerability to sanctions«
The Balance of British Trade.
The British trading balance can he established for 1797-1812 
by the figures for imports and exports which are available at 
both "official values" and "real values"*' The former gives a 
picture of a consistently favourable balance even in times of 
economic adversity, although the size of the gap is subject to 
several interesting variations. The narrowness of the mp 
between exports and imports in J.Ô03» during the Peace of
Amiensj was the result of a substantial drop in re-exports with
the and of hostilities. With the renewal of war, the trade gap 
remains comparatively steady until 1809 when the upsurge of 
exports after the repeal of the Embargo Act and the easing of 
the Continental System, increases the surplus from B7 millions 
to £17 millions, 0?he later severity of sanctions and French 
regulations does coincide with a decrease in the favourable 
balance by 1811 a© a result of a greater fall in exports, 
an increase in which restores a more favourable balance in 1812,
y 'ytmwrni'tav^ n <
3, Bee Appendix A for explanation of origins of the two sets
of figures.
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kTable 29 ; The Be lanee o f B r i t is h  Trade 1797-1612*
(o f f  i  Gla 1 value s )
JSESSM US22EM Balance
1797 .0 2 6 ,3 1  m S21.01 m £5.30 m
1798 3 0 .2 9 27.85 2,JLtl|.
1799 33.64 2 6 .8 3 6.81
1600 3 8 .1 2 3 0 .5 7 7.55
1601 37.78 3 2 .7 9 4.99
1802 4 1 .4 1 . 3 1 ,1 0 1 0 .3 1
1803 5 1 .4 3 2 7 .0 4 4.39
1804 34.45 26.91 7.45
1805 3 4 .3 0 28,91 5.39
1806 3 6 ,5 2 2 7 .7 9 8.73
1807 34.55 2 7 .7 2 6.84
1806 34,55 27.55 7.00
1809 50.28 3 2 .4 7 17.81
1810 48.87 39.06 9.01
1811 3 2 .4 1 28.62 3.79
1812 4 3 .2 4 27.73 1 5 .5 1
For 1805-1812, the "real valwGS" of exports and Imports
Show higher totals than "official values" but they also
that the trade gap was smaller and that, more often thai
i t  was adverse ra th e r than favourable*
Table 30 ; The Balance o f B r l t la l i  Trade 1805-10.5
( re a l vaïîïee) " ................
ISM. a ç m M  laiasss-.
1805 a 51.10 m £ 53.58 m - ,8 2,48 m
1806 53.02 50.62 2.40
1807 50,48 53.50 - 3.02
1808 49.69 55.71 ~ 6.02
1809 66.01 59.85 6.16
1810 62.70 74.53 » 11.83
The years o f the B e r lin  Decree and the Embargo Act witnessed a 
dec line  in  exports o f some B3»5 m ill io n s , w h ile  Imports grev/ by 
a s l ig h t ly  g rea ter amounts The la t t e r ,  indeed, show a steady 
r is e  to  1810 v/h lle  the former show g rea ter va ria tion #  This is  
perhaps an in d ic a tio n  of the greater Impact o f war and co n tro ls
4* Compiled from Customs# F ile  17» volume 30,(17/30)# ’ S tate of 
Commerce, NavigaHonTand Revenue 1808 ’ #
Orcuzet, L* économie B rita n n iq u e *. . * Appendix 2 ,Tables 1 a 7#
3* C rouzet.op o l t # Appendix 2, Tables 1 & 7 
Qua r t e r ly  H©view * Ma rch 1812,pp 13-17.
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upon exports * The sudden upsurge of exports in 1809» conse^ izent 
on the opening of the South American trade and the repeal of the 
Embargo Act, created a favourable balance* In fact the adverse 
balance of ^6 millions was converted into a surplus of ^6 millions 
In that year* In 1Ô10, however* this temporary advantage was 
eliminated, not so much by a loss of exports but toy © sharp rise 
In imports of quite substantial proportions* This change is not 
nearly so evident in "official figures" and comparison of the two 
sets of figures at this point may shed light on the differences 
between "official" and "real" values*
Although the Whigs queried the accuracy of the "official" trade 
statistics, falsification is probably of a very minor nature. The 
answer probably lies in the nature of the two sets of figures* 
"Official values" toeing more of an indication of volume, while 
"real values" are a more accurate indication of contemporary 
monetary values*(see Appendix A)* It can toe suggested,therefore, 
that the volume of exports was greater than its value, while the 
valu© of imports was greater than its volume* The "official" 
statistics for 1810 show that the volume of imports was lower than 
the volume of exports. On the other hand, "real values" show that 
imports were more valuable than exporta* Thus the price of Brltlet 
Imports was greater than the value of exports* In 1810 there was 
speculation in the South American trade which created a glut and 
a fall In export prices in that market* This would account for 
the unprofitatoillty of the export trade* Speculation helped to 
Increase the price of imports* In 1810, British importers used
the d iffé re n ce  between B r i t is h  and C ontinenta l p ric e s , brought
about by in f  I': t  ton to o t t r a c t  commodities In to  the B r it is h  Is le s
6a t high prices. Therefore3 the main reason fo r  the d if fe re n t
balances o f trade l ie s  in  the nature o f the s ta t is t ic s  used.
In  volume o f trad e , B r ita in  was able to  m ain ta in  a s te a d ily  
favourable balance« V a ria tio n s  in  the p rice s  of exports and 
imports tended to  n u l l i f y  th is  advantage at times and created 
an adverse balance o f payments. This was probably o ffs e t in  the 
long term by In v is ib le  earnings on shipping and insurance. The 
adverse balance o f payments coincided w ith  the years o f economic 
pressure from Fi*anoe and the United States. U n fo rtuua ta ly ,
" re a l va lues" are not a va ila b le  fo r  years before 1805 to  te s t 
th is  idea o f the coincidence o f f in a n c ia l imbalance and economic 
warfare. So B r i ta in  does not provide a complete con trast to  the 
permanent adverse balance o f American trade.
6. Orouaet, OE-O-lt,.. 633-635.
** TO
B ri118h Bxporta
During the e ighteenth oentury, exports from England and Wales grew 
from #6.5 m illio n s  In 1 7 0O-I7OI to  &12,5 m illio n s  in  1750-1751, 
w hile  exports from Great B r ita in  rose from ^17 m ill io n s  in
1772-1773 to & 30 millions in 1797-1798; all Indioativg of a steady
7r is e  in  exports.
The ammal v a r ia t io n  in  exports In the deoaclo before 1612 Is
shown by the o f f i c ia l  to ta ls  from the customs records.
Tabla s Exports from B r ita in  1801-1812*^
(o f f 1c la l  value b)
1001 B 37.78 m 180? a 34.56 m
1802 41.41 1808 34,55
1803 3 1 ,4 3  1809 50.28
1804 34,45 1810 45.87
1805 34.30 1811 3 2 ,4 1
1806 3 6 ,5 2
Exports tended to  f lu c tu a te  according to  the events o f the 
European war. The drop in  1803 coincides w ith  the Peace o f 
Amiens and a f te r  the outbreak o f war there ie  a steady r is e  u n t i l  
1806, although the previous h igh p o in t o f 1802 is  not a tta in e d .
The combined e ffe c ts  o f the French decrees and the Embargo Act 
in  reducing to ta l  exports is  q u ite  sm all, but the le v e l of exports 
in  1609 should be noted. The r is e  above normal le ve ls  suggests 
th a t the American measures prevented an expansion ra th e r than 
caused any s ig n if ic a n t d ec line . The much g rea ter varia tion©  In 
annual export f ig u re s  a f te r  1809 co incide w ith  the more severe 
measures o f Franc© and the United States.
7. Deane & Oole, op c i,t .u87.Table 22 (based on Customs records)
8. OrouEîetj, pp„ c i t .  Appendix 2, Table 1: Custom© 17/301 
Annual B o g l^ e r . issue© o f 1009,1810,1812;
Review. May-August 1812; Q uarte rly  Heview.March 1612,
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The " re a l va lue" f ig u re s  fo r  exports reveal a s im ila r  p a tte rn  o f 
annual change w ith  a small dec line  o f 03-4 m il l io n s  in  1807-1808, 
and much g reater v a r ia tio n s  th e re a fte r. Most noteworthy is  the 
su b s ta n tia l dec line  o f nea rly  020 m ill io n s  in  1811, the year in  
which the Kon-Im portation Act is  renewed,
Table 32; Exporte from B r i ta in  1805-1811^^
(re a l values)
1805 051,10 m 1809 066.r i  m
1806 53.02 1810 62,70
1807 50*48 1811 43.93
1808 49.69
There was a basic upward trend in  to ta l exports in  s p ite  o f the 
d i f f i c u l t ie s  o f the la te r  years. The only apparent e ffe c t of
economic warfare is  to  slow down the ra te  o f increase by a small
Eimount. While no t a© spectacular as the growth in  American trade , 
the increase In  exports shows the steady pressure o f an expanding 
economy succeeding against wartime re s tr ic t io n s ,
( o f f i c ia l  values,Basw 31)
1801-1803 0 36,87 m
1804-1806 35*09
1607-1609 39,77
1810-1812 41.50
Whether In  " o f f i c ia l "  o r " re a l values, the breakdown o f the export
f ig u re s  in to  exports o f B r i t is h  manufactures and expoi’to  o f fo re ig n
produce shows a s im ila r  p a tte rn  of annual v a r ia t io n . The bu lk  o f
B r it is h  exports comprised goods made or produced in  B rita in ,a lthough
re -expo rts  were not unimportant. In  1604, fo r  example 28 per cent
o f export© consisted o f re -expo rts , and by 18X2 th is  had fa l le n
s l ig h t ly  to  24 per cent. Re-exports d id  tend to  be more vu lnerab le
9* OrouBotp op c it,A ppend ix  2^Table 2,
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to  r©s t r ic t io n  ae the percentage f e l l  to  19 per cent in  1B06 under 
the embargos, and to  21 per cent in  1811. Ihe much h igher 
percentage o f B r i t is h  made exports remained much more constant, 
except in  1810-11* Only in  1811 d id the export o f B r i t is h  goods 
s u ffe r  a g rea ter percentage loss than d id  re -exports  o f fo re ig n  
and c o lo n ia l produce*
In
SSJ?ie J k  ; C O ff I c :l a 1 va lus a )
Year B r i t is h  goods
1801 B 25.69 m £ 12*08
1802 26,99 14.41
1803 22.11 9.321804 23.93 10*51
1805 25.00 9,30
1806 27.40 9*12
1807 25.17 9.391808 26.09 7.86
1309 35.10 15,18
1810 34.92 10.94
1811 24.13 6.27
1812 31.24 11*99
The g rea te r v a r ia t io n  in  re-exports  suggests several lin e s  o f 
thought* These include the p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t B r ita in  found i t  
easier to  f in d  a lte rn a tiv e  markets fo r  her own goods up to  1811: 
L a tin  America being a good example. Since the French decrees 
a ffec ted  both exports o f B r i t is h  goods and re -exports  to  E«.rope, 
w hile  the American sanctions tended to  a f fe c t  the former on ly , 
i t  would appear- th a t the C ontinenta l System had a great^impaot on 
B r i t is h  exports than d id  sanctions before 1811$ The drop in  
domestic exports in  1811,co inc id ing  w ith  the Non-Importation A c t, 
appears to  support th is  argument*
A% " re a l values" the two classes o f exports e x î i ib it  the same 
pa tte rn  of annual v a r ia tio n *
10. Ci?ouset, a_iÉlü. Appendix 2, Table 1,
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1 1TatolQ33 s B r i t is h  Exports and Re-Exports 1605-1811$
(re a l values)
Tear B r i t is h  Goods#Ca*T0lPlK#Kl?
1805 0 41,06 m 0 10.04 m
1806 43,24 9,78
1807 40.48 10.00
1808 40.88 9.08
1609 52.24 15,77
1810 49,97 1 2 ,7 2
1811 34,91 9,02
The on ly  d iffe re n ce  seen in  the above tab le  is  th a t the 
percentage o f re -exports  a t " re a l values" tesicied to  be a l i t t l e  
less than but more steady than those a t " o f f i c ia l  va lu e s". In  
18039 some 20 per cent, and in  1609p about 23 per cent, and in 
1612g 20 per cent o f exports were exports o f fo re ig n  produce.
In  the short term,, the annual fig u re s  fo r  exports a t " re a l 
values" revea l a steady upward trend to  1809 a f te r  which there 
was g rea te r aimual f lu c tu a t io n s . But th is  is  too re s tr ic te d  in 
time to  be o f much value In  ascertaining the basic trends in 
exports . In terms of volume or " o f f i c ia l  va lu e s ",1801- 1812, 
B r i t is h  exports r is e  a t an increasing  ra te  because of the growth 
o f exports o f manufactured goods. Re-exports remained stab le  
in  absolute terras fo r  most o f the period  and then declined in  
re la t iv e  terms in  the la te r  years. This f a l l  in  B r i t is h  
re -exports  was not as d ra s t ic  as thsit su ffe red  by American 
re -exports  in  the same years. Thus, the export o f B ritish-m ade 
commodities was the more dynamic and expanding sector o f B r i t is h  
expo rts •
11. Orouaet, op cd tA p p e n d ix  2, Tables 4 & 6, 
Hecksher, TheTîontinonta l too tern,245
Seybert,Stiatl,stioaX Annai^TRF?,- n . LU M  n f i  m * i—TTTrn— Mniw.^M.ir»i t m i
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Table ?6 Average AirnuaX Domestic Exports and R©-lxqpï»t8< 
(official valuasr based on Table 35)
1801-1803
1804-1806
1807-1809
1810-1812
Domestic iSxnonts
&', 24.93 m 
25.26 
28.78 
30.10
Re~SxportB
0 11.93 m 
9,64 
10.81 
10,40
In terns of individual geographical markets for British exports, 
North .America was conaiste.ntly the best customer for British 
exporta during the 18th century* both before and after the War of 
Independence* In terms of regions rather than ooujxtries* the 
Europe* and the "Rest of the World"(eill non-Eu.ropean areas except 
North America) were greater customers* This was particularly 
true of blie latter during the years of sanctions and regulations, 
Nevertheless, in the long term* the United States was the best 
pur o,ha se r of British exports.
Table 37 % Geographical Distribution of Exports in the 16th 
( Off 1 clal vaI'uas |
1 7 0 0-1» 1730-1-: 1750-1« IZZâzâ 1760-1
H * V'/ ^ Europe £3 « 2m £3 ,2m 04 * 2m 05.3m 03*5m £5 A 2m
Baltic 0,3 0 * 2 0 *4 0*5 0.4 0 . 8
Q $ ^iurope 1*7 2*5 3*8 2.5 0 . 8 2.4
Ireland 0*3 0 . 6 1*3 2.2 2 * 1 2.3
N* America 0*3 0*3 1.3 3.2 1.8 3.6
West Indies 0 * 3 0*5 0.6 1.3 1.5 1.9
East Indies 0.1 0*1 0,6 0*9 0.8 2.1
A fr ic a  * 0*2 0*6 0.2 0.8
.England Si Walt38 only*
By 1798 p exports to îlorth-Wcs-fc 'Europe had risen to  010 m illio n s
w h ils t  those to  North America had r ise n to  £6*2 m ill io n s , and
export to the West Indies to 05 millions*
-----------------------------------— -------------- —r  T i—  r^ r~ ^ r  I T» V  •• iT 'r  ifm  "* i  n i f m i r ncw w itM H w iw c iin it. 'n fW min •
12. Adapted from Deane a Gols.Brltlab ISoonoHilc Grov/th.bS?.Table 22,
13. Ibid.
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The continued importance of the United States as a market top the 
exiporta of Great Britain can he seen in the "real" and "official" 
values of British exports in the decade before 1812* As a 
national market the United States is very important and compares 
favourably in else with regional markets such as Europe and the 
"Rest of tlie World" * No other national market consistently 
surpasses the United States*
Table 36 s Destinations of British Exports 1802-1812.^^
(o!E'?ïcïaï Values)
Year Horthem Southern United Rest of the
Euï’ope Europe» States
1802 8 17.4 m a 5.2 m a 5.3 m @13.3 m
1803 12.5 2.7 5.2 10.6
1804 12.7 3.0 6.4 12,3
1805 13.0 2.4 7.1 11.7
1806 10.5 2.6 8.6 14.7
1807 9.4 3.2 7,9 13.9
1808 4.7 6.5 4.0 19.2
1809 13.6 10.0 5.2 21.3
1810 11.9 7.6 7.8 18.4
1611 2.7 12.1 1.4 16.0
1812 6.4 14.5 4.1 18.1
» Incltiaes Spain and Portugal.
Table ,39 ! Destinations of British Exports 1805-11^5
(real values)
Year Europe Asia Africa P,tS,,A. Other areas
1805 S20.4m S3.1m ai.lm @11.4m @8.5m
1806 17.5 3.2 1.6 12.8 11.8
1807 15.4 3.5 1.0 12.0 11,3
1808 13.9 3.7 0.8 5.3 18.1
1809 27.1 2.9 0.9 7.4 19.8
1810 24.2 3.1 0,6 11,2 17.6
1811 18,5 3.0 0.4 1.8 12.8
A more detailed view of the place of the United States as a national 
market for British exports can be seen below.
14. Grouget,op pit.Appendix 2,Table 1*
15. Monthly Magazine*1st July 1812,592^4 
Orouzet vp oit.Appendix 2,Table 6*
J6 -
1 6Table 40 : Destina Mona of Eaqoorte 1801-1812A.
1801 1802 
075îT feili'Sm
1804
01.2m
18Q5
STTfm
180.6
^rr7m
3.9 4.4 1.7 2#3 0,4 1.2
1.2 a.4 1.2 m
9.2 8.8 6.6 S>2 6.7 6.0
0.3 0,4 1.7 3.6 4.3 1.4
Ooimtyy
Huesïa 
Holland 
France 
Germany 
Hoi?way-Denma i
Sweden*** *• — — — — 0.2
Spain*“* — *» — — — 0»1
Portugal# *f - - - 1#4
Mediterranean# - - - - 0.8
U.S.A. 7.5 5.3 5.3 6.4 7.2 8.6
Br.West Indies 4.4 3*9 2.4 4.3 3,8 4.7
Canada# - - - - - 1*0
South America# - - •* - - 1*8
160,8 1609 1810 1611 m g
» 0.4m 00.9m 00.9m 00.7m
1.6 6.6 4.8 0.2 0.3
0.3 0.2 0.7
2.4 3.5 4.9 0,5
0.9 2.4 1.4 1.2 1.1
1.1 1.4 2.0 5.1 tm
4.3 5.8 4*3 5.8 8.7
4.0 5.2 7*8 1.4 4.1
5.9 6.0 4.8 4,1 4.8
1.1 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.4
4.8 6.4 6,0 3.0 —
ible for 1801*:1805
Russia 0 1.7tei
Holland
France -
Germany 0.6
NOFvvay-Denmar k 4*9
Sweden 0.7
Spain 0.1
Portugal 1.0
Mediterranean 1.6
U.S.A. 7.9
Br.West Indies 4.6
Canada 1.1
South America 1.3
The above tables reveal several points of interest. The importanci 
of the continent of Europe as a market for British export© Is 
considerable, but subject to fluctuations during the years of 
economic warfare. Although it is the largest regional market, 
it is best studied %y a division Into northern and southern areas 
because these two areas were affected differently by the 
Continental System, and did develop in different ways during 
the decade. At first, Northern Europe formed a very important 
market but it declined in utility and profitability under the 
pressures of war and the rule of Napoleon. Southern Europe
orei^ r^^ througBou?
Schv/art2!.Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy 
1 7 9 0 * 1 8 5 0 ' 3 V. Wîume' T.oE&t0r ' 2 ....  "
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became a more important market as Britain tried to find new 
markets and circumvent the Continental System $ The growth of* 
trade with Southern Europe more then compensated for the losses 
further north. During thte decade as a whole, exports to Europe 
rose in spite of the Bhort*term losses incurred through war and 
restrictions.
The United States was the best national market# This position, 
however, was not unchallenged in the short-term, as exports across 
the Atlantic were surpassed from time to time by exports to other 
Qoimtrles, Britain, perhaps, was a little less dependent on the 
United States as a market for exports as a whole, than the 
Americans were on the British market and British industry. The 
greater importance of the United States as an export market lies 
not just in its si^ se hut as an alternative area of compensation 
and expansion as the markets of Europe were closed by Napoleon, 
Sanctions were to prevent the full use of this alternative,
Exports to the United States rose after the renewal of war in 1803, 
but a small decline in this growth in 1807, before sanctions, can 
be seen. After 1807 the relationship between exports and 
sanction© is quite marked. The sudden rush of exports in 1812 
might be the result of the rush of American vessels back to the 
United States before war broke out.
The percentage of exports to the "Rest of the World" tended to 
rise during the decade, and became particularly obvious from 1Ô08# 
This can be attributed to the search for alternative market©, 
especially in Latin America, but, as with all increases in exports, 
the pressures from a fast growing industrial economy must not be 
underestimated,
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Heturning to Europe, the area of greatest effort by British 
exporters was in Germany and in Scandinavia, but these markets 
were not sooure or free from French influence as the 
fluctuations and eventual decline of British exports to German 
and Scandinavian ports reveal* This was balanced by the 
considerable rise in exports to Portugal and Spain, but this was 
more a response to the needs of the Peninsular War rather than 
to market demand, and this was complemented by a similar rise in 
exports to Italian and other Mediterranean ports as an effort to 
circumvent the Continental System,
Outside Europe, three points of more detailed interest can be 
seen. The relative unimportance of Canada, possibly because of 
the smallness of its population in comparison with the United 
States, meant that no alternative market of any consequence was 
developed there. Throughout the decade, exports to the British 
West Indies remained at a steady and high level. Although not as 
important as the United States as a market, its steady purchase 
of British goods was a reliable and stabilising influence in the 
changing pattern of exports. Fimlly, the sudden and sharp rise 
in exports to Latin America in 1808*9 and its relative decline 
after the glut of 1610 is readily apparent* Its importance lay 
in its use as an alternative market and in it© consequent 
inability to absorb all the excess British exports during the 
period of sanctions and of depression in Great Britain,
While the bulk of British re-exports went to Europe, a 
considerable proportion of the ©xpoz»ta of British manufactures 
were sent to the United States,
7 9  -
PeyoealîaKe geogy'aphloal Distribution of BKpoyts.
(based o n '" re a l"  values.
Year B ri t i s h  Goode Re-Exnor'W
Hes;^MSPpe.^, Rest Europe _JWL.A
1805 37.8 30*5 31.7 78,7 5.1
1806 30.9 31*3 37,8 72.9 5.7
1807 25.5 33,4 41.1 80*0 3.1
1800 25.7 15,0 59.3 71.1 0.9
1009 35.4 16.2 48*4 83.1. 1.4
1810 34.1 23.9 42*0 76,9 2.7
1811 42.9 6.2 50,9 83.6 0*4
21.4
16.$ . 
28.0;
15.5 
20.4
16.0
The export o f B r i t is h  goods and re-exports to  Europe as a whole 
underwent some f lu c tu a t io n  but su ffe red no d ra s t ic  decline during 
the years of the O ontinanta l System, p o ss ib ly  because of the 
change from the mai'kets o f northern Europe to  those fu r th e r  
south# In  co n tra s t, the impact o f sanctions on the la rge -sca le  
export trade in  British goods to  the United States is  apparent 
in  the decline  in  the percentage sent across the A tla n tic#  Ae 
re -exports  to  the United States were n e g lig ib le ,  B r i t is h  
in d u s try  would foe the sufferer in  any economic war w ith  the 
Americana* The steady r is e  in  the percentage o f B r i t is h  goods 
exported to  the "Rest o f the World" confirms the search fo r  
a lte rn a tiv e  markets and im derllnes the v u ln e ra b il i ty  o f B r i t is h  
domestic e%30%^ t8 to  sanctions* This basic p a tte rn  o f exports la  
confirmed by " o f f i c ia l "  and " re a l"  f ig u re s  for exports o f B r i t is l  
goods and fo re ig n  produce# They fu r th e r  i l lu s t r a te  the r is e  o f 
the L a tin  American and Southern European markets from 
comparative o b scu rity  to  places o f value during  the la s t  years 
o f the decade before the War o f 1812* Of these two markets, 
both purchase B r i t is h  manufactures, w h ile  only the la t t e r  tends 
to  buy B r i t is h  re -expo rts  o f fo re ig n  or c o lo n ia l produce*
17* Hackaher *The PontinentaX Bvs tern.325
Gayer, Rostow a" 'ëohwarta * on oi't. chapter 2,
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î D estina tion  o f B r i t is h  Exporte a t both values#
A# O f f ic ia l  Values 1802-12
181. B r i t is h  Manufactures
Year* s1Europe iUQfàf, Hest ot World
1002 0 6.9m B 4.2 m 05.1 m & 10.6
1803 5.9 2,2 5.1 8.8
1804 5.7 2.5 6.2 9.5
1805 7.0 2,0 6.8 9.0
1806 4.9 2.3 8.2 11.8
1807 3,6 2.6 7.7 11.2
1808 1.6 4.9 34^ 9 16.1
1809 4.6 7.6 3.0 17.6
1810 6.3 5.7 7.6 15.3
1811 1.1 8.5 1.4 13.0
1612 1.9 10.2 4.1 14.9
2. Re--ExîDorts^^
1802 10.3 0.9 0.1 2.7
1803 6.6 0.5 0.1 2.0
1804 7.0 0.5 0.2 2.2
1805 6.0 0.3 0.2 2.6
1806 5.5 0.3 0.3 2.8
1807 5.7 Ü.6 0.1 2.7
1808 3.0 1.5 0*6 3.1
1809 9.0 2.2 0.1 3.7
1810 5.6 1.2 0,2 3.1
1811 1.6 3.7 2.9
1812 4 3 4.2 #* 3.2
B. Heal Values 1605-11
1. B r i t is h  Manufactura©20
Year S.ÎSirroBs U,#,A, South Am. Rest
1805 fi 10.3 m fi 3.3 m fi 11.0 m fi 7.7 m fi 3.7 m
1806 7.5 3.8 12,3 10.8 8.6
1807 5,0 3,9 11.8 10.4 9.2
1808 2.1 6.8 5.2 16.6 10.1
1809 5.7 10.1 7.2 18.0 9.1
1810 7.7 7.9 10.8 15.6 7.0
1811 1.5 11.3 1.8 11.4 0.5
y iiinnw
18. Customs 8/1. Export of British manufactures by Article; 
Croufiset, op eit.Appendix 2, Table 3#
d’lvernois.The Effects of the continental Blockade.(1810). 
------------------- g5=7755=B-----------
19. Customs 10/1-10/4#B 111 sh Re-exports by Country.
GrougZo^. op Pit.Append 1 x. 2, Table 5.
20. Heoksher#% e  Continental System.245 
Porter .Progress of" a Ion 11X79
C r ou g e tT"oî> ' . S p oiSITk fT Table 4#
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p]
2, Re-Exports
Year K#Europe S.Europe U.S.A. Hast(incl.S,Ameplca)
1805 0 6.3 m 0 0.4m 00*4 m fi 2.0 m
1806 5*8 0.3 0 #4 3.1
1807 5.7 0,6 0*2 3.3
1808 3*2 1*7 4.0
1809 8#8 2.4 0.2 4.2
1810 6.1 2.4 0.3 3.8
1811 1*9 3.7 3.2
The Importance of British manufactured goods in the British
export trade with the United States is the most important point
to emerge from this brief survey# Britain depended on the export
of her own goods rather than on the re-export of colonial and
foreign goods for the health and wealth of British exports# Of
the markets for the former# the United States was easily the
most important and most consistent national market# The marked
fluctuations in this export trade to the United States 180?^?12
underline its importance and its vulnerability to American
economic coercion# The table below further illustrates the
importance of the United States as a consumer of British goods#
oo
Table 43 : Exporte of British Goods to the United States
(official'' values   '
Total Br.Ex|)orts Total Br#Goods
   to U.S.A. ...
1802 iS 5*23 IB @ 5.14 m
1803 5.27 5.14
1804 6.39 6.19
1805 7.14 6.86
1806 8.61 8.28
1807 7.92 7.74
1808 3.99 3.93
1809 5.18 5.02
1810 7.81 7.60
1811 1.43 1,41
1812 4.31 4.09
Among the other points gleaned from this geographical analysis of
21# Grouiset# op cit.Appendix 2# Table 6#
Annual Register » 1812 t,p224 *
22# Orou^et# op oit.Appendix 2$ Tables 1 & 3# ' 
Maggregor/CJoiiTO Statistics, vol 3,800*
Sears#L#M. J6fferson and the Embar^o.(1927)#294-6.
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British export trade# the export of both British good© and 
re-exports to b European market which changed in geographical 
importance as Britain tried to overcome the French regulations 
by concentrating on southern 'Europe# and the search for 
alternative markets for British made goods in the "Rest of the 
V^orld" are of considerable importance* All reflect the impact 
of war and economic coercion on the export trade. It remains 
to be seen whether exports were more susceptible to external 
influences than British imports*
British Importa 
British Imports rose steadily during the eighteenth century# 
with a marked acceleration in the rate of growth in the last two 
decades, under the impact of industrialisation the flow of 
imports doubled, in 1700-1701# the official value of imports 
into England and Wales was £5*819,000; by 1760-1701 this had 
risen to £11#189,000 of imports entering the ports of Great 
Britain; and by 1797-*?798 British imports had grown to 
@23,903,000.23
In  the decade prior to the War of 1812  ^British imports were 
comparatively steady with only small annual variations* The one 
exception was the sudden drop in  importa in 1811, which was the 
probable result of the speculative inflow of goods in 1810 
because of price differences between Britain and Europe, The 
drop in demand re s u lt in g  from the depression in B r ita in  
p3?olonged the sluggish flov/ into 1812,
23, Beane & Pole,British Economic Growth, p ,87 ,Table 22.
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Table 44 : British Imports 1 8 0 5-1 8 1 0.
real values)
1805 £53. 85 m
1806 50. 62
1807 53. 50
1808 55. 71
1809 59. 85
1810 74. 53
Table 45 : British Imports 1801-1812.25
. . « - n , jÿ ^ Y c ia ï Value8 ' " " ' '  ' ’ '
1801 £ 32*79 m 1607 £ 27,72 m
1802 31.10 1808 27,55
1803 27,04 1809 32.47
1804 2,:|-91 1810 39,86
1805 28.91 1811 28.62
1806 27.79 1812 27,73
The specu la tive  in flo w  in  1810 is  more marked in  " re a l values" 
than in  " o f f i c ia l  values" which tends to  re in fo rc e  the p o in t th a t 
the change was the re s u lt o f p r ic e  changes ra th e r than any 
su b s ta n tia l change in  the volume of im ports.
Between 1801 and 1812 there was a s l ig h t  upward trend in  B r i t is h  
imports which became much more marked during  the years of boom and 
slump 1809-1912. Apart from th is  there seems to  be l i t t l e  
connection between annual changes in  to ta l  im ports and the 
incidence o f war and reg u la tion s . But# in  comparison w ith  the 
e ighteenth century, the war against Napoleon almost stopped the 
rap id  growth in  im ports.
Table 46 : Average Annual British Imports 1801-1812.^^
1601-1803 £ 29.97 m
1804-1806 £ 27,87 m
1807-1809 £ 29,24 m
1810-1812 B 32.07 m
24. Quarterly Review.March I812#ppl5-17,
25. Customs 17/50,State of 0ommeroe#Nav ig a t ion and Revenue, 
Orouaet.op cit.Appendix 2,. Table 7*
26. Based on Table h5.
—  8 4  —
Imports can be divided into those fop re-export and those for 
consumption within Britain# Although n r direct figure© are 
available for the latter# a rough guide esm be obtained by 
subtracting re-exports from the total value of im ports. L ike  the 
t#tal Inflow of imports# imx)orts for home consumption remained 
fairly steady until the crisis years of 1809-1812* llien, 
imports changed as the result of developments in the British 
economy# and not as the direct result of any American sanctions 
w'hich had begun Im 1807, There was a substantial rise in 
imports for home consumption in 1810» probably the result of 
spaeul' tion in B rita in #  and an equally sharp fall in 1811-12# 
probably as a result of the slackening of demand in Britain as 
the economic depression began to curtail business and private 
expenditure.
Table 47 * far Home Consumption and Re-Export.
(Official values)
Home
S®S£ T o ta l. Importe. a8".B3CtlOX‘tt5 it'PercentsA’8 Consnmntlon.
1802 S 31.10 SB & 14.41 IB 46.3 % S 16,69 la
1803 27" 04 9.32 34,4 17.72
1804 26.91 10.51 39,0 16.40
1805 26.91 9.30 32.1 19.61
1806 27.79 9.12 32.8 18.67
1807 27.72 9,39 33.8 18.33
1608 27.55 7,86 28,5 19.69
1809 32.47 15.18 46.7 17.29
1610 39.86 10,94 27.4 28.92
1611 28,62 $.27 28.9 20,35
1812 27.73 11.99 43.2 15.74
The im ports o f commodities fo r  re -expo rt showed a s im ila r  
steadiness in  the e a r ly  and m iddle years o f the decade# after 
the upsets o f the Peace o f Amiens which caused a sharp drop in  
1803* During these years approxim ately o ne -th ird  o f a l l  
im ports were re-exported. From 1808# however# th is  trade
9N»»w<wwti*#dwe#i
27, Crouget; op Appendix 2, Tables 3 & 7i
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experienced sharp f lu c tu a tio n s  in  volume and in  the 
percentage o f to ta l  imports* The very eharp r is e  in  1Ô09 
co incides w ith  the end o f the Embargo Act and a re la xa tio n  o f 
the C ontinenta l System*. The- la te r  v a r ia tio n s  1810-1612 mark 
the increased s e v e r ity  and then the break-up o f the 
C ontinen ta l System* Imports fo r  re -e xp o rt do not fo llo w  the 
same p a tte rn  as imports fo r  heme consumption 1810-12 but both 
re f le c t  the demand and a b i l i t y  to  reach th e ir  respective  
markets*
In general, l ik e  to ta l  Imports# impoi'ts for- consumption w ith in  
Great B r ita in  were much less va ria b le  than B r i t is h  e%%]orts.
This <e # perhaps because exports were more subject to  the 
vagaries o f economic warfare than im porte , In  o ther words, 
B r ita in  was more vu lnerab le  to  ac tion  against her exports than 
aga inst her im ports*
Throughout the e lg îiteanth century# but e sp e c ia lly  in  the la te r  
decades# the ■'p r in c ip a l supp lie rs  o f goods bought by B r i t is h  
merchants were not in  Europe or in  the American co lonies and 
United States? but in  the areas o f the "Rest o f the W orld"#such 
as the West Indies and the Ernst Ind ies* In  1772-3# fo r  ,
example? out o f a to ta l  import b i l l  o f £13*59 m illio n s#  
approxim ately 05*5 m ill io n s  came from these tro p ic a l regions and
on ly  £1,9 m ill io n s  from North America and 0i|.*5 m ill io n s  fi»om
28Europe."
K»OTteWWW*H*^AW<lei
28. Deane & Pole.BEiMASi._MQMoi:alc Qpowth.%87.Tabls 22.
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T ills  p a tte rn  was continued in  the e a r ly  n ine teenth  century? 
even during  the years o f economic w arfa re , A f te r  the "Host 
o f the World"# Europe as a whole was a more im portant 
s u p p lie r o f Imports than the United S tates, L ike exports#
Europe was d iv ided  in to  northern and southern markets whose 
re la t iv e  importance changed under the pressures of war*
Northern Europe# which included the whole co a s tlin e  from Franc© 
to  Russia# o r ig in a l ly  provided many o f B r ita in *s  needs. But 
import© from th is  reg ion  dropped d u ring  the periods o f strong 
French a c tio n  in  1808 and 1810-11# and these losses, u n lik e  
exporte# were not balanced hy any increase in  im ports from 
southern Europe. During the whole decade imports from the 
la t t e r  region remained com paratively s ta t ic .  They d id  not 
increase when most needed and a c tu a lly  f e l l  in  1808-9, hu t 
u n lik e  exports which can he sold in  most markets no m atter 
what s o r t o f commodity is  exported# im ports depend more on the 
nature o f the supplying country and# therefore# southern Europe 
may no t have been able to  replace northern  Europe as a source o f 
supply because o f c lim a te  and geography.
Imports from the United States remained sm all and reasonably 
steady except during  the embargo 1807*9? a re f le c t io n  of the 
ihnerioan des ire  to  s tr ik e  a t B r i t is h  im ports w h ile  re ta in in g  the 
b e n e fits  o f th e ir  own export trad e . Imports from the United 
States derived th e ir  importance not from to ta l  value but from the 
nature and importance o f the in d iv id u a l commodities supplied by 
the United States*
— By —
Losses in Europe and the United States were more than 
compensated by a steady rise in imports from the "Rest of the 
World". This remained true until 1811 when the sharp decrease ii 
the possible result of a contracting British demand as a result 
of the depression. So total imports wore comparatively 
unaffected by restrictions until the slump which was brought 
about ill part by the loss of export markets caused by France 
and the United States. So long as Britain could purchase goods 
from the "Rest of the World" there was little that Franc© or the 
United States could do to affect the total inflow of goods: 
but an amilysla of the main commodities may reveal weaknesses.
Year
(official values) 
Horthern Europe Southern Europe Unitea States
Rest of 
World
1802 S 6.3J+ m @ 2.81 m fil. 9 2  fii £19.88m
1803 5.82 3.04 1 .9 1 16.25
1804 6.57 2.07 1.65 16.61
1805 7,60 2.40 1 . 7 6 1 7 .0 4
1806 6.04 2.15 2.00 17.59
1807 5.66 2.30 2.84 16.90
1808 2.33 1.89 0 . 8 3 2 2 .5 1
1809 6.39 3.19 2.20 2 0 .3 0
1810 8.02 4.45 2.61 2 4 .7 7
1811 2.68 1.66 2 .3 0 2 1 .9 6
1812 3.92 2.24 1.29 2 0 .2 7
Two commodities of vital importance in the composition of imports 
wore cotton and grain. The former was essential to the growth of 
the industrial areas of Britain while grain imports reflect a 
degree of dependence on foreign supplies of foodstuffs. As 
records are usually in volume rather than monetary value, it ie 
difficult to ascribe exact orders of Importance but for both
@^8tqms 4Z5--4/8,Record of Imports by Oountry,(for U.S.A.) 
Orouaet, m  cit. Appendix 2, Table 7.
Maogregor.Commercial Statistics, vol.3,800.
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oomraoditi©8 the figure© for volume give Indications of annual 
fluctuations and sources of supply*
Britain imported substantial quantities of cotton during the
year© before the War of 1612* In spite of the difficulties of
war and the restrictions, British cotton imports rose during the
decade we a whole. The greatest annual variations in imports
took place during the years of dispute with the United States,
But relations with the United State© were not the sole
determinant of the scale of imports as the size of the crop, the
market price and the British demand for cotton were all important.
However, in those last years of the decade the variations
during the years of dispute with the United States show that the
normal rate of Increase of cotton Imports was ©lowed down and.
partially reversed* In contrast to the long term growth then,
the diplomatic entanglement with the United States and economic
sanctions caused a short-term reversal of the normal trend*
Table 49 : Average Annual Import© of Ootton,^
180.3*1604 57*64 million pound©
1805-1807 64*26 " "
1808-1810 87*63 " "
1611-1812 77.34 " "
The annual fluctuations in British cotton imports confirm the
pattex»n of upward growth and greatest variation during the years
of controversy with the United States* There is a ©teady rise
in the volume of cotton imports until 1807. Imports fall
drastically in 1608 when the effects of the embargo would be
felt and then rise beyond the nomal levels in 1809-10 which
suggests that the end of the embargo opened a floodgate of
30. Hecksher, The Continental Bystem, 242*
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co tton  importB, This was fo llow ed by a considerable dec line  
1811-12? and then during  the war w ith  the Americans a le v e ll in g  
o f f  occurs w ith  co tton  imports a t th e ir  pre-1807 le v e l*
Table 50 s B r i t is h  Cotton Imports 1802-1616,
Hi WFiimiiimijtuTi miiff wwww^hm^hi wh i»i ii» ih'hiii>ip
■Xeag SlllignB of, Pctaida.'^ '' Bag3...of^ 0o
1802 «H. 281,353
1803 53.81 238,898
1804 61.86 24.1,510
1805 59.86 252,620
1806 58.17 261,738
1607 74.92 282,667
1808 43.60 168,138
1809 92.81 440,362
1810 132.48 561,173
1811 91.66 326,141
1812 63,02 261,205
1813 #» 249,526
1614 287,631
1815 270,189
1816 369,462
The United States was the greatest s ing le  su p p lie r o f cotton  but 
the Americans d id  not enjoy a monopoly s itu a t io n . During the 
yea 1*8 o f sanctions im ports o f cotton from B ra z il and In d ia //' 
although there 1b not enough data to  d if fe re n t ia te  between 
B ra s ilia n  and American co tton  1809-10 s u f f ic ie n t ly  to  say th a t 
B r i ta in  found an alternative source In  the Portuguese colony.
A t f i r s t  the United States was not the p r in c ip a l source o f co tton  
P r io r  to  1790, the B r i t is h  West Ind ies supplied over 70 per cent 
o f B r it ia h *3  Imports* The re la t iv e  importance o f these is lands 
declined during the 1790*a as the United States grew in to  a 
dominant p o s it io n  which was confirmed during  the fo llo w in g  
decade. By 1806-10, over h a lf  o f B r i ta in 's  cotton imports 
o rig in a te d  in  the United S tates, Not q u ite  as dramatic in  the 
to ta l  p a tte rn  o f Imports but o f considerable lo c a l importance
31, Hecksher,The 0 #n tln e n ta l System*242,
32, Seybert.S ta t is t ic a l  Annals, ^2
N, Buck#The Development and O rganisation o f Anglo-American 
Trade,(19S5),p34-37.
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was the growth of imports from India and Brazilc- 
Table 51 : Origin# of British Cotton Imports 1802-12*^^ ^bags)
ISEK
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806 
1807 
1808 
1809 
1810 
1811 
1812
Brasil Ind la
107,494 74,720 8,535
106,831 76,297 j.0 ,2 9 6
104,105 48,588 2,561
124,279 5 1 ,2 4 2 1,983
124,939 51,034 7,787
171,267 18,981 1 1 ,4 0 7
37,672 5 0 ,4 4 2 1 2 ,5 1 2
301,107 35,761).
389, 605 79,382
128,192 118,514 14,646
95,331 96,704 2 ,6 0 7
i2 : Origin of Cotton Imnorts by !
Other OowntPles
90,634
45,474
86,358
75,116
77.987
81,010
67,512
105,511
92,186
64,789
64,563
34
U.S.A.
Braall
British West laûles 
Mediterranean 
East Indies(India)
Elsewhere
.1Z84.-90
0.16
7.87
70.75
20,44
0.78
24.08
11.43
35.23
18.47
8.90
1.89
1806-1810
53.14
16.07
16.23
1.28
12.79
0.49
The United States had not only become the supplier of’ the 
greatest volume of cotton imports but also as imports rose the 
value, and hence the importance,of the cotton trade grow. 
Between 1800 and 1807 the value of cotton imports from the 
United states trebled. In the same period the quantity of 
cotton imported rose by only 70 per cent, thus indicating a 
tremendous rise in cotton prices during the war and thus much 
prosperity to the United States,
33. 90ybert t l o a a $ . 92
Buck? op c i t e 3C--37
34. 2)11180m * Cotton ,Tz*ad©, p86 (quoted from Buck)
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3 5Table 53 ï Value of Gottorn Imports from U.S.A,
HI l. l r i i» ■ ■  IIWII MIIH IIH I ■■■HMMWa m i l l IIMH H M . I I IB W .IW
(Official values)
1800 £ 517,083 1805 £ 911,155
1801 £ 612,012 I8O6 £ 845,936
1802 £ 865,559 1807 £1, 532,531
1803 £ 881,961 1608 £ 425,925
1804 £ 817,081
Note the d ra s tic  f a l l  In  I 8O8 when the Embargo Act took e ffe c t
British imports of grain varied considerably between 1800 and 
1812. The large-scale imports at the beginning of the decade 
took place in years of very bad harvests and much distress.
As conditions improved, grain imports slackened off. In the 
years of war and sanctions, two points were observed. The 
large imports of grain in the relatively prosperous years of 
1809-10, and the sharp drop in imports during the depression 
years of 1811-12: the reversal of the previous pattern. This
can be explained partly by Napoleon's policies and by changes
in British agriculture. The available evidence points to an 
improvement in farm output in this decade and to less severe 
shortages in 1811-12 than in 1800*1, Hence there is less 
dependence on imports, Napoleon forced grain into Britain
1809-10, by using the licence system, because of high 
production and low prices in Europe ( aided by British 
speculation), but when Britain had a greater need for grain, 
supplies were cut off.
Table 54 i British Grain Imports 1800-1812.^
1800 2,130,000 quarters. 1807 1,270,000 quarters.
1801 2 ,4 0 0 ,0 0 0  " 1808 700,000 "
1802 1,280,000 " 1809 1,700,000 "
1803 9 4 0 ,0 0 0 " 1 8 1 0 2 ,3 2 0 ,0 0 0 "
1804 1 ,2 4 0 ,0 0 0 " 1811 7 0 0 ,0 0 0 "
1805 1,480,000 " 1812 850,000 "
I8 0 6 8 6 0 ,0 0 0 "
'3§"7"yompllS'Trom Ous16m^ ï'7722%ï7/3681ate of 0ommeroe. 
Navigation and Bëvënïïe I8OO-I8O8 .
3 6 , W.F.Galpin. The Grain Supply of England during the 
Napoleonic WaTsTT#fT7CT-g%:--------------- ^----
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Ireland was the largest single source of grain and was safely 
under British control. The other important suppliers were in 
northern Europe and shipments from them, Germany,Prussia,Russia 
and what had been Poland, declined as a result of the enforcemer 
of the Continental System. As a source of grain supplies the 
United States was comparatively unimportant. Its importance was 
potential rather than actual, French restrictions therefore, 
were more destructive than American sanctions to British 
supplies of grain.
Table 55 s American Grain Supplies to Britain 1800-1812.^^«niiiia ij I IWIMWI i     i«l M        
(volume in thousands of quarters)
Year Quantity Percentage Year ..Quantity. Percen
1800 90 4.2 1807 250 20.0
1801 372 15.4 1808 13 1.8
1802 80 6.2 1809 172 10.0
1803 109 11,6 1810 98 4.2
1804 4 0.3 1811 18 2.5
1805 13 0.8 1812 11 1.3
1806 79 9.1
Unimportant as these supplies were, the effect of the Embargo 
Act is apparent in 1808. The quantity imported in 1808,however, 
was not unique as the other small imports in several years 
testify.
Without accurate information about agricultural production, it 
is difficult to estimate the importance of grain imports into 
Britain. The high pries of grain at times of distress and the 
demands to end the distillation of grain indicate that the lack 
of grain imports could have made Britain's position very 
difficult. As the United States was an unimportant supplier, 
sanctions were not a serious threat to Britain*© food supplies.
7 .  G a l p i n ,  G r a i n  S u p p l y . . , ,  2 3 8 - 2 5 6
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The United States was not a major source of other imports such 
as wool, sugar and coffee. The two tropical commodities rise 
steadily while wool Imports vary considerably during the decade. 
The changes in the latter commodity were the result of British 
demand rather than French or American action#
Throughout the period before the outbreak of war with the 
United States, British imports varied much less than British 
exports because of the comparative steadiness of the demand for 
imports for consumption within Oreat Britain, Apart from cotton, 
the United States was not an important supplier of imports. The 
United States was of much more value to Britain as a purchaser 
of British exports than as a supplier of imports.
Between 1792 and 1814, the mmber of ships registered In the 
British Empire rose by 60 per cent. The bulk of this tonnage 
was owned in Great Britain, where the upwarrd trend in tonnage 
was even greater^ By 1814, the tonnage registered in Great 
Britain hud doubled in spite of the war and the comparative 
standstill in expansion 1804*'1809»
Table 56 g British Regj 
Year British Empire
gpea, vessiel s ..Mjfl ..Æonï^ge 30
Great Brltaim(OEnglana only
1801)
isaasm
1792 16,079 1,540,000
no data 1793-1796
g M m
19,776
1 _ 
1793
1799
1800 
1801 
1809
1803
1804
1805 
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810 
1811
1814
16,902 
17«2$9 
17,891 
18,, 806 
19,676 
80,490 
20,879 
21,714 
20,984 
22,006 
22,280 
22,646 
23,070 
23,703 
24,106
1,618,858
1 ,6 6 4 ,8 7 8
1 ,7 5 2 ,2 4 4
1,911,988
2,016,11?
2.123,804
2 ,1 6 7 ;1 2 5
2,268,568
2 ,2 2 7 ,6 3 6
2 ,2 6 3 ,6 2 4  
2,281,622 
2,324,818 
2,368',486 
2 ,4 2 6 ,0 4 4
2,474,744
1 3 ,3 5 6
1 3 ,6 0 6
13,896
1 4 ,7 2 1
15,387
16,195
1 7 ,0 0 3
1 7 ,8 0 9
1 7 ,9 6 0
18,059
18,265
1 8 ,4 7 6
15,687*
Tonnage
1,187,000
1 ,4 0 4 ,6 5 1
1,443,967
1 ,5 0 0 ,6 7 8
1,643,208
1,733,488
1,845,364
1 ,9 2 7 ,4 5 2
2,018,999
2,035,683
2 ,0 2 4 ,3 6 9
2,039,926
2 ,0 7 1 ,4 3 7
1,870,000*
no data 1812-1813 
24,418 2,616,000 19,585 2,330,000
Annual admission to British registry confirm this upward trend ij 
ownership and filie in the gap in the above table for 1812. The 
outbreak of war in 1812 sav/ a alight decrease In the number end 
tonnage of vessels admitted to British registry after a constant 
annual Increase in both numbers and tonnage since 1803,
*T î~ i- ‘r r ^ n m ‘*iTtiiigTtrr'ii~"riiinfinnrirr r i r r r - '—rrr-if -m ii
38, Oustoins 17/30.State of Commerce,Navigation and Revenue,1806 
ParklnBon.Trade Wlnae.(1948).83
Perceval MSS.Bti.Afld.ESS 49,177{Budget Statement of 1810, 
PÔr'beï'jlPrdgreBB of a Nation,511-514.
A m m a L R m iateg.,; ÏI9 .
Table 37 : Admissions of Veemols to British Registry.
1801 2.779 369,563 180? 2,76% 377,519
1802 2,827 358,577 18o8 5,222 ^48^758
1603 2,286 307,570 1809 5,5%? 493,527
1804 2,535 537,443 1810 3,905 534,346
1805 2,520 339,763 1811 4,025 556,240
1806 2,564 342,248 1812 3,899 515,044
As employment o f e liipe is  a muoh more immediate In d ic a to r  of 
the response o f the B r i t is h  merchant f le e t  to  war and 
Sanctions, two aspects o f employment have to  be determined. 
The p ro po rtion  of the B r it is h  merchant f le e t  employed in  
overseas t r a d e a n d  the degree o f ^^^^endenoe by B r ita in  on 
fo re ig n  veosels fo r  overseas commerce» The dependence on 
American vessel a ;la c n ic ia l*
A breakdown o f the employment o f vessels in to  trade routes 
reveals th a t a com paratively sm all number o f v e s s e ls ,B r it is h  
and fo re ig n  were employed in  the long d istança trades to  the 
Amerioae,Asia and A frica»
Table 58 s Vessels en te ring  anc
Entered Cleared
Long Distance Trade© 1,231 1,493
(o f which in  US trade 202
Southern Europe 1,151 878
Northern Europe 5*762 4,918
Tota l in  OverseaB Trade 8,304 6,526
Total in all Trades* 13,035 15,891
* Includes I r is h  and coasta l trades*
The o f f i c ia l  re tu rns  fo r  entrances and clearances give equal 
weight to  every ship,whether coaster or East^lndiaman,Ships 
in  oversea© trades were la rg e r and th e re fo re  more valuable» 
Taking 1806 as a saimple year (see Table 59), the record o f 
entrances in to  B r i t is h  p o rts  shows th a t the average slge o f a
39. PorteF.P?og:ç»0SB. of a. Matlm..
40, Papk:lnson,TmaeWgj^a.73.
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British vessel was apound 120 tons? while a British vessel 
arriving from the United States averaged about ISO tone*
Foreign vessels tended, to be l a r g e rw ith  an average ei&o o f 
1.50 tonSj, and those arriving from the United States were the 
la rg e s t o f a l l  a t an average o f 250 tone» Smallness In  numbers 
in the long d istance trades Is  balanced by the g rea te r s ise  
o f the vessels concerned. This gives even greater Importance 
to  the xmtioeim o f fo re igs i vesse ls p since the records o f th© 
movement o f B r i t is h  ships w i l l  inc lude those in  the coastal 
and 8hort*GGa trades.
Foreign tonnage played a considerable ro le  in  B r i t is h  overseas 
trade. Probably about h a lf  o f a l l  the vessels in  that trade 
were fo re ign^ The B r i t is h  merchant fleet, despite  the meroant^ 
l i e  ou tcry  a t American com petition and p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  could not 
meat the demands o f B r itis h , commerce, The re lian ce  on 
fo re ig n  tonnage Is  h ig h lig h te d  by the almost complete monopoly 
enjoyed by American vessels in  the trade w ith  the United 
States* A lthough ship movements in  B r i t is h  records are ju s t 
d iv ided  in to  B r i t is h  and fo re ig n  ships? the o f f i c ia l  American 
fig u re s  have shown th a t p ra c t ic a l ly  a l l  the American trad© 
w ith  B r ita in  was ca rried  In  American ships* Therefore, i t  
la  a ju s t i f ia b le  assumption th a t the vessels l is te d  as 
*^forelgn” in  the trade w ith  America in  Tables 59 and 60 are 
American owned «
8hip movements in  1608 and in  1811 In d ica te  th a t American 
ships not on ly dominated B r it is h  trade with, the United States 
but a lso played an im portant p a rt in  B r i t is h  trade  w ith  o ther 
p a rts  o f the world* In  1808, fo r  example, entrances in to  
B r i t is h  po rts  from the United States f e l l  from 653 vessels to 
134 vessels w h ils t  entrances o f a l l  fo re ig n  ships f e l l  from
9 7  ***
4*087 to 1 ,9 2 5# The dooXin© in American trade was not solely 
responsible for the latter decrease, thus suggesting that the 
withdrawal of American vessels under the Embargo Act probably 
played a part in the decline of total foreign entrances. In 
other vfords, British commerce was indebted to the United 
States on many routes other than that across the Atlantic*
As total clearances and entrances in 1808 of British ships 
only rose slightly, it would ##pear that the embargo did damage 
Britain by depriving British merchants of the use of American 
tonnage.
Table 59 t Entrances into British ports 1797^1812,^^
A*  British Vessels,
Total jg^ umber Number ex U8A.
Tontg aMsa. Tons
1797
1798
1799
1800 
1801 
1802 
1303 
I8 0Ç.
1805
18 0 6
1807 
1808
1809
1810 
1811 
1818
9,081
9,537
10.557 
10,496 
10,347 
13,626 
1 2 ,0 6 0  
10,508 
1 1 ,4 1 4  
12,118 
1 1 ,2 1 3  
11,316 
1 2 ,6 5 6
1 3 .5 5 7  
12,908
1,121,704
1,289,144
1,375,169
1,379,807
1,376,620
1,794,333
1,620,286
1,396,387
1 ,4 9 4 ,2 9 0
1,482,664
1 ,4 3 6 ,6 0 7
1 ,3 1 4 ,2 4 1
1,539,573
1,609,088
1 ,5 2 2 ,6 9 2
77
1 3 1
100
1 35
7 2
701
12
7 7
2
1 7 ,2 4 4
2 5 ,9 5 0
1 9 ,7 7 0
30,638
1 7 ,2 4 3
16,003
11,347
18,229
2,188
7,910
8,195
18,969
5 1 4
41. Oastoms 17/22-17/30 ana 4/5“4/8.
ItoB k lB S oa MB3.3M Add M88 38,759,2226 
Annual fe~A'lsian. 1012,219 
MontnlV 'Hamgina.let July, 1812,
1797
1798
1799 
1600 
1801 
1802 
1803 
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808 
1809 
1810 
1811 
1812
1797
1798
1799
1801
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810 
1811
B. Foreipoft Vessels 
Total Number 
B^ips Tona
Humber ex TIBA
Bhlpe Tone
3,447
3,112
3,012
5,512
5,497
3,728
4 ,253
4,271
4 ,517
3,793
4 ,087
1,925
4 ,922
6 ,8 7 6
3,218
451,084
420,028
476,596
7 6 3 ,2 3 6
780,155
480,251
638,104
6 6 7 ,2 9 9
691,883 
612,904 
660, Ili4  
282,892 
759,287
1 ,1 7 6 ,2 4 3
687,180
550
7 2 3
m
3 63
3 9 2
5 0 8
m
582
6 6 9
430
356
1 2 4 ,0 1 4
1 5 9 ,4 1 2
91,348
1 1 5 ,4 2 7
89,500
1 0 2 ,3 6 6
1 3 5 ,6 3 4
167,814
34,186
140,938
1 5 6 ,7 5 2
1 2 1 ,0 4 4
1 0 1 ,0 1 3
Table 60 : Clearance* from Bnltlah Porta 1797-1811 4 2
( no data for 1812)
A. British Vessels
T o ta l Number 
Shins Tons
Humber to USA. 
Ships Tons
9,121
10,565
11,085
11,867
10,282
13,012
1 1 ,1 7 9
1 1 ,1 3 1
1 1 ,6 0 8
1 2 ,2 5 1
11,428
1 1 ,9 2 3
12,499
13,090
12,774
1,074,835
1.139.151  
1,302,551
1 ,4 5 5 ,2 7 1
1 ,3 4 5 ,6 2 1
1 ,6 2 6 ,9 6 6
1,453 ,066
1,463 ,286
1,465,209
1,486,302
1 ,4 2 4 ,1 0 3
1,572,810
1 .5 3 1 .1 5 2  
1 ,6 2 4 ,1 2 0
1,507,353
62
141
135
89
39
38
56
14,351
2 9 ,2 5 2
2 9 ,4 1 0
21,090
13,738
12,682
8 ,7 3 1
8 ,3 3 2
1 4 ,2 0 4
42. Customs 17 /22 -17 /30  and 4/5 -4t/8
Husklsson MSS. BM Add MSB 38.759.f226 
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99 
EL
SlilpB Toïie Ships Tona
1797 3,002 398,766
1798 2,645 365,719
1799 2,392 414,774
1800 4,893 685,051 507 112,596
1801 5,626 804,880 718 158,916
1802 2,398 461,723 397 93,523
1803 3,672 574,542 - 472 111,857
1804 4,093 587,849 412 100,778
1605 3,632 605,821 433 106,083
1606 3,459 568,170 53& 138,856
1807 3,846 631,910 67& 183,385
1808 1,892 282,145 817 52,499
1809 1,530 669,750
1810 6,641 1,138,527
1811 3,350 696,232
The dependence of a eonaiderabX© part of British overseas 
trade upon foreign tonnage seems to have been accepted, apart 
from the outcry about .American competition* British sMpbuilt-» 
ing output did not rise during the decade* Output bore no 
relation to the annual changes in registered tonnage, 
presumably because losses,sales and sox^appings Irere taken into 
consideration* In 1797,630 vessels of 78,250 tons 'mr© built 
In Great Britain* A peak of 1,194 vessels constructed was 
reached in 1803, and by 1808, the last year about vjhich data 
is available, only 455 ships were built
The dependence on foreign tonnage Is the principal point to 
emerge from this brief survey. Large as the British merchant 
fleet was, it could not cope with the increasing demands of 
British commerce and could not compete with American vessels,
43# Oustoms, 17/go* State of Commerce,Navigation and Revenue,
'w 1 0 0
Concltislons
In terms of volixmo, British trade was balanced favourably, but 
In terms of meh value of trade there are some doubts about 
thle balance in the later years of this period* The invisible 
earnings of British shipping are difficult to assess but they 
were probably not as beneficial ae American shipping profits 
were to the United States*
The basic trend of British esq^orts is upwards despite the annual
fluctuation© which tend to slov/ down the rate of growth in the
la tar years of the decade* While the bulk of British exports
consisted of manufactures, the importance of the variable 
re*export trade must not bo overlooked* The export of British 
manui'actures rose steadily emd, until 1611, was less affected 
by economic warfare than the re-export trade, which declined 
under the pressure of restrictions: an indication that French 
regulations had a greater impact than American sanctions prior 
to 1811,
The United States was the largest single national nmirkot for 
British-made goods, %e*e%ports tended to be sold in the 
markets of European eountriee, Exports to i^rope as a whole 
were greater than to the United States, while substantial 
quantities were sent to the ^^ Hast of the World”, There was a 
steady rise in exports to this latter region, partly as a result 
of Britain*© search for alternative markets during th% periods 
of French and American restrictions. On the whole,British 
exporta to America were more important than British imports 
from the United States« British exports tended to switch from 
northern to aouthoz/n Europe duz'lng the years of Economic 
warfare? although Germany and Bcandlnavla remained fairly 
constant customers. As trade with northern î^ luropo declined,
1 0 %
the importance o f Portuguese, 8panlsh and o the r Mediterranean 
markets grow? a re s u lt o f B r ita in *s  e f fo r ts  to  circumvent the 
C ontinen ta l System* The two main fea tu res o f the export trade 
with the "Rest o f the World” are the la rge  and steady West 
Ind ian tra d e , and the sudden r is e  and then re la t iv e  decline  
o f the L a tin  American market. The p e rs is te n t search fo r  
markets underlined the c ru c ia l importance o f the export o f 
B r i t is h  mamzfactures fo r  the British economy*
Imports tended to he much steadier than exporta and showed 
l i t t l e  o v e ra ll upwaM. trend* There was no t such a d e f in ite  
re la tio n s h ip  between imports and economic warfare as there wae 
w ith  exports . M ostly there was a la rge  and steady in flo w  o f 
goods fo r  consumption In  B r ita in *  The main f lu c tu a tio n s  occurred 
in  im ports fo r  re-export#
The la rg e s t s u p p lie r o f im ports was the "Rest o f the World" 
w ith  the con tinen t o f Europe fo llo w in g  ahead o f the United 
States* Except fo r  the year o f the Embargo A ct,im ports  foo ii 
the United s ta te s  were steady bu t not la rg e -s c a le . T he ir value I 
la y  not in  q u a n tity  o f to ta l  imports bu t in  th e ir  commodity 
composition* The Unlttad S tates was the most im portant 
B upp lie r of cot ton, needed by B rita in *©  growing t e x t i le  in d u s try , 
Cotton could be obtained from B im s il and In d ia , bu t not in  
s u f f ic ie n t  q u a n t it ie s . U nlike  exports ,im ports  from northern  
Europe were not compensatod by imports from fu r th e r  south.
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Thus Britain depended upon the United Btetea a a the moat 
important euatomer for her mamifactnres, and only a little lesa 
for the smaller but very valuable Import trade in raw cotton <,
In both cases, American shipping dominated the trade* American 
ships generally played a vital part in the flow of Britain's 
commerce because, in spite of the eiae of the British merchant 
fleet, it was never able to handle all of the commerce of 
Britain, and hel3? her war effort, nor could it compete with the 
more economical American vessels, American purchases,supplies 
and ships were essential to the British economy,whereas only 
British supplies of manufactures and her purchases of cotton 
were similarly important for the American economy, Great 
Britain was more dependent on the United States and thus was more 
vulnerable to eeonoml# sanctions*
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GimPTER FOUR
BRITAIN AND THE EMBARGO 1807-1809
Between December 1807 and March 1809# Britain wae subjected to 
two forme of American economic sanctions: the Non-Importation 
Act which prohibited the entry into the United States of a 
selected number of British manufactured goods, and the Embargo 
Act which confined all the ships flying the American flag to 
harbour and thus deprived Britain of their employment* The 
effect© of those two measures ware both economic and political. 
The former can be traced througli the impact of sanctions on 
British trade and then on the economy as a whole. But the main 
aim of Jefferson*a policy was to induce a change in the British 
maritime policies towards the United States, and consequently, 
the political effects of sanction© on the government and it© 
opponents must be examined*
According to official sources the balance between British export© 
and imports was more favourable in 1608 than it had been in 
1807 because of a alight fall in importa. In 1807 there had 
bean a surplus on the balance of trade of ^36,840,000 which was 
increased to 07,000,000 during the year of the embargo*^ So the 
American efforts had no apparent adverse effect on Britain's 
overall trading position: sanctions might have been estpected to 
affect the balance by shutting off British export markets in the 
United states# This conclusion,however, is not confirmed 
entirely by the value of escort© and import© at "real values." 
This reveals that a small cash surplus of £2,400,000 in 1806 
was turned into a deficit of £3,020,000 in 1807, which plunged 
to 06,020,000 in 1808. Though exports fell by nearly £3,000,000
Grou^et, on cit. Appendix 2, Tables 1 & 7.
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in 3.8 0 6 - 7  the fall between 1807 and 1808 when sanctions were in 
operation was lass than £1,000,000* The deficits of 1807 and 
1808 were the result of a rise in British Imports from some 
£50,000,000 in 1806 to over £55,000,000 In 1808. As tha 
American measures would have greatest effect on British 
exports, whether to the United States or whether in American 
ships to iisurope, they cannot he held responsible for this 
deficit in 1806* Despite the differing conclusions from the two 
sources, both show that American coercion had no visible Impact 
on Britain's trade as a whole.
In total British exports In 1808 did not differ significantly 
from the total value of ejqports in previous years. Exports had 
totalled 034,000,000 in both 1804 and 1605, according to official 
sources, had risen to £36,520,000 in 1806, and then dropped 
slightly to £34,5000,000 in 1807# The total value of British 
exports in 1608 was £34,350,000: a drop of only £10,000 from the 
previous year.*'^  This pattern is confirmed by the "real value" 
of British exports in these same years, A total of £50,480,000 
worth of goods had been exported in 1807, and this fell to 
£49,690,000 in 1808*^ On this basis the Embargo Act and the 
Non-Importation Act cannot be said to have caused any 
significant fall in the total outflow of British exports.
Changes in the composition and destination of British exports an( 
more important, the impact of sanctions on the potential gro?/th 
of British exports suggest,however, that Jefferson's policy was 
not a total failure economically. A general relaxation of trade
2. Orouset, op oit.Appendix 2, Tables 1 & 7#
Quarterly Hevîëw.March 1812, 13-17*
3. OrouKet, op git.Appendix 2,Table 1» Annual Register.1609.161* 
& 1812 g MonSily'''Review.Ma.y-August l8i2TouarterlynR^~View,Maroh 
1812.
4. Orougot.op pit.Appendix 2,Table 2*
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occurred in 1809 with the repeal of the two American acts and 
an Increased laxity in the enforcement of Napoleon's decrees* 
This would Ifead to an increased flow of trade, but the 
sharpness and slae of the rise In British exports in 1809 
suggests that the French and American policies may have acted 
as a brake on the growth of Britain's exi^ort tradet that 
potential rather than actual growth was the main victim of 
American sanctions. In 1808 exports had been officially 
valued at 034,330*000 but in the following year the outflow had 
risen to £30,280,000 which was not only a sharp rise on the 
previous year but also a total considerably above the norm for 
the years prior to 1808. "Heal values" show a similar jump 
from 0 4 9 ,6 9 0 ,0 0 0 to 066,010,000#'^ As there had been no real 
fall in exports in 1808, this suggests that production for 
ex|?orts had grown considerably during that year and that sales 
of this new production had been held up until tha relaxation 
of American and French restrictions on trade. Although the 
removal of sanctions was not the sole cause of this sudden 
upsurge of exports, as speculation boosted e^cports to new 
markets such ae Latin America, a comparison of the inoreaees 
in exports and imports in 1809 suggests that the removal of 
restrictions was not unimportant# Speculation because of higher 
prices in Britain, did lead to an Increase in imports in 1809, 
but this rise wae not nearly as great as that for exports* 
Whereas the official value of exports rose from 034,550,000 in 
1808 to 050,260,000 in 1809, imports only rose from £27,550,000
Grouset, op cit.Appendix 2, Tables 1 & 2,
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to £32,470,000 which added £10,000,000 to the balance of
6payments surplus» This sharp growth in exports, after 
speculation Is taken into accoimt, indicates that the 
restrictive measures of the United States and France had acted 
as a brake, and had kept exports static in 1806 rather than 
caused any decrease in the total of exports*
The relative impact of the American and French measures on
actual and potential exports in 1808 can be ascertained through 
the breakdown of export data into exports of manufactures and 
of colonial goods* As the United States was only an important 
purchaser of the former, and the European markets absorbed both 
types of goods, the effects of the sanctions can be 
distinguished best in the change© in the outflow of British 
manufactures*(although much of Britain's trade with Europe 
was carried in American vessels and would also be affected by 
the Embargo Act)»
Officially, the export of British manufactured goods in 1808 
totalled £26,090,000 which was a rise of nearly 01,000,000 
over the total for 1807s a year which had seen a fall of over
£2 ,000,000 from 1806# There had been a steady growth in thC
export of manufactures until 1806, and the total for 18o8 
represents a ©wing back to the normal pattern* This suggests 
that the Berlin Decree, in spit© of the difficulties of its 
enforcement, had a greater impact than the Non-ïmportation Act 
and tha ismbargo Act combined. The small increase in exports
6. Crouset, on cit.Appendix 2, Table 2*
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and, the reversai to normal levels Is also seen in the rise 
in the "real value" of the exporte of British goods of
0400.000 in 1806 over a total of 040,480,000 in 1807#^
In spits of the Berlin Decree, re-exports rose slightly in 
1807 and only fall significantly In 1808 from 09,390,000 to
A
07.660.000 § a pattern confirmed by "real values»" This 
suggests tv70 related possibilities; the Berlin Decree was 
ineffective In stopping the flow of colonial goods into Europe 
and that the losses only took place in 1808 when the . Embargo 
Act caused the withdrawal of the American vessels in which 
that trade was carried normally* This tends to contradict the 
probable offact of the Decree on the export of British 
manufactured goods* It is possible that soma other factor auch 
as the slackening of pi'oductlon in 1807 or the emergence of 
other export markets in 1607-8 disguised the full affects of 
the French and American policies on the export of British 
manufactures# Comparing the general impact of both American 
and Frenclz restrictions on the two types of exports, British 
manufactures underwent fairly small annual fluctuations and 
actually rose in 1808, whereas the re-export trade suffered 
proportionately greater changes, especially the loss in 1808* 
Both types of exports experienced sharp increases In 1609 
whilst re-exports rose from 07,860,000 in 1608 to £15,180,000 
in 1809*^ The increase of over 100 per cent in re-exports 
compared with a 30 per cent increase in the exports of 
manufacturée indicates that the former benefited most from
7# Orouaet, Appendix 2,Tables 1,4 & 6,
Hecksher,The Continantal System,245
Beybert#8tatiBtioal Annals,287 
8# same sources as footnote 7#
9. Orouiaot, Appendix 2,Table 1.
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the relaxation of the French Decrees and the re-employment of 
American vessel a#
Both types o f exports were at a substantially higher level than 
normal in 1809 which confirms the overall impression that 
speculation and increased production for exports contributed to 
the sharp overall growth in exports* The lack of American 
shipping and the restrictions of the French would lead to a 
stockpiling of colonial goods for Europe's markets. Relaxation 
led to a flow o f re-exports in 1809, but as this was not 
sustained in 1810, it would seem that stockpiling was 
responsible for the sharp rise in 1809# The export of 
manufactures, on the other hand, continued at a high level in 
1810 Indicating that more than just stockpiling and 
speculation were the causae? an increase in production for 
export and In demand for British products took place 1808-10*
The benefits of this growth might have been felt earlier had it 
not been for French and American restrictions, of which the 
latter, because of the Non-Xmportation Act was more likely to 
effect British industry* A geographical analysis of the 
changes in British exporte will help to confirm whether American 
sanctions or French Decrees had the greater Impact upon the 
growth o f British production for world markets* 8o far it can 
be seen that sanctions had relatively little impact in cutting 
back exports, but their role as a brake on expansion has not 
been proved conclusively#
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Table 61 ; Geographical Distribution of British Exports.
{official values ; £ millions)
10
1806 1807 1808
A. B C A__.. B C . A , B a..
N#Europe 1 0 .5 ii.9 9.5 9.4 3*6 5*7 4*7 1 *6 3.0
S.îiîurope 2 .6 2,3 0,3 3#2 2*6 0 *6 6.3 4.9 1.5
U.S.A. 0 .6 8 .2 0.3 7*9 7.7 0 *1 4*0 3*9 0 .6
Rest of World Ik.7 11.8 2 .8 13,9 1 1 ,2 2.7 19*8 1 6 .1 3.1
1810
A . 0 . A B 0
N.Europe 1 3 .6 4.6 9.0 11.9 6.3 5*6
8,Europe 10 ,0 7*8 2 .2 7.6 5*7 1 ,2
U.S.A. 5.2 5*0 0 .1 7.8 7*6 0 ,2
Rest of World 21,3 17.6 3,7 18*4 15.3 3.1
A « Total Exports
B
0
Exports of British manufaotxiree» 
Re-exports.
Exports to the northe%*n half of Europe underwent a small decline 
during the first year of the Berlin Decree, because of a fall 
in the export of British goods from £4,900,000 to 03,600,000 
which was not compensated by the rise of £200,000 in re-exports. 
This suggests that the decree was more harmful to the output 
from British factories. In 1808, however, all types of exports 
declined drastically, with a drop of 30 per cent* This 
coincided with the Withdrawal of American vessels from the 
Bzropaan carrying trade under the Embargo Act, though the 
continuing drop In the relative position of the export of 
British goods suggests that the French decrees continue to have 
some effect on British trade as well. The relaxation of 
American and French restrictions in 1809, and the extensive use 
of licencesf created a three-fold Increase tn both types of
10. Customs 8/1, 10/1-10/4
Crousset, ov olt«Appendix 2,Tables 1,2,& 3 
d'lvernois.The Effects of the Continental Blockade,(1810)* 
26-27,66-68:
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exports? of which only that In the export of British goods was 
sustained into 1810# Tîzis tends to confirm the temporary 
stockpiling of colonial goods in 1808* and the increased 
output from Britain's factories to meat increasing continental 
demand, and that the major obstacle to expansion in îSurope was 
not BO much the French decrees (in spite of the early effects) 
as the lack of American shipping in 1808. The lack of that 
shipping being the only new obstacle introduced and taking 
effect in 1808 which could account for the drastic decline 
in exports sent to northern Hîurope in that year.
The bulk of British exports sent to the southern half of Europe- 
the Iberian Peninsula and Mediterranean porta - consisted of 
British manufactures* Such exports doubled in 1808, continued 
to rise at a slower rate in 1809 and then declined to a level 
which was still above normal in 1810, This raises two related 
possibilities. This rise in 1809-10 above previous levels 
provides more evidence of the growth in British production to 
meet European demands. Secondly, the decline in euch exports to 
northern Europe in 1808 was more than balanced by the flow to 
southern Europe in that same year. This was not paralleled by 
any switch in the re-export trade. Southern ;Suropa,therefore, 
provided an alternative market and an alternative, if longer, 
ïiiathod of entry into the markets of central Jihirope,where the 
demand for British goods was undlminished by Napoleonic decrees. 
There is no evidence of the Embargo Act having any effect on 
this ôrades It may have boon aided by the switch to this market 
by forcing a concentration of tonnage on this route because 
American ships were not available to ease trade further north* 
Lack of shipping might have curtailed the full exploitation of 
this southern market but there is no evidence of any shortage of
- Ill - 
tonnage for this trade.
The British exports trade with the United States Bhould be the
trade where the effects of American sanctions alone would be
seen distinctly, British trade with the United States? which
consisted mainly of British manufactures, was cut by half as a
result of sanctions. As this trade was virtually monopolised by
American vessels, the results ought to have been more drastic.
Certainly the number of foreign-owned vessels which cleared from
British porta for the United states fell from 6?6 to 217, but
this v/aa partly balanced by the increased use of British vessels
11which rose from 38 to 55, The Non-Imp or te t i on Act banned the 
import of certain products but not others euch as cotton goods. 
The Embargo Act prevented the departure of American vessels 
from American porta but not the arrival of British and American 
vessels Ijstde^n with unrestx’ioted commodities» Although the 
embargo came into effect in December 1807, the normal westward 
flow of vessels from Britain did not take place until the 
spring of 1606, As most American vessels made at least two 
annual voyages the effects of the loss of American vessels v/ould 
not be felt until the summer and autumn of 1606, by which time
Ip
Britain had found alternative markets, " Buch technical 
loopholes in the American acts together with smuggling via 
Canada tended to mitigate the effects of the sanctions on 
Britain's export tj?ad©. In 1807? goods to the value of
0 7,700,000 had bean sent from Britain's factories to the United 
States. In 1808 a loss of 03,600,000 was sustained. Just as
11* Cuatoms 17/22-17/30t 4/5-4/8,
12* HeatonyHon-Importatlon 1805-12", Journal of Economic Hi at or: 
November 1941,ppl78-198,
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108808 Iti the United states were more than compensated by a 
05*000,000 increase In the flow of British manufactures to the 
"Best of the World," While exports to Canada remained static, 
exports to the British West Indies rose from 04,600,000 to 
05*900,000 and exports to South America rose rapidly from
01,300,000 to £4j,800,000s a rise which continued up to a maximum 
of 06,400,000 in 1610* The bulk of this, trad© with the "Rest of 
the World" comprised British manufactures* While exports to the 
United States slowly returned to normal levels in 1809 and 1610, 
this rise was not as dramatic as that elsewhere and by 1810 
exports were only at pre-embargo levels* In other trade^routas 
sanction© had acted as a short-term brake on expansion, but 
sanctions and the continued uncertainty about Anglo-American 
relations had a more permanent effect on the growth of British 
exporta to the United. States* Therefore, while the losses 
caused by the embargo were not as great as expected, the loss 
of potential growth was considerable.
Such potential losses were obscured by new British Interest in 
Latin Araerloa where, for a time, speculative growth blun(^ ?ed the 
losses in North America* By 1810-11, the loss of the United 
States market as a growth point was felt when the relative 
backwardneee of the Latin-Americeai economy, the continued output 
of British industry, and much ©peculation proved that the temporary 
relief provided by Latln-A.merioa in 1808 could not compensate for 
long-term losses in tha American trade, Official British interest 
in the possibilities of trade with Latin-America, which had been 
the colonial preserve of Spain and Portugal, had been aroused 
before the embargo. Oastlereagh had urged the seizure of Buenos
- 113 ~
13Aires as a base for British trade# This was in spite of the
failure of an earlier expedition under Admiral Popham and General
Whltelock in 1806-7,He was motivated partly by commercial
considerations but mainly by the need to maintain some British
interest on the South American continent as a counterpoise to
French success in Europe#^^ The initial British seizure of
Buenos Aires had whetted but not sustained British commercial
interest in the area# It wae the need to find an alternative
market for British goods in 1808, combined with Napoleon'a
attempt to take-over Spain in May 1808 which opened the way
for large-scale British trade with the area# With the start of
the Peninsular War, British exports to Ijatin-Amerioa rose
rapidly enough to compensât© for losses in the export trade to
the United States# Contemporary and later observers have
remarked that this sudden change of events saved Britain from the
worst effects of sanctions and the Continental Byetem#^^ While
this market did provide relief in the short-term, the American
acts, by foz^ oing British manufactures to look elsewhere for
markets, substituted a less stable market for that of the United
States# Although fears of a glut, expressed by George Canning
in April 1808, or of the impermanence of the Latin American
market, voiced in 1606 by Alexander Baring*, were not unlmown,the
reXie# to British industry and the large-scale speculation in
South American trade 1608-9 created a new feeling of boom and
prosperity in Britain, in spite of the American sanctions and
16French decrees»* This speculative boom was one of the main
* iij— wm w .
13, Vane.Oastlereagh Gorreepondence#Yol,8«96-100 to Cabinet in 
memo ' iSoT",'
14, C.J.Bartlett,Oastlereagh,pp70-72*
15, Smart, Economie. Annals of the l^th, Century #vol # 1,176-177# 
d' IV8rno%lB%93r^^ [(B'"'%e ContjHen¥al Blockade# .36#
16, Bathurst Papers,BM Loan 57»yol • 3: 'letter S' 'canning* 19th 
April,1808,
A .Bar ing .Inquiry into Orders in Council# #, .let ecl#,p 50,
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causes of the slimp in tha British economy in 1810-11 when 
ciroumstancea made the weight of sanctions felt. Thus, as far 
as the effects of sanctions on British trade with the western 
hemisphô3?e 1808-9 were concerned, they caused short-term losses 
In Anglo-American trade which were balanced by gains In Latin 
America: gains which were to help the policy of economic 
sanctions in the long run because of the speculative nature of 
the Latin American market.
The effect of sanctions upon British exporta was not catastrophic, 
and, in fact, the Embargo Act would seem to have been a failure* 
The losses caused by direct cuts In trade with the United States 
and by the lack of American vessels In the European carrying 
trad© were balanced by gains elsewhere; in southern Europe and 
In Latin America, Only In the export trade with the United 
/ States did losses occur in the export of British manufactures 
\ and these were balanced by gains in southern Europe and south 
America, Although the immediate losses were not very great, they 
were Important in the longer term for the success of the sanctions 
' policy. Losses were sustained not ©o much In actual exports as 
. in the potential growth of B??ltish exports. Compensation for 
,i actual losses was found in the politically unstable,economicallyf
■/ backward, and highly speculative markets of Latin America which
/
were no substitute for the growing and stable American market 
In the long run. The lack of American vessels,combined with the 
restrictions of the Continental System, forced exporters to 
emplo^ r more costly British vessels on more circuitous and 
consequently more expensive routes? thus increasing prices and 
cutting back the profits on which future expansion would be based*
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The American sanctions, therefore, introduced a degree of long 
term Instability into the British export trade, even though the 
short term losses and dislocations had been nullified by 
increased exjjorts to new markets.
The total flow of Imports into Britain does not appear to have 
been affected by American sanctions. Officially imports 
totalled £27,720,000 in 1807, fell to £27,330,000 in 1808, and 
then rose to £32,470,000* This rise continued in 1810* This
17trend is confirmed by the "real value" data for total Imports,
The Hon-Importa11on Act had little power to effect imports
other than to reduce British purchasing power by the decline in
export sales to the United States, The Embargo Act would have
a much greater effect aa the bulk of trade with the United State
was carried in American ships, which were confined to port: in
18o6, 1807 and 1808 some 99 per cent of American trade with
18Britain arrived in American vessels.' In 1807 some 633 vessels 
mostly American, totalling 16?,814 tons had entered British 
ports from the United States. In 18oB this was reduced to 134 
vessels of a total of 34,186 tons. This reduction was not 
matched by any increase in the employment of British tonnage 
in the American trade: 84 vessels in 1807 and only 12 isi 1809
Consequently, British imports from the United States which 
consisted of American produce for consumption within Britain, 
fell from £2,840,000 in 1807 to £630,000 in 18o8, Even though 
1807 had seen a higher volume of importa than in previous years
17. Oîii^ toma 17/30
Cï'Oïizet, O'D cit.Appenûlx 2.Table 7.f  fnTT*"nn&i#%T,r iK i,ii*n  « •*
QuarteiQjy Rev 1 ew,March 1812,13-17.
18, ASPON 1 »
19* Customs,17/22-17/30 ; 4/5-4/6 
Ammar s t e r .1812» 219 # 
ffontlSy'"ÏÏagazIne ,1st July, 1812.
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the total for 1808 was substantially below that of the years 
before 1807, Losseo cannot be measured just in terms of value, 
but aleo in terme of how far demand outran supply# Thla can 
be assessed in the cases of cotton and grain imports.
On the whole, shortages seem to have been met by increased 
impox^ts fx’om the "Rest of the Viforld#" Imports from this region 
rose from some £1 6,90 0 ,0 00 in 1807 to £2 2,5 1 0 ,0 0 0 in 18 08, and 
balanced the reductions of Imports from the United States axid 
Europe caused by the withdrawal of American ships#(import© 
from northern Europe fell by £2,330,000 and those from southern 
Europe by £410?000)# That this new source of imports was 
adequate to meet overall British demand was shown by the 
increase of £1,360,000 In imports for consumption, in Britain 
in 1608 and by the total value of imports from the United 
8tates in 1809# If there had been any severe shortage of goods 
normally supplied from the gfeited States then a considerable 
inflow in 1809 might have been expected# As it turned out.
Imports in 1809 only returned to their normal pre-1807 level,
Pn
£2 ,200,0 0 0, and then only rose slowl|r in 1810.
The United States had been the principal supplier of cotton 
since Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton gin as a result 
of which Imports of cotton grew until a peak was reached in 
1807. In that year Britain imported 171,267 bags of American 
cotton out of a total inflow of cotton of 282,667 : the
20. Gjistom§J^ /5--ii/8;
Grouzet op oj.t, aupendix 2,table 7.
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2 1Americana* highest relative and absolute level# This high 
level produced a temporary glut In supplies which helped to
0 9
delay the effects of the e m b a r g o I n  spite of this relief
total cotton importa fell somewhf t and cotton imports from the
United States fell very heavily. In 1808? out of a total
import of 166,138 bags of cotton ? only 37,672 were of American
origin. This decline, which was very evident i:ri the port of
Liverpool, was effective In cutting back production in the
Lancashire cotton industry where the resultant distress was
to have political repercussions# Scarcity of cotton drove \vg
25•prices? just as shortages of othor commodities didi in 1808,
Likewise the price of Bea«-Island cotton which had been fairly
steady in 1808 at a round two shillings per pound, rose rapidly
during the sumiuox* of 1606, reaching a maximum of five shillings
and ninepanee per In January 1809« A rapid reduction
24followed soon after the removal of the Embargo Act.
The Bhox»tage of cotton and. the high prices led to efforts to 
develop new sources of supply# Imports from Brazil rose from 
18,891 bags to 50,442 bags# The Levant Company, which 
attributed the shortages to the embargo, imported cotton from 
Tn.-'^ keye The East India Company oMorad some twenty million 
pounds of cotton from India, none of which arrived until 1809# 
as a result of which the Company sustained heavy losses about 
which It complained to the ^British government in succeeding
21# Seybert,Statistical Annals# 92#
Buck, 30-37.
22# Perkins, Ihf’oXoguo to War, 26#
23. Bins rt, Economic Annale.,. ? vol 1, p#183*
24 « Jennlngs,W # ? The American i:mbargo ,(1927 ), 72-62 #
25. BT 1/41, f92, petition from Levant Comnany,31st Aug#1808*
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26years* " In spite of these efforts the high prices and above 
normal Imports of cotton In 1809 and 1810 ^ when 4^0,382 and 
361^173 bags were imported respectively «* the embargo did 
produce an acute shortage of cotton at a time when the cotton 
Industry was expanding rapidly as the growth Industry^ of the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain, Only the glut of imports In  
1607 mitigated the shortages for a time. Of all the Industries 
of Britain, the cotton Industry* dependent on American sources 
and American markets for its products, bore the brunt of American 
efforts to employ sanctions 1807*9 #
The Irish linen Industry depended upon Imports of flaxseed from
the United States and It was thought in 18o8 that war with the
27
United States would disrupt supplies* Certainly sanctions
reduced drastically, supplies to thla industry. Imports from the
United States fell from 48,038 hogsheads in 1807 to 38,783 In
?81808 and only lO^lSS In 1809# This had serious repercussions 
not only for Irish industry but also for British seapower. In 
early 1603, the Navy Board complained of the scarcity of 
flaxseed and of hemp because "foreign supplies are precarious"
9i,
and that attempts to groiY hemp in Canada had failed,^ '
Contrary to the belief of ministers such as Lord Uawkesbury, in
1807 Britain suffered a bad harvest which was followed by an even
30worse one in Britain was self-sufficient in food in years
of good harvests but bad harvests made her dependent on imports 
31of grain*"" The Continental System out off normal supplies from
27. Memo of let March 1808.
28. B'F lYltY.flj.l.Table of Irxah imports of f3.axseea,
29. 10g-!.g.f290; BT l A S .flSli Memos of 28th March & 11th July
1809.
30. Liverpool MSS.BM.Ada.aS3.36.571! Hawkeshury to Wellesley
3rd November 3X807., Sma rt. Economic Anna la. vol 1,182*
51. Portei%Prgsreas„M..a..Iati
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Northern Europe and, because of the Embargo Act, the United 
States could not provide an alternative source# In 1808, out 
of a total import of 700^000 quarters of grain, only 10,000 
came from the United States. In the previous year the United 
States had been able tc supply 250,000 quarters out of a total 
of 1,270,000**"'" The embargo curtailed Buppliee when Britain*s 
needs were greater: thus a potential source of food, was cut off 
As a result» grain prices rose from 68/lld per quarter in 
January 1.808 to 30/6d in June* and to a maximum of 9h/6d in 
March 1809a In this difficult period the major source of 
grain was Ireland taut this was not sufficient to alleviate the 
bad harvests as the rising prices indicate. The high food 
prices, to which the embargo contributed* was a major source 
of social unrest in 1800, That the United States could have 
supplied Britain if sanctions had not been in force as 
demonstrated by the Import of 930,000 quarters of grain from 
that country in 1809 out of a total of 1 *700,000 quarters# 
Though the sanctions had little apparent Influence on total 
imports, through their effects on particular commodities, they 
dislocated and cut back industrial production and helped to 
drive up food prices#
By withdrawing American vessels from the high seas, the Embargo 
Act harmed British trade in two ways* Direct transatlantic 
trade was reduced drastically, though the effects were 
mitigated by the slow return of the Amerioan ships to the 
United States. A considerable part of British trade with 
Europe.» end particularly to those parts of northern Europe 
under French Influence was carried in American ships# This
32. G a i p i R 2.50-2 5 6 .
33* Monthly prices In each issue of Gentleman's magaaine#
declined as a result of the embargo* As British tonnage was 
overstretched by the needs of war, these locoes could not be 
coBipeneated# Many British ohlpovmere actually welcomed the 
withdraw#! of the more economical and more efficient American
7J,
vessels* Certainly a greater proportion of British trade was 
now carried In British ships and* according to George Rose, a 
junior minister* earned profits totalling millions*^' But 
the decline in trade with the United States and Europe, together 
with the longer and often more circuitous routes to new export 
markets* put a strain on the British merchant fleet. British 
trade needed American vessels and suffered accordingly; longer 
routes, new and lass stable markets and inferior ships were a 
less profitable substitute.
The effects ci the Embargo Act do not seem to have been 
appreciated at the time# The British government* shipowners and 
journalists concentrated their attention upon the short-term 
benefits to British shipping resulting from the American 
withdrawal* .Perhaps this is an indication of the strong influence 
of the "shipping interests" as foppcsed to inclus tria lists or 
workers,had upon the government of the day. In a similar fashion, 
the American government whether under Jefferson or Madison* did 
not appreciate the British need for shippings perhaps the New 
England opposition to the embargo prevented action. All future 
sanctions were aimed at depriving Britain of her most important 
singl# export market while allowing British use of American
343 Bee Bteph0n*"War In Ulsfniise» and the evidence of Klrkman 
Finlay and John Gladstone to the Gommons inoulrjr on the 
orders in Council, 1808oPp 18p8,
33# Annual Register,1809,131, George Rose to House of Common,1809
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vessels* whose owners uwu&lly accepted regulations in order 
to meUce a profit. If the Woctrgo Act had been repeated, and 
the American ships withdrawn again* when the British economy 
was less strong and her war-effort vital to the survival of 
the government, then sanctions might have worked more speedily 
and possibly prevented the War of 1612#
There are two basic difficulties in assessing uhe effects of 
the commercial disruptions caused by the sanctions upon the 
British economy aa a whole# Firstly, to distinguish the 
effects of sanctions against the background of social and 
economic upheavals which characterised the process of 
industrialisation# Secondly, the fears expressed by 
politicians and businessmen of the potential economic 
consequences of sanctions must be distinguished from the 
actual effects,
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 
British economy was undergoing a process of rapid expansion 
and Industrialisation, the main characteristics of which were 
the growth of factory-based industries, especially in textiles? 
mechanisation and the application of steam-power; migration to 
the new industrial towns where an urban working class was being 
created? the Mergence of Lancashire and of Yorkshire as 
industrial regions, with the Midlands growing as well, and the 
emergence of a new class of Industrialists* Agriculture had 
been improved considerably and now made Britain self-sufficient
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in basic food supplies, except in years of bad harvests* The 
eocipl consequences or Industrialisation, with the creation 
of towns and cm urban proletariat were not as beneficial; 
considerable distress in the form of poor living conditions 
and dependence on wages for an adequate food supply created 
suffering and insecurity amidst economic progress# The war 
with France had stimulated demand for munitions but had not 
converted the economy into that of a "nation at war", 
Government financial requirements, together with expansion, 
had created an Inflationary situation, especially through the 
issue of paper money from 1797» In spite of social distress 
there was a feeling of confidence In the dynamic strength of 
the economy* The main weaknesses, according to one recent 
authority, were the dependence of some new industries such as 
cotton and wool on export markets in the United States and 
Europe, and a dependence on foreign supplies of raw materials.
The economic and cocial conséquences of the embargo tended to 
be felt moat in those Industries and areas which were 
involved in manufacturing goods for ejsport, though the general 
rise In prices, due to the scarcity and speculation, must have 
bean felt throughout the economy# Food prices rose by nearly 
5C per cent and even greater rises took place in the prices 
of imported raw materials* such as wool* which rose from 6/9d 
per pound in ISO? to 26/- per pound in the following year, 
and In cotton which rose from l/<- to 2/7d per pound*^^
36. OrottSiet, i2L..£tb. 2O3-20U.
37* Grain prices in the monthly issues of Gentleman'b
Magazine, Other- prices In Smart,Economic Annals^.«yol 1,
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Costa of production rose, cutting back profits so that 
employers were less ab]i to %my the higher wages made 
neoGQsary by the higher food prices. Interruption of exporte 
generally caused short-term leases until alternative markets 
were found and loss of raw materials helped out back production; 
forced up prices and caused more unemployment* In ©pita of 
these general observations about the probable effect© of 
sanctions, actual complaints of losses and specific examples 
of distress were limited in numbers and geographically.
Though British commerce was placed on a less secure footing, 
the nation-wide effect© of sanction© on the economy seem to 
have been so diffuse that comment on this question was 
confined to those who either benefited or suffered as a 
result of the Orders in Council and the Araerioan sanctions,
Generally, shipowners and merchants In London felt that the 
sanctions together with the Orders In Council* were beneficial 
because of the removal of American competition at saa. The 
evidence of the House of Gommons Committee of Inquiry in the 
spring of 1806 brought forth views of both the beneficiaries 
and the sufferers. The former included the Liverpool 
shipowner and merchant,John Gladstone, the London Merchant, 
Robert IcKerraX, and the Glasgow manufacturer^Kirkman Finlay, 
This inquiry revealed that those who complained of the losses 
caused by the sanctions were almost entirely composed of 
merchants engaged in trad© with the United States, and that 
they blamed the Orders in Ooimcll rather than sanctions for 
their losses. Those engaged In trade with Europe, such as the 
men named above, which was also decreasing^ supported the 
Orders in Council and saw no reason to blame sanctions. This
t,ype. of evMenoe indicates the limited nature of the economic
■' '"38losses caused by sanctionsJ Those who complained against
7
the Orders in Council were less concerned with actual losses*
which only stimulated the later successful search for nei?
mdrketk, than wlth potential losses. They feared that the
Americans would be unable tc pay foi* future Imports from
Britain* and they dreaded an even greater breach with the
United*,States* The observations of William .Pinkney, the
Ameridhn minister, illustrate this# A Bii'mingham correspondent
of Pinkney wrote that war with America would cause considerable
unemployment in that olty, yet the same man thought that it
would be humiliating to repeal the Orders In face of American 
P9
pressure," This fear of potential losses was oohoed by
political figures rmch as Alexander Baring who feared the
growth of American industry# This evidencep mostly from 
witnesses from Lancashire* tends to o<nfIrm the idea that 
whatever actual losses the Embargo and Non-Importation Acte 
caused to British exports# their role aa a brake on industrial 
and commercial expansion was equally* If not more important»
The limited effects of sanctions on specifics industries and 
regions was seen in the economic and social distress amongst 
the new urban proletariat* Only in a few areas was distress 
attributed to the cutback in exports# The principal sufferers 
were the iveavers in the IancashX7-e cotton industry* but even 
here the connection between sanctions and the distress is not 
clear* As manufacturers incurred losses they began to out 
back wagess but they began to do this in the autumn of 1807
3 6# PPlôOoqüommons Inquiry into tne Orders in OounHTT 
39. Ü8 DlD.DQBpéVOl Ib.Pinimey to Madison» 11th March»1608»
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when .Supplies were good and the American market open,^^ This 
Bug^ jésts that the initial hardship was the result of the
C^bnti^ental System# Hardship in the cotton Industry found 
/political expression in parliam ent in March 1808 when the 
8;^hject of the Orders In Council was debated.Though this 
y//hardship and outcry took place before the embargo could have had 
effect on the cotton industry (which was unaffected by the Non» 
Importation Act) again fears of future losses were expressed and 
much rhetoric was expended in attacks on the Orders in Council. 
At this early stage little evidence of distress was produced,and 
it was confined mostly to Lancashire# The weavers of that 
county continued to suffer as the cotton industry really felt 
the hito of sanctions in the early simmer of 1808* As a result# 
Sir Robert Peel presented a bill which would prescribe a 
minimum wage for weavers whose bad condition he attributed to th< 
lack of foreign trade*^^ In support of this bill, rioting 
occurred in the towns of Manchester,Bolton,Bury and Rochdale,
In all cases, wages rather than prices were the principal 
grievances of the weavers * The government replied by using 
troops to suppress the riots. This was the only militant 
action taken over economic conditions that arose in part from  
economic sanctions. Thus the so c ia l distress of 1808 was not 
seen to be cgused by sanctions alone# The link between 
sanctions and distress was to be seen only in the cotton 
industry* In th a t Industry, apart from a few riots, the 
reaction of the workers was peaceful* Sanctions did not cause 
the widespread distress or social revolution, but their more 
limited effects did have a considerable political impact on the
40* Gray,D, Spencer P erceva l,176*7#
Bears. L *V3^BFer8cm''a Embargo.278-290.
41* Smart.EcmiorniolRmals.'"vol''T'. IQB*
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Opposition and'^ the on the government whose "de facto" leader,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer#Spencer Perceval, did consider
important policy changes as a result of the social unrest and
42economic dislocation.
The disruption of trade and the social distress of 1808 had two
\
related political consequences. Firstly, tlxe dreation of a 
movement composed of Whig politicians and businessmen who 
opposed Britain's policies towards the United States. Ih 
particular, this group demanded the withdrawal of the Orders in 
Council which had been Issued in November 1807* Although the 
Embargo Act did not produce any drastic reversal of British 
policy, the results of sanctions played a considerable part in 
inducing the Tory administration to reconsider and modify its 
policy; a limited political result for an American policy whose 
economic results had been limited also.
Although fears of distress, economic losses and social unrest 
had been expressed by Lords Gi^ville and Auckland, the Whig 
leaders, in the autumn of 1807»^^ the first large»soale 
opposition to government policy manifested itself in the spring 
of 1808 when, as a result of petitions from merchants, 
manufacturers and hard-hit areas, the «Cfects of American sanctions 
relation© with America, and the Orders in Council were debated 
in parliament.^ The debates provided an opportunity for the 
Whigs to present their arguments against the OMers in Council.
42. Gray,Spencer Perceval. 174»S.
43. Auckland to Grenville l6th October 180?,L.M.Bears,"British 
Industry and the Embargo," Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
I#19»20,p89.
T.Grenyllle MBS.BM.Add.MSB 41,852,Lord Grenville to T. 
'mënViîÏB 1807.
44. Gray, op eit.172-4, for details of petitions.
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Although this had no apparent effect upon the governmont, they 
were successful In forcing a parliamentary inquiry into the 
comr>iaint0 outlined in the petitions. Ultimately this Inquiry 
was to do little more than provide a forum for the opponents 
and supporters of the Orders in Oounoil to air their views.
This presentation of the arguments against the Orders in Council 
by politicians and businessmen laid the foundations of the 
later successful campaign against the government in 1812, 
Sanctions, together with the Orders In Council, stirred up a 
political movement in Britain which was to achieve ultimately 
the main aim of American policy* This was the most important 
political effect of sanctions in 1808.
The Whigs did not oppose the American decision to employ eoonomi
coercion. Instead they reserved their wrath for the Oï*ders in
Oounoil which they saw as the main cause of sanctions and of
poor relations with the United States, They countered the claim
of the government that the Orders In Council had been issued in
retaliation for the Berlin Decree by saying that, since the
Berlin Decree had been ineffective against British trade,
retaliation was unnecessary. Retaliation was also very
offensive to neutrals since they rather than France suffered as
a result of British policy, Alexander Baring claimed that the
2jl6Orders in Council had made the Berlin Decree effective.* The
Whigs contended that the embargo was causing serious losses to
British trade and that the Embargo Act had been the direct
!i3^*"^^Sarïng's' Spoeckio''"HoÏÏsè” *6F"7Jomm'ci&^ ^
th e p l ie r s , . . . . .  1 -9 .
Lord Auckland,15th February 1Ô08,Gentleman's Magagine,
March 1808, 245*9.
Minbur^^h Review .Januarv 1808,484*498,
46. Baring's Speech, op cit.. p53.
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result of the Orders in Council* Ae a result the Orders In
Council were more destructive than the Berlin and Milan
De/crees# The distress about which the petitioners from
Lancashire and elsewhere complained was caused by the policy
476t the British government*
The opponents of the Orders In Council were concerned not only 
with the economic and social results in Britain# Fears were 
expressed about the decline of Anglo-Amerlcan relations# Lord 
Grenville feared war with the Americans whilst Lord Holland 
thought that the Orders in Council were not conducive to good 
relations with the United States, the goodwill and prosperity 
of that country being advantageous to Britain. In the same 
debate in the House of Lords, Lord Lauderdale felt that the 
Orders In Council were tantamount to a declaration of war 
against the United States. Alexander Baring wrote that the 
Orders, by restraining American commerce, not only harmed 
British Trade but also made the United States an economic 
dependency of Britain; something which would not be tolerated 
Vy the Americana* Baring believed that the United States would 
resist the Orders even if it meant war# In a pamphlet 
addressed to British merchants trading with America, a Mr,Mann 
thought the Orders would encourage American hostility to 
Britain because they encroached on American independence:
Britain needed American friendship and trade to balance the 
commercial losses In Europe,
The Orders in Oouneil were part of the Tory government*s efforts
47, Baring's Speech
Brougham.MemoirsJvcjT?. p4,pp7*8
voTlS.Pinkney to Madison,23rd November,1807*
48# Magaaine.February 1608,151, and May 1808,441-5#
- . , 15-22*^ 58-2ed 
6li5.:)»63: Pamphlet by Mr#Mann copy in FO files.
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to win the war against Napoleon, but the Whigs felt that these
regulations actually aided the French F^nperor* Firstly the
Orders made the Berlin Decree effective* More Important,
many felt that the Orders in Council created hostility amongst
potential friends of Britain and drove them into common cause
with Napoleon. This view was even expressed by Lord Sidmouth,
a Tory outside the government, who characterised the Orders as
a "doubtful expedient*H?hich could unit all nations against
Britain, Lord Auckland expressed similar views in February
1608 and in his pamphlet Alexander Baring felt that Britain
had thus given up an opportunity to cause disunity amongst 
49her opponents.
Of all the opponents of the Orders in Council, only Baring, 
in hlG Important speech in the Commons on lot April,1608, 
expressed fears at the long term effects of the Orders in 
Oounoil upon Anglo-American trade. He warned that the 
supporters of the Orders should not rely on the continued 
superiority of British industry# He thought that British 
dominance of the American market would decrease as the 
American economy changed from an agricultural to a more
r]A
industrial basis#
Opposition to the Orders in Oounoil because of their bad effect 
on British commerce and industry, hardship to the poor; the 
deterioration of relations with the United States? their help 
to Napoleon and the long-term effects on commerça with the 
United States were the main points which emerged from the
49. Baring*© Speech,let April 1008.Baring.Inquiry..#.128-9.
?A egler .Addington# (1965) # 28 3 *
Gentlemanls M ^ a ^ n ^ jmroh 1 6 0 8 .2 4 5 -9 ,Lord Auckland in 
House of Lord,15th February,1008.
50* Baring's Speech 1st April, 1808, in Baring,Inquiry..
69,
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parliamentary debate© between February and May 1808, The 
debate had been Initiated because of the economic and social 
consequences of sanctions* Although opposition was expressed by 
many Whig aristocrats, members of the Commons,businessmen 
before the Committee of Inquiry, and by periodicals such as the 
Edinburgh Review and the Monthly Review - driving force and the 
most eloquent opponent of the Orders in Council was Alexander 
Baring, A- Member for Liverpool since 1806, Baring owed his 
influence to hbs position outside the arena of politics as a 
member of a family firm of merchant bankers, which had had long 
and extensive connections with the United States, At this time 
a liberal and free-trader ( he became a Conservative in the 
1830*8 as Lord Ashburton) he gave much strength to the 
movement against the Orders in Council but, at the same time, 
he was an illustration of some of the liabilities which 
hampered the movement in 1808-9. His business background gave 
him considerable knowledge of Anglo-American trade* His own 
constituency gave him a background in an industrial area with' 
strong links with the American market. As such,the distress in\ 
Liverpool gave him a direct political interest in achieving the 
restoration of trade with the United States* His business 
connections with the United States, however, exposed hi# toj^/
charges of self-interest. His firm had been the principal \
financial agent in Europe for the American government sinbd.
\
1803, and powerful Americah merchants such as Stephen Girard^ of
\
k
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PIillade3.phia numbered amongst his clients. Bo it could not he
said, that Baring's opposition to the Orders in Council, the
removal of which might lead to the withdrawal of sanction©,
was entirely diainterected* The same was true of moat of those
who spoke against the OMei's in 1806 s the businessmen who
testified before the committee of Inqniv:^^  which Baring helped
to set up, opposed the Orders because their own specifics business,
51interests had been hit#' This hampered efforts to widen support 
for their case at a time when other business "interests" v/ere 
more powerful and when, in general, the economy, though 
damaged, had not been put in jeopardy*
The leadership provided by the Whig aristocrate such as Lords 
Grenville and Auckland was somewhat different# Although deeply 
concerned about the effects of the Orders and of sanctions, they 
were less devoted to particular business interests or to the 
interests of the United States* Party politics rather than 
économie self-interest was their motive* On occasion they 
lifted the debate to a higher level# Lord Erskine declared M s  
hppoaition after a lengthy legal analysis of neutral righte;^^ 
This leadership, however, lacked the sharp edge of debate and the 
devotion to a cause which was to be found amongst Baring and hie 
friends# While in government, Grenville and his colleagues had 
been responsible for policies which had restricted American
51* Hidy, glie  House of pp24-54#
PP1808#Evidence and l/Xst of Witnesses*
Horsman, The Caisse©, pf, the War of ,1812.# (1962) *132*
52# 8ears .Jefferson azKl the Embargo ^ 269-70* Er^kine : in House of 
Lords
/,
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oommerocî and In opposition the Orders in Oounoil was only on© 
stick with which to beat the Tories* Bo economic self-interest, 
party politic©, ami past policies, made it difficult for Baring, 
Grenville and their supporter© to obtain widespread support*
The opponents of the Orders in Council faced the difficulty of 
attacking a vital part of the government's war effort without 
doing anything to create national disunity in face of the threat 
from Napoleon with hie armies and hia Continental Bystem, This 
inhibited many in their opposition to the government and may have 
prevented other© from lending their support. Repeal of the 
Orders In Council in face of American sanctions and Napoleon's 
power was thought to be too much of a national humiliation by 
many* It is difficult to estimate how much support was lost in 
this way, but an indication can be found in the speeches of Lord 
Grenville, The Whig leader said that war with the United States 
was preferable to any sacrifice of British maritime rights; and 
even Baring could not see any retreat on the issue of Impressment# 
If the leaders were inhibited* the rank and file of the movement, 
Buoh as the Birmingham moi^ohant who had written to William Pinkney 
to express his fears of economic loss and his view that Britain 
should not back down, were even more reluctant to commit themselves 
to complete opposition to the government,'"^ *
It has been suggested that the opponents of the Orders in Council 
harmed their ease ‘fcy their failure to propose any alternative 
method by which the government could oppose the Oontlntal System?^^
53* Gentleman's Maaamlne. February 1606,Grenville in LordsJl^thFeb,
MaMh,1808.
54• Cunningham^British Credit in the Last Napoleonic War,(1910),
" p68,
Alternatives to the Orders in Council are not easily found 
amongst the statements of the Whigs » but the Edinburgh Review 
did suggest that the best way to combat the French decrees was 
to encourage neutral trade with Eui^ opog continental demands for 
British goods would increase resentment in .Europe against 
Napoleon's policy* Apart from thla, the lack of any alternatif 
suggestion© probably contributed to the failure of the 
opposition to t.he Orders in Council in 3.606-9#
Th.e debates on the Orders in Oouneil ended in the early summer 
of 1808 with the parliamentary recess and the revival of trade 
following Napoleon's invasion of Spain* ‘.Discussion was resumed 
briefly in early 1809 but» with a stronger ©conomy» some small 
concessions from the government, and the repeal of the Embargo 
Act, the opposition achieved little other than the opportunity 
once more to restate their views# The improved economy and the 
strength of the Tory administration provided the essential 
background to the short-term failure of the movement#
ilie passage of the Embargo Act and the implementation of the 
Non-Importation Act did not lead to panic or outright hostility 
to the ^united States amongst members of the British government# 
sorrow rather than anger seems to have been the feeling amongst 
leading Tories about this decline in relations with America* 
Regret, combined with a reluctant acceptance of the prospect of 
war, was balanced by a firm determination to maintain British 
maritime rights, including the Orders in Council and
53” .Sâl#ur^Sâ1ZlS‘ -508, !{.84-498.
impreasraent# On the whole, tills stand was maintained In the 
face of économie distress in some parts of the coimtry and of 
political outrage from those who opposed the Orders in Goimcil#
With few apparent reservations, leading members of the 'J|ory 
administration actually welcomed the embargo? war had bëôn 
considered as a strong possibility and relief was felt a't 't.he 
imposition of sanctions. More positively, like the shlpowne&s
\'v
who welcomed the withdrawal of American competitors, Tories ''\
believed that the embargo benefited Britain, In the spring of
1808, Ylscount Castlereagh. expressed the view that the embargo
operated more favourably than any British measure to curb the
oomnieroe of America, From the point of view of diplomatic
relations with the United States, Oestleroagh hoped that the
embargo would continue* Its unpopularity in America would
undermine the position, of the American government and of the
"Jeffersonian P a r t y * W r i t i n g  to James Madison In May 1606,
William Pinlmey stated his belief that the Bï’itish government
felt that the embargo was more harmful to the United Btatos,
and that as a consequence, oonoesalons would not be 
57
forthcoming* Later in 1808, he believed that Britain was
encouraging: American discontent by allowing American trade with
68Spain and Portugal#
56. Pej20evai,-.1 BS,BH.Aad.*8 8.ij.9,177; Memo by Cas'l;lereagh,Mai>oli
1808.
57. U8 Mo.Deep.vol 15,Pinkney to Madison,10th May,1808.
58 # D/osp#vol 15,Pinkney to Med:lson. 7th September, 1808,
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Lack of fear over the embargo was combined with a continued 
belief in the correctness of the policy of the Orders In Council 
Belief In this policy was justified by the need to retaliate 
against the French decrees.' Perceval and his colleagues
argued that such retaliation was necessary, even though it was
60harmful to neutrals* Mûr© positively members of the government
believed that the Orders in Council harmed Napoleon* Early in
1808, the President of the Board of Trade? Lord Bathurst,assured
Perceval that the Orders in Oounoil had ©topped all trade in
61
European manufactures. ' In the parliamentary debates of 1809,
George Rose made a strong defence of the Orders by contending 
that British policy had deprived Napoleon of colonial goods to 
the value of £9 millions at a coat of leas than one half of 
British trade with the United States, which to him was ample 
proof of the IneffectivenaeB of the embargo* The positive 
benefits of the Orders in Council were reinforced by the 
arguments of Tory backbencher, James Stephen, who believed that 
the Orders in Council had saved British trade from the effects 
of the Berlin Decree* "
Furthermore, Spencer Perceval believed that the British maritime
policy had not given the United States any cause for offence*
The Order In Oounoil did not harm the United States, therefore,
Ah
there was no need to repeal them in order to be conciliatory*
39* Annual Register,XBoB?p74? Perceval to Commons,3th Feb*1808#
6 0* Mayo,2#.: canning to Jackson» 1st July» 1609,Number 3 *
6 1* liTcKley»Bathurst Papers,Bathurst to Parcova. 1 .February 1808.
it “" “ Œ
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Lord Liverpool thought that the government was being 
conciliatory to the Americans as far as the rights of the country 
would allow. While deploring any rupture of good relations with 
the United States, Lord Sidrnouth believed that British efforts 
to ensure good relations were being thwarted by American
65partiality for France* There is no evidence amongst these 
confident, even arrogant, statements of any effort at 
understanding the American sensitivity on the issue of neutral 
rights.
The confidence of the government was not so apparent when they
gave consideration to the possibility of war. Lord Hawkesbury
(later Lord Liverpool) and Lord Bathurst thought the war with
America would damage British commerce and industry quite 
66seriously. Most felt little regret at the prospect of war,
67viewing it as a means of checking American maritime growth, ^
This comparative lack of apprehension at the prospect of war made
it easier for the government to accept the embargo, Castlerea&h
felt that the firm stand in face of hostilities had made a
considerable impression upon the American government and so
68helped avo’d a war. The hesitations felt by some members of the 
government were not shared by Tory members such as James Stephen 
who had dismissed the possibility of war, much earlier. He 
believed that the Americans would understand both Britain's 
position in Europe as the "protector of liberty ’ànd the
6 5* Annual Register,180 9 ,p2G; Liverpool and Sidmouth in Lords, 
19th January "I809 «
66. M.yj£go.g.LM§% BM.Ada.mss.39,2^2.Hawkeabuyy to Lord Worth,9th
January I6O0 .(Hawkoabury became 2nd Earl of Liverpool later 
in I808).
o^ Madison.24th January 1808.
6 8. 00V3/22.Castlereagh. to General Craig in Quebec,7th July.,1806
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v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  A m e r i c a n  c o m m e r c e  t o  B r i t i s h  a t t a c k .
British attitudes to the United States in 1808 wop© not only
Influenced by the conviction that the Orders in Council were a
necessity and that \mm was unlikely to occur, but also by the
belief that the Americano were complaining about the methods
used to enforce the Orders rather than the principles behind 
"Pn
them, * This view played a very Important part In government 
ctiscusBions during 1808 and 1809 about possible changes in the 
Orders in Oounoil#
In 1008,therefore, the attitude of the British government on the
embargo? Orders in Goimci3. and relatione with the United States
created an atmosphere In which the embargo's main objective of
Inducing' a ahan.ge In British marl time policy would be very
difficult to achieve. The apparently strong stand by the
government was illustrated by the relative lack of concern over
the economic effects of sanctions. Chancellor of the Exchequer
Spenoer Perceval was apparently satisfied with the economic
eituatlon with hi© optimism in January 1606 and his feeling in
18o8 that "neither Decrees nor Mbargoos can materially affect 
73our trade." “ This is not to say that American sanctions had no 
effect on British policy. The Tory administration was less 
firm a M  more flexible than it appeared In public. Changes in 
the Orders in Coimoil were discussed or enacted several times
  w f * — i v tTTfi " r in n rrm rnt v - 'WTmrn*wormw: i m w i r i n # W K w i i o # . # m
69# James Steuhen,War In BisgulBe, 133-4?176,>
70, ? Canning to Jackscm.let July ,,1809? Numb or 3*
71. Bmart? l,pl83; quoted from Hansard Xll,
3-5.(January 1609).
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between early 1808 and April 1609» This was seen in Perceval’s 
ideas on possible changes In the Orde?:-© In Council in the first 
months of 1608| the American Intercourse Bill in mid 1808? In the 
continued dlscuBsion on possible changes in the Orders In. Oounoil 
in the winter of 1808-9 , which led to some public expectation of 
a change; and in the Issue of a new Order In Council in April 
1809,
The member of the government who was most persuaded by sanctions 
to consider some changea wae Spencer Perceval* As a result he 
made two sets of proposais which would change some of the methods 
by which the maritime policy was enforced. Firstly? in February 
IBOBp he proposed some minor changes such as the removal of 
duties paid by American vessels when forced? under the Orders In 
Council* to pass through British ports* It was hoped that this 
would remove some of the financial burden incurred by American
VO
merchants ae a result of the Orders. " These changes wore
accepted but Perceval’a main proposal in March 1808 to revise the
Orders In Council to conciliate the Americans was not, Perceval's
proposition did not concede any principle to the United States àe
a consequence of the embargo. The Embargo Act certainly A
stimulated a desire for change but not at the expense oé
sacrificing the main principles of British maritime policy, '
Instead of concession, Perceval hoped that h© could .force a \
' \
724 Gentleman's Mam #lne>. March 1808,245-9; Perceval in the \ ^
Q omrrtoriB » 19 th  February ? 1808 « \
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relaxation of the embargo by making eome practical changes 
which would make American merchants less inclined to accept 
the embargo* He felt it was desirable that America should 
relax the embargo as it affected Anglo-American trade. 
Therefore, a new Order in Council would out down on the 
frequency with which American ships were searched or seized, 
would give assurance and confidence to American merchants that 
Britain was basically friendly* It was hoped that this would 
make the embargo less popular in New England and induce 
Jefferson to make concessions instead of Britaln*^^
Although Perceval obtained the support of Lord Bathurst* he was 
opposed successfully by the majority of the cabinet who were 
©gainst any concession in face of the embargo* Foreign 
Secretary George Oanning opposed change because he believed 
that the embargo was working in favour of Britain, and 
Castlereagh agreed with him# Canning, who did not fear war 
with America* opposed concession for two tactical reasons; he 
wanted no concessions on the eve of his talk© with William 
Pinkney, and he felt that the parliamentary battle over the 
Orders in Council had been won in the debates of February and 
March* In face of this opposition, Perceval did not press his 
case for changes whose effect on the United States would be 
indirect but which might also be construed as a direct 
concession to the embargo policy.
73# Perceval MSB*BM*Add*MSB 49,177,Memo to Oabinet*March 1808*
74* Perceval MBS *BM » Add * MOB 49 * 177*Oomments attached to above
memo.
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In the Bununer of I808 a change was made in Britain's navigation 
la we as a direct repv'Ji of the embargo, but this change in no 
way was a repudiation of the Ordore in Oouneil. The American 
Interooixrse Bill allowed American vessels to trade with the 
British West Indiee? as the islands were suffering considerable 
hardship from the embargo. The colonies were dependent on 
American food supplies end no altexm-^tive source was to be 
found in Britain or Canada» Between 1'793 and 1803* for example, 
164p680 barrels of flour had been imported from the United 
States? while only 1*570 barrels came rom Britain during those 
years. In 1808 American exports to the British West Indies 
totalled #1,500,000 as compared with 05,900,000 in 1607* The 
outcry from the islands was loud, enough to cause the
introduction and passage of the American Intercourse Bill# But
75this was only a minor concession#
Discussion of possible changes in the Orders in Council 
continued intermittently during the second half of 1806 and, 
although no change took place? the talks do show that the 
members of the government were prepared to discuss the 
possibility amongst themselves: they were not rigidly trying to 
maintain the Orders of November 1807* The main force for 
change now came from Bathurst rather th^n Perceval, while 
Calming still opposed any conceoBlonB. In fact Bathurst was 
more concerned with changing the Orders to meet the new 
situation in Europe now that Bpain and Portugal were allies#
75. 1608, 3I; 7-8. : Mja&gSSÏLÊSZlËm,
Jan.1809 Be.Ping,lacia ly y .,. . .  59-60;
M -lZSgrâZÜk. (many references); BT lA S . f f  199«20^,220
Newfoundland ; j,Hf.00ate8worth,American Trade with 
Eur op ©an 0a r r  ib ean Gol oni @ s ♦ *,
William and Mary Quarterly.1967,243-266*
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H© did not favour repeal in face of American pressure and
wanted to balance change© in the Iberian peninaula with
stronger regulations against Franca alone* This anticipated the
Order in Council of April 1809 which Bathurst felt would remove
American objections without conceding the main objective of the 
76embargo*
Although there was no reversal of policy, by the beginning of 
1809 William Pinkney was hopeful of a change, not through any 
knowledge of government discussions, but partly because of 
Madison’s election to the presidency, and partly because he 
thought that Britain feared the loss of American markets#
Although there 1© no evidence that the government felt like this, 
Pinkney's comments are either wishful thinking, or an indication 
of a ©low change in the political climate! the intermittent 
government discussion suggests the latter# With the repeal of 
the Embargo Act, the Whigs decided to press for repeal of the
77
Orders in Council, Shortly thereafter, the government made
considerable change© in the Orders in Council* Was this the
response to the embargo?
The Order in Council of April 1809 was issued in some hast© 
following news of the repeal of the Embargo Act* George Canning
urged haste before any receipt of new© of worse developments from
78the United States* In this sense, therefore, the Order was not
76. m  s/61. 205-8.Bathuret Memo of 29th July 1808.
Pegoeval MSS.BM.Ada.M88.h9.177.BathuP8t to Perceval,21st 
OotoberdEoBV and Canning to Perceval,31st December,1608#
77. 118 Dip#Deep»yol#1.51 Pinkney to Madison,23rd January, 1809. 
Auckland Correspond©noet Grenville to Auckland,1st April,1809
78# Rose MSB#BM.Add#IBB#42.773.Canning: to Rose,7th April,1809, 
MSA# Volume 3,f276,Canning to Bathurst,7th^A|>ril»
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80 much a oonceaaion induced by the embargo? but more an effort to
conciliate the Americans and prevent any more drastic action being
taken by the United States following the repeal of the Embargo
Act* This was to be done by making extensive changes in the
operation of IHritiab maritime polioy? but the principles of that
policy., including the rights of search? seizure and impressment
remained* In effect the Order lifted restrictions on neutral
trade with Baltic and Mediterranean p o r t s F c  longer were
American vessels trading to those ports to be forced to call at
British. ports before ■proceeding. On the other hand» the British
blockade of the coastline of France and Holland remained in
force., It wagi hoped that this change in practice would conciliate
79the Americans without endangering British maritime rights#
Although, the haste displayed by Canning, the commente in journals, 
and Canning's later comments on the Order suggest that it wae 
issued in order to Improve Anglo-American relations? there is 
little evidence of these motives in the cabinet discussion In 
April 1809* On 12th April, Bathuret outlined his reasons for 
wanting to change the Order in Goionoil of November 1807# ' Nowhere 
In hlB lengthy memorandum was there any suggestion of conciliating 
the Americans* In fact he was rather apologetic about diverting 
the attention of the cabinet from o'bher matters. After outlining 
reasons of parliamentary tactics, he based his case upon the 
changes in the war situation in Europe since 1807; Spain and
79* G ray,Bp enccr Perceval,b 50-1 *
NewÎLife of Henxu/ Brougham,58
Perkins,"George Canning,Great Britain and the United States 
3.807-9” Aa\ei±saÎ1 J.la togLgglJiev^^^ , 1957. P2 ♦
*»
Portugal were now a l l ie s  and have thus created a gap in  the co n tro l 
o f c o lo n ia l trade w ith  Europe; Turkey and A u s tr ia  ware f r ie n d ly  
one© more, and In  consequence changes were required  in  the 
re g u la tio n  o f trade in  the Mediterranean. There had a lso been 
some changes in  Imports from Franc© and Holland. Towards the end, 
he voiced the op in ion th a t any proposal to  extend American trade 
w ith  the West Ind ies  should be kept separate from th is  Order* 
G enera lly the re s t o f the cabinet agreed w ith  B a thu rs t. Perceval 
showed some concern f o r  ,Am©rlcan p u b lic  op in ion  regarding trade 
w ith  the French West Ind ies  but herds L ive rpoo l and Eldon f irm ly  
opposed any such concession. Apart from th is  there was no 
d iscussion o f the e ffe c ts  o f the new Order upon the United S tates, 
nor any expression o f the government*© hopes fo r  a favourab le  
change in  re la tio n s  w ith  the Americans.®^
A fte r  the Order was issued, Georg© Canning d id  admit th a t the
Order was an e f fo r t  to  remove those fea tu res  o f the o ld  Orders
which had been most ob jectionab le  to  the Americans: the requirement
to  c a l l  a t B r i t is h  p o rts  before proceeding to  Europe. Inrmme o f
h is  comments, nor in  any by h is  colleague©, was there any suggestion
th a t concessions be made a t the expense o f the p r in c ip le s  behind
the Orders in  Councils Impressment, search and ©elaure, and open
blockades* Only ta c t ic a l concession© were to  be mad© to  sooth
61American p u b lic  op in ion .
80# Blokley.Bathurst Papers, 87’-90, Bathurst Memo and attached 
comments 12th April,1809.
61* F05/63: Canning to ll!rskina,2nd May 1809,Number 9.
Mayo * 285. Canning to Uackson.lst July 1809,Number 3.
1In some quarters the new Order in Council v/ae seen as a complete
82abrogation of the previous Orders, " whilst others saw it as a 
direct response to the American substitution of the Non^Interoourae 
Act for the Embargo Act.^^ These views were all British, 
president Madison did not see the changes in naval practice as 
being the equivalent of a complete reversal of previous British 
policy. Although the Embargo Act achieved so little « only a 
few practical concessions - Madison continued to oppose the British 
use of naval power when it Infringed on American neutral rights, 
and continued to try and find some form of economic coercion which 
would put pressure on Britain without stirring up further dissension 
within the United states. Such opposition had been the main 
reason for the withdrawal of the Embargo Act*
Thus the Embargo and Non-Importation Acts did help to bring about 
some practical concessions from the British government whose 
leaders had become more aware of the need for American friendship 
in spite of their initial disinclination to meet coercion with 
concessions* Yet this softening of attitude did not mean a 
reversal of policy. This would have been too much to expect from 
an embargo whose economic effects were limited, and especially 
as the political position of the British government and the 
apparent prosperity of the British economy became more visible 
towards the end of 1808, As the embargo did not induce any greater 
changes, the United States government chose to regard it as a 
failures moat observera have agreed with them without understanding
82, Monthly Review.MavnAugmst 1Ô09,P?6*
S3* Annual Register.I809*25h.
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tha two re la te d  p o in ts  o f l im ite d  economic e f fe c t and a strong 
B r i t is h  government. The most Important p o l i t i c a l  re s u lt  o f the 
Embargo Act was the crea tion  o f an opposition  in  B r ita in  to  the 
Orders in  Council* Although th is  opposition  was unsuoccssful 
in  1006-9, i t s  members were given the o pp o rtu n ity  to  come 
together in  un ited  p o l i t ic a l  a c tio n , s ta te  th e ir  case, and f in d  
leaders such as Alexander Baring, who would p e rs is t in  opposing 
the government*© p o lic ie s  u n t i l  success was achieved#
Although l im ite d , th© p o l i t ic a l  a ffe c ts  o f sanctions contained 
tha seeds o f fu tu re  success. S im ila r ly , though economic e ffe c ts  
seem to  have been lim ite d  to  d is lo c a tio n  ra th e r than to  severe 
losses, the foundations fo r  fu tu re  bucoosb war© la id *  This was 
not BO much due to  exposing the v u ln e ra b i l i ty  o f B rita in *©  
export trade to  such coercion or to  the w ithdrawal o f American 
sh ips, but more to  the e ffe c t o f sanctions upon an expanding 
economy. The pressures o f expansion had to  be met by la rg e - 
scale e f fo r ts  to  f in d  new and a lte rn a tiv e  markets to  replace the 
American market. The re s u lt  o f th is  was to  place the B r it is h  
economy on a more unstable basis because o f the excessive 
spéculation and g rea te r poverty  o f these markets* This led  to  a 
slump 1810-11 which provided a more c r i t i c a l  economic and 
p o l i t ic a l  s itu a t io n  in  which sanctions could work to  g rea ter 
e f fe c t .  The re s u lts  o f the embargo were not confined to  the 
short-term  economic and p o l i t ic a l  impact o f 1808-9. The Embargo 
A ct mad© poss ib le  the fu tu re  economic and p o l i t i c a l  success o f 
the American sanctions p o lic y .
IhS
Considerable p u b lic  d iscon ten t, e sp e c ia lly  in  areas such a© Nevf
England whose economies had suffe red because o f the non-employment
of the American mox»chant f le e t ,  together w ith  the la ck  o f strong
p o l i t i c a l  leadership  from Ja ffe rso n , brought about the repeal o f
the Embargo Act in  March 1809« C o n trib u tin g  to  the fa i lu r e  o f
the act was i t s  apparent lack o f success aga inst B r i ta in ,  which
contemporary op in ion a ttr ib u te d  to  la x i t y  in  enforcement o f the
A c t ,"  and to  the American resentment a t the s e lf -d e n ia l o f
p ro s p e r ity  and the government in te rfe re nce  w ith  in d iv id u a l l ib e r t y
which enforcement e n ta ile d . A c lim ate  o f opin ion was created in
the w in te r o f 1808-9 in  which James Madison, convinced th a t the
embargo had fa i le d ,  suggested i t s  s u b s titu t io n  by a non-in terooiiree 
2A ct, Such a step would re lie v e  Americans o f the burdens o f the 
Embargo Act w ithou t abandoning sanctions, fo r  the a lte rn a tiv e s  
were c a p itu la tio n  to  B r ita in  o r war w ith  th a t co im try* In  power, 
President Madison attempted to  re ta in  sanctions w ithou t damaging 
the American economy in  the way th a t the embargo had done*
The successive measures o f economic sanctions between 1809 and 
1812 displayed two general c h a ra c te r is tic s  in  the nature o f th e ir  
operation* A© a re a c tio n  against the Embargo A c t, sanctions were 
made weaker in  the Non-Interoom’S© A ct o f 1809 and became merely 
a threat in  Macon*© A ct in  1810* Follow ing the apparent success
1, ly  3 F2 35-9 * L e tte r  from a London mcrohemt to  an American 
f r ie n d , '17th  September I 608* ( in te rcepted?)•
2 , I,Bî?ant,Æamga MadiBQn.8e.preta.py. of. State.(1 9 5 3 ),ppl21i-5,l|.78.
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o f th le  1810 Act in  securing the w ithdrawal o f the Berlin and 
M ilan Decrees, the use o f sanctions was increased w ith  the 
renewal o f the Non-Im portation Act aga inst B r i ta in  in  1811,
F in a lly  a n ine ty-day embargo was imposed in  A p r i l  1812, The new 
Non-Im portation A ct was d ire c te d  s o le ly  a t B r i ta in ,  i l lu s t r a t in g  
the second c h a ra c te r is t ic : the changing ta rg e t fo r  coercion. 
A lthough the IMhargo Act was intended to  be im p a r t ia l,  the 
simultaneous enforcement o f the 1806 Non-Im portation Act had made 
the measure a n t i - B r i t is h ,  The p rov is ions o f the Non-Intercourse 
Act and Macon*© A c t, whose im p a r t ia l i ty  was welcomed in Londons'^ 
app lied e q u a lly  to  Britain and France, Just as the apparent 
reversal of French p o lic y  brought a change to  g reater s e v e r ity , i t  
refocussed American a tte n t io n  against B r ita in  w ith  the renewed 
Non-Im portation A c t, As a re s u lt  B r i ta in  bore the b run t o f 
American sanctions 1811-12 a t a tim e when the B r i t is h  economy v/ae 
not B.B s trong  as in  1808, because o f a depression which the e a r l ie r  
sanctions had helped to  create.
The p r in c ip a l measures employed 1809-11 were the Non-Intercourse 
A c t, Macon*B Act No#2, and the renewed Non-Im portation Act# 
I n i t i a l l y  to  operate fo r  one year, the Non-Interoourso A ct o f 
March 1809 allowed American vessels to  trade w ith  a l l  coun tries  
except tha B r i t is h  and French empires. In  a d d it io n ,B r it is h  and 
French sh ips and cargoes ( in c lu d in g  a l l  goods imported from these 
two co u n tr ie s , even in  n e u tra l ships) were banned from the p o rts  
o f tha United States* As an Inducement to  the B r i t is h  and French
3« Timaa. (London),9th June 1810
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governments, these p ro v is io n s  would be l i f t e d  i f  e ith e r  the French 
Decrees o r the B r i t is h  Orders in  Council were repealed: the Act 
con tinu ing  In  fo rce  aga inst whichever country maintained i t s  
regu la tions  after the other had repealed i t s  a c ts , Madison hoped, 
a lso , to  put pressure on the B r i t is h  government by sub jec ting  
B r i t is h  supplies from th© United States to  the expense o f double 
voyages, close the American market to  B r i t is h  exports and?
h
consequently, a id  the growth o f American In d u s try .
The Act had three basic handicaps In  conception and operation. As 
th® embargo had fa i le d  to  induce the B r i t is h  government to  make 
fundamental p o lic y  changes, then the expectations of th is  act 
cannot foe very great: th is  suggest© th a t Madison saw the Act not so 
much as a p o te n tia l succesa but more as a means o f retaining a 
sanctions p o lic y *  The Act laid down no methods by which American 
ships could foe co n tro lle d  a f te r  leaving American waters. This led  
to considerable evasions vessels cleared fo r  Scandinavia or th© 
Azores b u t, e ven tu a lly  they or th e ir  cargoes reached Britain,
S im ila r deceptions were employed to  m aintain B r i t is h  exports to  the
%
United S tates, The A ct was fu r th e r  weakened by a lack  o f 
c o n tin u ity  in  i t s  enforcement. Normally the bulk o f Anglo-American 
trad© was conducted between the spring and autunai o f each year.
The Non-Xntercoure© Act went in to  e ffe c t on May 30 th ,1809, but was 
suspended on June 10th as a re s u lt  of the agreement between th© 
United States government and David Frekine, the B r i t is h  M in is te r in 
Washington, Although reimposed on August 9 th a f te r  Canning’ s 
repud ia tion  o f Erskin©*© agreement, American vessels caught in 
B r ita in  by the sudden reverea! o f p o lic y  were allowed to  return
 ' p-ih5 i e K l % K '
5# AePGH 1. G a lla t in ’ s Report to  congress,2»d December,1813
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w ith  B r i t is h  goods u n t i l  la te  1809* In  e f fe c t ,  the Act operated 
only during the w in te r o f 1609^10 and would have become e ffe o tiv o  
in  the sp ring  o f 1810 had i t  not been suporceded than by Macon’ s 
Act*
In  the spring  o f 1810 Madison had had hopes o f strengthen ing the 
Non-Intercourse A c t, but instead Congress passed Macon’ s No*2*
B i l l  which was much more negative than any preceding measure, 
American ships were perm itted  to  s a i l  anywhere to trade f re e ly  
w ith  a l l  coun tries* Instead o f p o s it iv e  sanctions on ly  the 
negative th re a t o f the re im pos ltlon  o f the Non-Intercourse Act 
remained* I t  would be reimposed i f  one of the two powers refused 
to  w ithdraw i t s  re g u la tio n s  a f te r  the o ther b e llig e re n t had done 
ao in  response to  the A c t, Taking advantage of th is  Act to  
worsen re la tio n s  between B r ita in  and the United S tates, Napoleon 
agreed to  withdraw his decrees. In August 1810, the French 
fo re ig n  m in ister,O adore, wrote to  the United States government 
s ta t in g  th a t the Berlin and M ilan  Decrees had been revoked and 
th a t they would cease to  have e ffe c t a f te r  November 1st IS10, 
provided B r ita in  had repealed her Orders in  Coim oil, aM  i f  n o t, 
the United States must uphold her r ig h ts .  This was a co n d itio n a l 
o f fe r  contained in  a p r iv a te  le t t e r  and no t a p u b lic  repeal o f tv/o 
of the fundamental laws o f the French Empire, and no mention was 
made o f o ther French decrees which invo lved American shipping such 
a© the la m b o u ille t Decree and the s t i l l  secre t Trianoxi Decree*
In s p ite  o f the lack o f formal confirmation of the withdrawal o f 
the Berlin and M ilan Decrees, and anxious to  use the occasion to
6, E*Brown.Republic in Peril, ( 196!*.) .#22,
B, H©cksher .p ie ^ b h t in é h tà l System. pi 39 *
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impose harsher measures aga inst B r ita in ,  which had not i^esponded 
to  Macon’ s A c t, the president announced the re im po s itio n  o f the 
Non-Importation Act in  November 1810# This would take e ffe c t in 
Febmiary 1811# H© wae fe a r fu l  a lso th a t any delay In  implementing 
Macon’ B Act might re s u lt  in  a reve rsa l o f p o s it io n  by Napoleon# 
Because Macon’ s Act was unc lear. In  March 1811, Congress passed a 
new Non-Im portation Act ra th e r than rev ive  the Non-Intercourse 
Act# L ike  i t s  predecessor o f 1806, th is  A ct was designed to  
undermine the B r i t is h  export trade , w ith o u t damaging the 
p ro s p e rity  o f American shipping# A l l  im ports from Britain were 
banned v /h lls t American vessels were perm itted  on ly  to  ca rry  
American exports to  B r ita in #  This Act remained in  fo rce  u n t i l  the 
outbrmk o f war between the two countries In  June 1812# ^
The aims ami methods o f economic pressure employed by sanctions 
in  1809-11 were not identical w ith  those o f the Embargo Act since 
the various measures used by President Madison were not as a l l -  
embracing as Je ffe rson*s  experiment had been# In d ire c t pressure 
was to  be put on the B r i t is h  government by d is lo c a tin g  trade 
between the two countries, B r i t is h  exports* and consequently the 
manufacturing in d u s tr ie s  which produced those goods, were the most 
im portant target# Much less e f fo r t  was mad© to  prevent American 
exports to B r ita in  o r to  prevent B r i t is h  use o f American tonnage* 
The Non-Im portation Act* indeed, was Intended to  fo s te r  American 
exports and shipping in  order to  encourage p ro s p e r ity  and prevent 
domestic oppos ition  to  the sanctions p o lic y , There was no e f fo r t  
to put d ire c t  pressure on th© B r it is h  government by hampering th a t 
country* b war e f fo r t *  American g m in  supplies and the employ non t
7. I.BraHt,gameB_gMl#n,,m Ê _ 2 î ^ 8 M m t ,PPl95-200.
H.H0atoïx,''îîon-Impoptation 1606-12" .tToumal of Economlo History. 
19W,ppl9Jv-7.
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of Amer learn chipa in support of Wellington’s ai*ïïiy in the Peninsula 
was til© most iisiportant target le f t  untouohsd by Madlsou#.
Altogether, British trade was subjeoteâ to InteralttSDt 
restrictions in 1809» none in 1810* and a total bun on exports to
the U nited S tates  1811-1&.
The elianging balance of British trade 1809-12 suggests that the 
Amerloan sanctions had a oonaiderable influence on exports but vary 
little on the total flow of imports. In  1809, officially Britain 
enjoyed a favourable trading balance of iâl?*0iô,OOD* but by 1811, 
t M a  had been rcduoed to only ^3,790,000, which the available 
’’real value" information suggests might even have been a deficit. 
The balaziee of l^ayments In 1809 was above the average for the 
pre-embargo years because of a much greater rise In exporte than 
In imports after the repeal of the embargos export ooramodltlee 
which had been stockpiled wore being sent to the United States,
The bulk of this increase sustained in 1810, but in 1811, the 
year of th© new Non-Importation Act, the export bill had fallen 
from ^ 50,280*000 in 1809 to  ^52*410,000: a drop of 40 per cent 
In  two years. In contrast lifiqiorts rose slowly in 1809 befora 
aoooleratliig sM % ^ly in 1810$ the year when diffsrsncea in 
continental and British prices and Napoleonic policy led to a 
s u b s ta n tia l speculative inflow of goods Into the B r itis h  Is le s ,
The considerable drop to pre-embargo import levels in 1811* and 
the continuing drop at a decreased rate in 1812 — from 
#39,860,000 in 1810 to #28,620,000 in 1811 and to #27,730,000 in 
1812 - would appear to be the result of the bursting of the 
bursting of the speculative boom and the start of tha economic 
crisis in Britain In the autumn of 1810, rather than the result of
eanotlons whose initial. Impact vmuld be on exports. Therefore, 
the main contribution of the sanctions to Britain’s balance of
•* %5 2 —
payments would appear to  be the s iibst^^ntla l drop in  exporte in
81811 which l e f t  B r i ta in  on the b o rde rlin e  o f a d e f ic i t  balance#
The exten t to  which sanctiono were responsib le  fo r  the dec line  in  
B r i t is h  exporte can be ascertained from the to ta l f lo w  o f exporte, 
the changes in  the types o f exports* and in  the d e s tin a tio n s  o f 
exported commodities# O f f ic ia l ly *  the to ta l  value o f B r i t is h  
exports f e l l  by on ly  #4,410,000 in  1810, bu t th is  was fo llow ed by 
a drop o f #13,460,000 in  I 8 l l ,  a f te r  which an Increase o f 
#10,830,000 took place in  1812. In  a s im ila r  way, in  terms o f 
" re a l va lues", the f a l l  In  1810 was on ly  #3 , 310,000 as compared 
w ith  the drop o f #18,770,000 in  1811.^
Bine© the b u lk  o f B r i t is h  exporte to  the United States consisted 
o f the products o f B r i t is h  in d u s try , the e ffe c ts  o f sanctions w i l l  
be most d iscernable  In  the changes in  the outflow  o f B r i t is h  
goods# The f a l l  in  exports in  1810 was due p r im a r ily  to  a 
decrease in  the flo w  o f re -expo rts , the b u lk  o f which went to 
Europe. 33uring 1810 Napoleon tightened up the operation o f h is  
decrees against B r i t is h  commerce. As American vessels sa iled  
f re e ly  and p a rtic ip a te d  in  B r i t is h  trade w ith  the co n tin e n t, th is  
f a l l  in  the re -exp o rt trade was not caused by the sanctions# The 
f a l l  continued in  1811 and the re -expo rt trade only grew again 
w ith  the slackening o f the French re g u la to ry  system in  1812.
While re -expo rts  f e l l  by #4,240,000 in  1810, the f a l l  in  B r i t is h  
exports o f mamifactured goods was an in s ig n if ic a n t  #160,000.
8* Data from Orouaet, op c i t .Appendix 2, Tables 1 & 7. 
F u ll d e ta ils  in  Chapter 3»
9* Orovigset, op c i t .Appendix 2, Table 2*
Annual R eg iaT^ fo r  1809,1810* & 1812,
Mo n th ly  Review, May-August 1812,
üwËoms "'ï773oT
Q im rte rly  Review.Maroh 1812.
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In  con tras t the ou tflow  o f goods from B r i ta in ’ s fa c to r ie s
decreased by # lp,790,000 in  1811, thereby p ro v id in g  the bu lk  o f
10the to ta l  1080 of/ over #13 m illion©  in  th a t year. L ike  
re-exports ,, B r i t is h  domestic exports rose s u b s ta n tia lly  in  1812, 
suggesting ^hat; sanctions were an im portant but no t the only 
in fluence  8n B r i t is h  ekports. The ro le  o f sanctions can be
b e tte r  defined by a geographical ana lys is  o f the annual changes
: , • /'
in  thé ^xports o f B r i ta in ./ / '  ^ -,
<èn 1810 the losses sustained by the re -expo rt trade took place
In  the markets o f northern  Europe, the p r in c ip a l market fo r  such
g<^oûB0 In  co n tra s t, the export o f B ritish-m ade goods underwent
Considerable reg iona l v a r ia tio n s , w ith  losses o f #2,100,000 in
southern Europe and o f £2,300,000 in  the "Rest o f the W orld":
these were balanced by gains o f £1,700,000 in  northern Europe and
£2,600,000 in  the United S tates, The exports to  the United
States in  1810 were comparable w ith  pre-embargo le v e ls , and
being above the ou tflow  in  1609 suggest th a t the p r in c ip a l
e ffe c t o f the Non-Intercourse Act was to  delay the recovery of
the B r i t is h  export trade u n t i l  1810, the year o f Macon’ s A c t,
as there was a r is e  in  American purchase© o f B r i t is h  goods o f
on ly £1,090,000 in  1609. The negative in fluence  o f sanctions
1809-10 W6\s to  create a r is e  in  B r i t is h  exports to  the United
States s u f f ic ie n t  on ly  to  balance losses in  o ther markets fo r
B r i t is h  goods and to  help in  th is  way lig h te n  the e ffe c ts  o f
11losses in  the re -expo rt trade on to ta l B r i t is h  exports.
10. CrouBOt, op P i t .Tables 4  & 6#
HeckBh©r.'liii^ontinental Bystem,p245•
Seybert. S ta t is t ic a l  '!AnnaiiVp!^5'7
11. Customs,. 8 /1 ,10 /1 -1 0 /4 .
ÏÏFÔüTeTf'Qp c i t .Tab lee 1 ,3 ,5 .
d* Ive rn o iS tW fe o ts  o f the C ontinenta l B lockade,26-7?66-8,
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Out o f a to ta l loea o f £10,790,000 In  domestic exports in  1811, 
some £6,200,000 was lo s t  as the re s u lt  o f the dec line  in  trade 
w ith  the United States a f te r  the r© -lm position  o f the Non­
im porta tion  Act* S ubstan tia l losses were Incurred in  the trade 
w ith  northern Europe, ivhere the loss was p a r t ly  balanced by an 
increase o f £2,800,000 In  the flo w  of British goods to  southern
Europe, W ith a loss  o f £2,300,000 the "Rest o f the World" fa i le d
1?to  provide an a lte rn a tiv e  to  the American market, " W h ils t the
L a tin  American market had acted as a cushion aga inst losses in
1808* I t  fa i le d  to  do so in  1810-11 because o f o ve r-e x p lo ita tio n
and specu lation  in  1809-10: exports to  L a tin  America f e l l  by 50
1*^per cent to  £3,000,000 in  1811, The main source o f r e l ie f  in  
1811 waa to  be found In  southern Surope-portugal,Spain and the 
Mediterranean p o rts  -  where a market was found fo r  B r i t is h  exports. 
This was in s u f f ic ie n t  to  o ffs e t the loss o f the American export 
market. The Non-Im portation A c t, th e re fo re , caused considerable 
losses in  the export trade in  B ritish-m ade goods and th is  was not 
balanced by the d iscovery o f a lte rn a tiv e  markets as in  1808; these 
losses co n s titu te d  the bu lk  o f the decrease in  exports in  1511,
The drastic e ffe c ts  of the Non-Importation Act appear to  be less 
severe in  1812 because of a r is e  o f £2,700,000 in  the flow  o f 
B r i t is h  goods to  the United S tates, Th is, together w ith  modest 
increases in a l l  o ther areas, improved B r ita in ’ s exports. The 
existence o f th is  increase does not undermine the argument th a t
12. same references as 11, 
13# see Table 40 on page 68
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the Non-Importation Act wee the moat important CaUse of British 
losses* as the upsurge in 1812 was short and sharp. The repeal 
of the Orders iai Council, in June, encouraged the departure of 
many British and American ships, laden with goods for the United 
States, before the news of the American declaration of war was 
known. Practically all of the #4,100,000 of British-made goods 
sent to the United States in 1812 left British ports in June and 
July.^^ The sudden release of this flood of exports is ample 
evidence of the effectiveness of the Non-Importation Act# Whereas 
earlier sanctions in 1809 had slowed down the flow of exports to 
the United States, this act caused substantial losses to British 
exporters, creating a stockpile of goods because of the lack of 
alternative markets at a time when Britain wae deep in a slump#
The start of a slump in Britain in 1810, after the speculative 
bubble had burst, together with the operation of the Continental 
System, were the most direct influences upon British Imports* 
Sanctions played an Indirect role through the closure of the 
American export market which caused a slackened demand in Britain 
for raw materials and a decrease in British purchasing power as 
a result of increased unemployment and low profits. The sharp 
rise in imports intended for re-export to #46,700,000 in 1809 and 
the subsequent fall to £27,400,000 in 1810 and the slight rise 
to £28,900,000 in 1811, coincide with the alternate slackening and 
tightening of the operation of the French decrees* Importe for
14. H.Heaton,"Non-Importation 1606-12".Journal of Economic History. 
1941,9197, ------------------ - ----------------------------
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home oonsUmption were leas a ffe c te d , as a whole, by changes in
French p o lic y , and ,ind ica te  the speculative r is e  in  1810, and the
f a l l  in  1611-12 as a re s u lt  o f decreased demand in  B r ita in *  The
very high to ta l  o f #28,920,000 in  1810 f e l l  to  #20,350,000 in  1811
and slumped to only #15,740,000 in  1812*^^ The importance o f
B r it is h  demand ra th e r than e ith e r  French decrees o f American
Sanctions for the fluctuations in British imports can be seen
in  the changes which took place in  a l l  the main commodities and
in  a l l  the main sources 1810-12, Imports from a l l  pa rts  of the
World f e l l  considerably in  1811 and perhaps i t  is  an in d ic a tio n
o f the e ffec tiveness o f American sanctions in  promoting American
exporta th a t imports from the United States f a l l  by the sm allest
16amount3 by on ly  #310,000* The loss o f American supplies became
more evident in  1612 when war prevented the recovery which took
place elsewhere# The decline  o f B r it is h  co tton  imports from
561,173 bags in  1810 to  326,141 bags in  1811 and to  261*205 bags
in  1812; in  g ra in  from 2, 320,000 quarters in  1810 to  700*000 in
1811 and on ly  up to  850,000 in  1812, a l l  in d ica te  a general
17decline  in  demand fo r  im ports„ Some of these goods were 
influenced by Napoleon’ s p o lic y , auch as g ra in  and wool* and w hile  
much o f B r i ta in ’ s supply o f co tton  was purchased from the 
Americans, the widespread dec line  in  a l l  types o f commodities, 
inc lud ing  those under complete B r it is h  c o n tro l, ind ica tes  a general 
f a l l  in  demand as B r it is h  p ro s p e rity  f e l l  during  the slumr o f 
1311. In  th is  in d ire c t way, sanctions d id  have some e ffe c t on 
B r it is h  impox»ts^
15. Orouzet, op.. G it*Tables 5 & 7.
16# 880 Table 4 8 r ^
17# see Tables 50 and 54*
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Although British Imports of cotton decreased in 1811 as a result 
of the inability to sell goods to the United States* the 
proportion of cotton imports originating from the United States 
actually increased, because American Bhipoimers were still 
permitted to export American produce to Bx'ltain* The Non­
importation Act was making British cotton importers more dependent
18on American supplies» Si 
planter and industrialist*
* anctions strengthened the link between
The distress and unemployment in Britain in 1811 was accompanied 
by a substantial rise in food prices because of scarcity. This 
distress might have been relieved by grain imports from the 
United States* This did not occu«r due to the negative Influence 
of sanctions* Unable to sell goods in America, British mercants 
were unable to purchase supplies of grain there« The British 
government* with great difficulty, scraped together enough 
bullion, which was very scarce, to buy food for the army under 
Wellington in the Peninsula* In nox*mal times, the United States 
only supplied 3 per cent of British grain imports* but the 
ability to buy American grain in 1811 might have alleviated some 
of the distress* Sanctions and British policy prevented this#
So, on the whole, American sanctions had an important negative 
influence on British imports.
Sanctions did not affect the employment of American vessels in 
the foreign trade of Britain* American supremacy on the Atlantic 
sea-lanes continued* There was no observable decrease in
18* see Tables 13 and 31.
19* see Tables 35 and 14*
Gentleman’s Magas^ine 1809-12 gives monthly grain prices
XAppendix B )*
Hecksher.The Oontinental System.335-340• 
elvln,mpoï@o^#miï(çation pa 3 ,
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20American tonnage In trade with Europe e ith e r . American
merchants no longer enjoyed the p ro s p e rity  which th is  domimmmoe
had given them in  e a r l ie r  years, and there was a tendency to
t r y  new markets such as Russia or to  abide by the Orders in
Council and concentrate on B r i t is h  co n tro lle d  trades* This lack
o f huge p r o f i t s ,  however, d id  not discourage the Ara.ericnns, and
B r i t is h  merchants continued to  resent the American shipowner.
This was seen in  the many p ro te s ts  by B r i t is h  merchants against
the e n try  o f American and o ther fo re ig n  vessels into the licensed
21trade w ith  Europe.
The two most im portant general changes in  the p a tte rn  of B r it is h
y
commerce were the re s u lt  o f French co n tro ls  rather than
Aineï»lcan sanctions. These were the system o f " lice n ce s " and the 
need to  use more c irc u ito u s  routes to  reach the markets of 
Europeo The Order In  Council o f A p r il  1809 had l im ite d  the 
operation o f B r i t is h  co n tro ls , but the French decrees remained 
in  force. To counteract Napoleon’ s p o lic y  in  areas not covered 
by th a t Order in  Council^ such as northern  Europe, the British 
government g re a tly  extended the system o f licences or 
perm its which allowed ships to p a r t ic ip a te  in  a p a r t ic u la r  trade# 
V/hereas only 2,606 haâ been issued in  1807, and 4^910 in 1808, 
the number o f licences issued in 1809 rose to  15,226 and to 
IB 0356 In  1610, before f a l l in g  to  7y602 in  1811, Until 1810 
th is  method was successful in  employing both B r i t is h  and 
fo re ig n  vessels to  fo rce  B r i t is h  goods through the French system 
o f regulations. But i t s  success brought r e ta l ia t io n  in 1810-11
20# see Tables 25 and 59-60#
21. J * Heinoehl, " Poet Embargo Trade♦ . , , "  M iss iss ip p i V a lle y  
H is to r ic a l Review.1955 *pp236-9.
G qurie r(London) , 14th January,l812.
S a in  .Economic A n n a ls .. . .May 1810,Francis  Horner in  Gommons.
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when the French seized B r i t is h  ships and goods a l l  over noxlh-srn
Europe. This t ig h te n in g  o f the C ontinenta l System was one reason
fo r  the slump in  B r ita in  In  1811* Licences brought only s h o rt-
term r e l ie f  from the rig o u rs  o f economic warfare* In  e f fe c t ,  they
gave as much c o n tro l over B r i t is h  commerce as the Orders in
Council o f I 807 and, in  consequence* many Whigs opposed the issue
o f licences because of the power which was being exertJised by
Perceval’ s administration* Licences were issued to  American
vessels but i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  estimate what percentage o f th is
trade was ca rried  in  such shipss c e r ta in ly  B r i t is h  shipowners mad©
very frequent complainte aga inst th© issue o f licences to  fo re ig n
vessels but many Scandinavian and German ships were involved also#
Bo the poss ib le  consequences o f any American embargo on the
licence  trade cannot be estim ated. Therefore sanctions had no
actua l e f fe c t on th is  safety«Amlve fo r  B r i t is h  trade, and. the
p o te n tia l damage cannot bo assessed* The licen ce  system d id
d is to r t  the p a tte rn  o f B r i t is h  trade by imposing a government-
co n tro lle d  e f fo r t  to  channel B r i t is h  goods in to  Europe* This
was on-.e way o f beating the Continental System, the other '"as to
send ships on longer and more c irc u ito u s  routes to  ports  ?aot under
99French c o n tro l, "  "
The p a tte rn  o f trade w ith  northern Fiu^ope, s tim ula ted by the 
system o f licen ces , led to  the development o f entrepot po rts  
from which B r i t is h  goods could be sent d ir e c t ly  in to  western 
Europe, The most notable o f these were H eligo land and the ports
Msîyai4xJliï£^ » leii ,4oa-uii.
Aprll„1812j305-6.
Liverpool MSS ,BM, Add ,M.BB # 38,362 : Monthly Issue o f Licences 1809-
1:812
p o k B h G P a y s t e m . 205-13.
Smar-6, Egm m ilo . 1 ,218.
Lour1e r, 12th January & 19th Feb,1812.
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of Sweden# Until French pressure was put on Sweden in
1810-11 that country was the main transit point for British 
goods* Goods sent under the guise of British exports to 
Sweden were sent later as Swedish exports to Europe: a British
use of the idea of "broken voyages" the American use of which 
Britain had opposed under the "Rule of 1756"# So successful 
was this scheme that the British minister in Stockholm reported
O'Z
that Sw'edish warehouses were overflowing with British goods#
Thl© scheme overcame the difficulties imposed by the French 
decrees at the cost of some inconvenience and lowered profits, 
but its success brought French retaliation in 1810s in June,
600 British vessels were seijged in the Bal'^ 'ic and pressure was 
put on the Swedish government# TMa effectively stopped British 
t}?ade with lïîux^ ope via the Baltic and a substitute had to be 
found. In 1811-12 goods destined for western and centi%l 
Europe were shipped to Mediterranean porta from which they were 
shipped via the Danube basin to their ultimate destinations# 
British shipowners complained that such routes were risky and 
expensive but that they would tolerate such conditions If the 
government banned neutral vessel© from the trade* So at a time 
when the American market was being closed by the Non-Importa11 on 
Act,Britain’s commerce with Europe was becoming more risky and 
less profitable; It was not a market capable of balancing the 
loss of the American market. In a negative sense, then,sanctions 
operated to worsen the overall position of British commerce at
---------------------  -------------- ----------- ---------  ------------------ ------------------— —  ----------------------------------- '1--- ---- r—r~~r r r i-T li riïi'iimiii r i  III r iw w w m w iiwiiii. ih    ............... i i  .n  .. _i.
23, Report from Augustus Foster in April 1810.
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a time of increasing difficultice in Europe, by removing the 
United States ae the principal alternative customer to the 
European countries# Difficulties In Europe could have bean 
borne if the Americans had been willing to continue buying 
British goods: because they were not* Britain’s difficulties
Ojjt
were compounded «
The repeal of tha Embargo Act and the subsequent passage of the 
Non-Intercourse Act and Macon’s Act took place during a period 
of apparent prosperity In Britain* The re-impoBitlon of the 
Non-Importation Act, however, coincided with a sever© 
depression in Britain* This slump had begun in the summer of 
1610 and continued into 1812* 9o, for the first time,effective
Sanctions were Imposed at a time of weakness in the British 
economy* Sanctions were an, indirect cause of the slump and 
hwlped to prolong It by preventing the revival of Britain’s 
exports.
The most immediate cause of the slump was the bursting of th© 
speculative "bubble" In the summer of 1810, This caused 
financial losses to many and was a considerable blow to bueinese 
confidence* Although there had been speculation In importing 
food into-Britain, and although the lack of orders from the 
United States and uncertainty in the European markets 
contributed to this loss of confidence, the main reason was the
24, Hecksher, The Continental System* 230-235»
Smart,Economic AnnaIs,.,, vol 1, 219-222,
BT 1/64,f3E; letter from Britxsn merchants on Mediterranean 
Trâ(îeT3rd April, 1812,
J,H.Rose,"British West India Commerce, "Cambpidp:© Histor­
ical Journal 1929,p45(has material on Sweden),
poor re a u lts  from tha export trade w ith  South Amer.tea, A g lu t
on th is  new market had been fo re ca s t by some observers 
25p re v io u s ly . A f te r  1810 commentators focussed the?, r  a tte n tio n
on tîxe South American losses* The Annual Register a ttr ib u te d
the slump to  general causes such as economic warfare and
apprehension about the s ta te  o f the currency, the e v ils  o f which
were "n o t a l i t t l e  aggravated" by specu la tion  In  South Amei?lGa?^
Another jo u rn a l. The Monthly Review, blamed the speculation in
South America, the end o f which coincided w ith  the gi%dual lose
27o f orders from the United S ta tes, Not a l l  pu t the blame on
losses in  South America# N icholas V a n s lt ta r t ,  w r it in g  to  the
South American n a t io n a lis t , I im n d a , thought th a t the c r is is  waa
the re s u lt  o f general changes In  trade w ith Europe and the
PAUnited States between 1608 and 1810*
The B r i t is h  e n try  In to  the South American market had been the 
result of the coincidence o f the Embargo Act and Napoleon’ s 
invasion o f Spain in  1608# The former created an intense 
desire to  f in d  new export markets to  replace the United States 
while the la t t e r ,  by making an a l ly  o f Spain and by loosening the 
Im peria l l in k s  between Spain and South America, created a 
p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere conducive to commercial success# In  s p ite  
o f the warning g iven by e a r l ie r  fa i lu re s  such as the exped ition  
to  Buenos Ayres in  1806, B r it is h  merchants eagerly seised th is  
chance and poured goods in to  South America, In 180? B r i t is h  
exports had to ta lle d  £1,300,000 but this rose to  £4 ,8 0 0 ,0 0 0 In
Ba;btoggt Jigs , v e l 3, fSM}»Gaming to  B a tliu rs t,1 9 tii Apx-il, 
18087 cF Ivern o ie , E:[feots o f the C ontinen ta l Blockade#64 
260 Annual R eg is te r. lBToT55S^"
il- î’i£E£^ -.|;Ji|I5J2'.»i''ay~Auguat 1812,380.
2a. yasl|tl%gl MgSjBM.Ada.MSB.31,320,Vanslttart to Miranda,
Ig th  march l u l l .
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1808, and £6,400,000 in 1809, but falling to £6,000,000 in 1610* 
After th© "bubble" buret, the total fell to £3>000,000 in 1611?^ 
The desire for commercial success in South America sprang 
largely from the need to find new markets for British-made goods 
sufficiently large to compensate for losses in Europe and North 
America* This task v;as. made easier by the availability of 
credit facilities because of the general inflation of the Britisi 
economy at this time# ïUasy credit facilities permitted 
speculation, and as other markets were closed or uncertain,
South America was seen as an opportunity to obtain riches from a 
new and unoxplolted market*"*^  The lack of alternative markets, 
easy credit, and the desire to maintain factory production and , 
commercial wealth led to too many British merchants entering 
this trade 1808-10# This was not apparent immediately as the 
relief from the losses of the embargo, the large-scale 
©peculation, and ignorance of the market created an atmosphere 
of confidence# In 1809, the repeal of tha Embargo Act added to 
this feeling of prosperity* In consequence tha effects of over­
exploitation were obscured until the first definite financial 
results were known in 1810s this new© precipitated the slump#
Exploitation of the South American market was made more difficult 
by the ignorance of most of the trader© and by the economic and 
political difficulties in South America# There was a large 
speculative ©lament in trade with the United States? th© bulk
29# Bee Table 40*
30# Orouaet, on cit. 558-362#
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of the good© despatched to the Americans was not the result of 
the receipt of specific orders but the visible evidence of a 
merchant's hope for a sale in the United States# This 
speculation was successful because of knowledge of the American 
market gained over many years by specialists in this trade, and 
because of confidence in the American ability to pay for these 
g o o d s , Spéculation in South America had neither of those 
advantages# Bo much ignorance of the market, the absence of 
assurance about payment, combined with the entry of too many 
merchants hoping to recoup losses suffered elsewhere, made the 
South American market less stable than that of the United States# 
The speculative fever created by the embargo and the Continental 
System led to the despatch of too many goods, many of which were 
totally unsuited to the South American market. Because of the 
long distance of the market the financial Impact of these 
mistakes was not felt until 1810,^^
The economies of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in South
America were less advanced than that of the United States* They
were often subsistence economies with little need and no ability
to peiy for manufactures, or cash crop économies whose ability
to pay for British goods depended on world markets# The
Brazilian cotton crop had provided an alternative to American
supplies in 1806 and also gave the Brazilian planters the means
by which to purchase British goods for a short time# The
resumption of American supplies and later sanctions v/hloh
prevented British exports of cotton goods led to stockpiling of
cotton in Brazil, and consequently, a reduction i,n the Brazilian 
ability to nay for British goods.35 The diversity of the
31# H*Buck*Development and Organisation of Anp:lo-American Trade* 
104-17#
32# BT/ 1/42*f82.Letter from British merchant in Brazil,16th 
August ,io06 *
33# BT l/6l{. * f4 2 * I! emor i a 1 from British merchants in Brazil,
22nd April,1812#
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United States’ economy made that market leas dependent on world 
markets for single cash crops. The hlerarohical social structure in 
South America also helped reduce pux*chasing power #$noe wealth was 
concentrated in fewer hands than in the United States* These 
economic characteristics reduced the South American ability to 
absorb British products at a time when British merchants were trying 
to create a substitute for the American market.
South America did not have the political stability of the United 
States, The French invasion of Spain had been a great stimulus 
to the independence movements in the Spanish colonies. The 
struggle between the Spanish imperial authorities and the 
revolutionariee created political problem© for the British 
government, but from the point of view of British commerce, 
difficulties were created by consequent political uncertainty and 
a division of authority between the two sides. The British 
government was aware of these difficulties and hoped to ease the 
situation by trying unsuccessfully to obtain the consent of the 
Spanish Junta for trade with South America, as under Spanish 
navigation laws, all such trade was i l l e g a l , B o t h  political 
groups in South America tended to be harsh and capricious in their 
attitude to British trade, and thus added to the merchants’ 
difficulties, In 1809, for example, the local government in Buenos 
Ayres imposed a duty of 24 per cent on all imports and confined all 
trade to Spanish merchants. In 1810, the Spanish Viceroy of the
34. BT 1/42^f98,27th November 1808,
W e l p g e y  MSS, BM.Add.M8B,37,292,3 letters from Henry 
Weilesloy in Cadiz, August 1810,
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sam© region ordered all British merchants to leave after payment 
of duty on imports.
While the political difficulties with Spanish America were 
considerable, those with th© colony of Britain’s Portuguese ally, 
Brazil, were no better# Though the Portuguese government now 
resided in Rio d© Janeiro, and there was no nationalist movement, 
that government did much to imped© British trade with Brazil.
This was due to the imposition of import duties upon goods from 
Britain and of transit duties on the flov/ of goods to South 
America via Lisbon. These duties caused considerable discontent 
amongst British merchant© in Brazil and were the subject of 
lengthy negotiations between the British minister in Rio, Lord 
Btrangford, and the Portuguese government* In spite of the 
conclusion of a commercial treaty between Portugal and Britain in 
1609, these duties were maintained and must have aggravated the 
financial burdens felt by British merchants in the South American 
trade* More seriously, the Portuguese government, for whom 
Britain was conducting a war In the Peninsula, impeded payment 
of British goods which had been sold in South America* Dollars 
sent by British merchants in Buenos Ayres to British mer#ante 
in Rio for shipment to Britain were bought up by the Portuguese 
government and by Brazilian merchants in order to prevent an 
outflow of bullion# In addition the export of gold from Brazil 
was forbidden,
g^;g-"'''i(^CTÏeBTëy'’ #'SM.Add .MëW 37.^9^.tetter from iirrfla^¥enzïe
BuenosTAyres,1810.
BT 1/49.f9Q.6th February,1810.
l/Bz f160,Letter from Admiral de Oourcey,3rd May,1810.
BT 1/53.f‘81-88.11/10/11 1 0 Z S . f U - 5 5 ,  14/11/10.
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Ab a result of Ignorance, economic difficulties» and political 
troubles, the South American market did not live up to the 
expectations of the speculators and as financial losses became 
known, confidence vms lost, firms went bankrupt, and bankers 
withdrew credit# The speed of this process from July 1810 burst 
the "bubble" and plunged Britain into a full-scale depression by 
November 1810# The losses in South America caused this rapid 
turn of events and sanctions had played an important part in 
forcing British exporters into that market. Sanctions,therefore 
were an important factor behind the depression of 1810-12: the 
slump which was essential for the ultimate success of sanctions.
It was ironic that the "bubble" burst soon after the passage of 
the least effective American measure, Macon’s Act, but the "bubble" 
had originated in the ‘Embargo and Non-Importation Acts. The 
financial losses were felt by London financier© and more immediate^ 
by firms in the export trade with South America* The depression 
spread rapidly in the summer of 1810 a© firms suffered losses and 
cut back production, but sever© and widespread as these losses 
were, the main casualty of the sudden change from boom to slump was 
business confidence* The crisis might have been weathered if 
British industry had had the ability and confidence to initiate a 
recovery, but this was not possible. The lack of alternative 
market© and the shaken confidence from South American losses 
coincided with a growing anxiety about Britain’s currency and the 
precarious situation arising from economic warfare. The crisis of
1810-12 was not just commercial, it involved a crisis of confidence 
in the monetary system which made recovery even more difficult.
37* Orouzet, op cit* 628-630.
•• 166 •• !\
In epit© of th© removal of all effective sanetione in May 1610 
and the upsurge of trade with the United States since the repeal 
of the Embargo Act, there were signs that the American market 
was less certain than it had been in previous years; in 
consequence, it was unable to act as a cushion for South 
American losses* The differences between Britain and the United 
States remained, and Macon’s Act contained the threat of further 
sanctions. In addition, orders for British goods from America 
were not as numerous due to declining American ability to pay for 
British manufactures. From 1809-10t American farmers suffered a 
decline in the world market prices foi» their produce, which 
constituted the bulk of American exports, because of the 
uncertainties of trade with Britain and Europe. American 
restrictions from 1808 had a general effect of raising the prices 
of imports from Britain, thus adding to the decline In American 
purchasing power* Resentment against Britain, particularly in the 
western states, also contributed to the decline in orders being 
placed in Britain.^ As a result of years of uncertainty, 
regulation and sanctions, the normal pattern of payments in 
Anglo-American trade had been upset. The trade balance between 
the United states and Britain was in favour of the latter in 
normal times. The deficit in American trade with Britain had been 
made up by the despatch to Britain of the profits derived from the 
aala of American produce in Europe. This, together with drafts 
drawn from business firm© and banks in Britain, was used to
38* Smith & Pole.Fluctuations in American Business. 18-19, 
Smalser, The D a m o c a S t l 207^7^ ' '
Perklhs.Prologue' "to ' War. 287-8.
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purchase British goods for export to the United States* The
uncertainty in Europe led to a decline in profits and made the
despatch of bullion to Britain more difficult* This led. to a
reduction in the American ability to buy British goods which was
serious enough for British merchants to complain to the Foreign 
39Secretary. So a combination of declining purchasing power within 
the United States in 1810 and a decline in the flow of American 
profits into British hands made the short-term prospects" of the 
American market seem less attractive in 1610* This situation had 
not Improved, rather it heid worsened, by the time of the new Non­
importation Act in 1811, which effectively closed the market in 
the United States for British exports* By contributing to the 
uncertainties of économie warfare, sanctions had made indirectly the 
American market less prosperous before sanctions finally closed that 
market*
Without the guarantee of renewed prosperity from the American
market, the prospect of recovery from the South American losses was
not encouraging* Nor were the prospects of two other markets for
the exports of British-made goods any better* The renewed severity
of the French controls, such as the Sclionbrunn Decree, the
annexation of Holland, and the closure of the French frontier with
Germany, combined to make a considerable reduction in British trade
howith northern Europe* eineè expansion could not be expected in 
the domestic market either imirtediatelylin the summer of 1810 or 
throughout the slump due to m/decrease fin the domestic purchasing 
power, no relief could be expbcted from that quarter* Inflation
39. Baring, 14%.3.
FO 5/74*f3Qo-l0* Memorial from British merchants,15th Kov*1810* 
Buck, OP Pit. 117* J 
Reinoehl, op cit. 236^9*
40. HeckBher*The Oontinenty^l ëystem. 183.
/: '
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in Britain since the suspension of eaeh payments by the Bank of 
England in 1797 had severely reduced the value of the pound and 
thus depressed the standard of living ae wages lagged behind the 
cost of living* Bad harvests since 1806 had increased food prices; 
in January 1809 the price of a quarter of grain was 90/6d*, but 
this had risen to ll6/2d by August 1810* A greater proportion of 
income had to be spent on food, and in many cases Income declined 
ae a result of unemployment or reduced wages caused by the slump# 
The income of the upper classes declined as a result of the losses 
incurred through speculation while the high taxes needed to finance 
the war further eroded purchasing power* As a result the domestic 
market was unable to absorb losses incurred in the export markets 
of South America and elsewhere. This failure prevented the 
recovery of business confidence which, even before the summer of 
1810, had been undermined by a growing concern over the state of 
Britain’s currency.
American trade with Europe provided Britain with a large amount of 
bullion which was sent to Britain as payment for British goods.
This contributed to a favourable British balance of paymenlL.^^
The uncertainties of economic warfare which reduced direct 
American trade with Europe caused this source of bullion to dry up 
and contributed to an unfavourable balance of payments which 
became ©vident from 1809* This balance was upset further by the
41 *' ' Orey'llBSTër^ ^^  ^   Sentember 1811 ™  —
Grmizet, 550-562.
Grain prices in Appendix B.
42. jf.Q,.3/7^r>.f3 0 6-3 1 0 , Memorial from British merchants.
43* 1 , o r 1810, 563-9,Abstract from Bullion Committee
Report.
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need to export bullion to nay for grain imports from Franco in 
1806, to pay for subsidies to allies, and to support overseas 
military campaigns such as that in the penlneula.^^*" As a result, 
by 1810, considerable alarm was being expressed at the scarcity 
of gold in Britain? one observer wrote to Lord Liverpool 
reporting that the shortage of bullion "ha© nearly laid an embargc
|t
on the trade of the whole country." Amongst others, William 
HuskiBson attributed the scarcity of gold to the Inflationary 
issue of paper money which, together with overseas needs, wae 
driving bullion out of Britain. He thought that the resumption 
of gold a© a circulating mediufn through purchases by the Bank of
j
England at market prices, would stop the outflow and restore
46confidence in the currency* The growing shortage of gold, with 
prices rising from ^3*17*10#d per ounce in 1806 to some &4*12.0d. 
per ounce in 1610, and to a5#9#0d. per ounce In May 1812,
; combined with the increasing issue of paper money ( which allowed
)
) the extension of credit needed to finance speculation and the
'I
war effort) caused considerable unease from 1810. Many 
disliked reliance on paper money because of inflation and the 
power given to the government as a result* Others saw the issue 
of paper money as the main cause of the currency depreclfllon.^^ 
Certainly, since 1797 when William Pitt had suspended cash 
payments by the Bank of England because of a drain of gold from 
Britain, wartime needs had led to an increased issue of paper by 
the Bank of England and other banlm. The Bank had issued an 
average of ^10 millions in notes annually before 1797, but by
5”;âine'i.'lB'Ï2'.''CT~é4*RQ8©''ln"^c'b?im
1612* A.duïiniîigham, op c l t ,  75<
43. L iverpoo l M88  ^ BM.AdSVMBl/ 38.243* unknown w r i te r - la te  1806. 
46. W*HusklB0o n ..*  Depreciation o f the C urrenov.(l8101.41-47. 
68-9,94*
47* Geyitlofnan’e Magasina* 1812,432* 
kQ . HuakiBson, SILSM, k l~ l4 .7 iM S ^ M S iM & m z ± n e . l / f i / l i ,U7a
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1809 thlB had risen to £19 millions, with a further £4-3 millions 
being issued by the country banks
The high price of gold and the uncertainty about the currency led
Francis Horner, a leading opponent of paper money, to press for
a parliamentary committee in the spring of 1810* The report of
this committee was published just before the prorogation of
parliament in August 1810, as a result of which it was not debated
in parliament until May 18X1. Consequently no decision was taken
for several months on its controverelal recommendations. This
prolonged uncertainty over the future of the currency and delayed
restoration of business confidence,^ In spite of the evidence
from bankers that the high price of gold was due to the war, the
political composition of the committee, chaired by Horner, led to
blame for depreciation being put on the "excessive" issue of paper
money. The committee, therefore, advocated a return to cash
payments: a return to gold ae the basis of the currency,^^
Although Horner was supported by George Oaiming, the government
opposed the resumption of cash payments, Oastlereagh stated that
paper money had given the country credit sufficient to ensure
prosperity and to finance the war; whilst LoM Liverpool thought
that resumption would paralyse military operations at a crucial
time, Vansittart criticised the publication of the report because
as>
it undermined business confidence in the currency,"'^  The 
government successfully opposed the committee’s recommendations
49* Smart, Economic,..Aimais, * *, vol 1* 250-1.
50, Gentleman’ zIne. December 1810, 545-6,
51,
J.8liberling,"Financial & Monetary Policy,.*"
Journal of Economies,1924. 430-1, 438-9*
52, AShiia 1 " Regi'sior^ . 86-93* 
a IT .T ^ g e .LÏFe''''of L ive rp o o l. v o l . l ,  369*
Smart, Economic'%imalW.*.. vol.l, 292-304*
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In 1811 and thus ended the uncertainty. Perceval’© administration 
did try to restore confidence In 1811 when, as a result of much 
business pressure, a committee to investigate commercial credit 
was set up. This body reported in March 1811 th&t the crisis was 
due to overspeculation and it asked that Perceval issue £6 
millions in exchequer bills to aid manufacturers. In spite of 
opposition from Huskisson who continued to blame inflation, and 
from Baring who advocated the new export markets demanded by 
witnesses before the committee, the prime minister agreed to this
limited government aid. It did little to relieve distress as the
main need was for confidence and an outlet for British exports. 
Continued uncertainty and the unsuccessful government action 
prolonged the crisis, and in 1811, economic and social distress 
grew. The losses in South America, partially created by sanctions 
had occurred when the absence of other markets and diminishing 
confidence in the currency made recovery more difficult. The 
renewal of the Non-Importation Act in 1811 retarded recovery even 
further by closing a normally large and prosperous export markets 
sanctions helped cause and prolong the slump.
Some idea of the nature and extent of the distress in 1810-12 can
be gained from the growth of unemployment, poverty,bankruptcies, 
and the rise in prices in those years.
It was recognised that the introduction of the factory system made 
the industrial areas of Britain more susceptible to fluctuations
53# Annual Register,1811, 56 6^ 3.
Scots Magasine.. March 1811, 227.
Bipole, OP clt. 207-0 .
Smartg Economic Annals.., vol 1, 263, 266-72.
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caused by even small changes in the international scone. This
was seen when the cotton industry - the most advanced industry -
was affected first by the slump In 1810, Ae the depression
deepened, unemployment and poverty became most evident in
Lancashire? the home of that Industry. It was the worst period
of unemployment yet in the history of Liverpool when about
1#,000 people, constituting one-sixth of the labour force,
required poor relief. In the rest of Lancashire, one-fifth of
the work force was on poor relief, and this does not Include
those whose wages had been cut as an alternative to unemployment.
Evidence of distress in other areas is not so full or continuous
(highlighting the position of cotton) but by May 1812, one
thousand weavers were out of work at Bpitalfields in London.
Unemployment in Birmingham had been averted by stockpiling goods,
but this was a short-term solution. One half of the Birmingham
labour force depended on trade with the United States and the
industrialists of that city claimed that they had lost over
£1,200,000 by May 1812, aa a direct result of sanctions. Such
losses were not compatible with maintaining a normal labour foro%
Glasgow was affected less and, after some difficulty, the wages
Bkof thè weaver© were maintained in that city. The need to 
provide increased poor relief laid a greater strain on the 
taxpayer and this, together with the lack of work, reduced 
purchasing power at a time of a general rise in prices due to 
the lack of bullion and the scarcity of food, Except for that 
of 1810, successive poor harvests caused a steady rise in
5^* 3h~(y, ; Zslgleg.Adainp;1iQn.310-12.
%/2/12. ; Qaledonian Mercury. 16/3/12.
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price© from 1808, reaching a peak in the winter of 1811-12, 
when the full effect© of the dopreeeion and of American sanctions 
were being felt. In January 1809, a quarter of wheat sold for 
90/6d in London, but by August 1812, the -price had risen to 
135/- per quarter: the steepest rise taking place in the early 
months of 1812,^^
Indicative of the spreading effects of the depression \m8 the 
rapid rise in the number of bankruptcies in 1810-12* In 
December 1804, the total number of failures was 60, by December 
1609 this had risen to 1X3, and in December 1810 It vmo 229 
and although the total fell to 17^ in December 1811, by the 
end of 1812 it had risen to 223* The total number of 
bankruptcies in 1809 of 1,069 rose to 1,670 in 1810 and to 
2,000 in 1811 before falling to l,6l6 in 1612* in effect the 
slump doubled the annual rate of business failures* The 
depression, therefore, was characterised by g.eowing unemployment, 
poverty, rising prices amd an increasing number of 
bankruptcies% sanctions were responsible partly for this 
situation*
The British government remained optimistic and tried to minimise 
the effects of the crisis* Following his glowing budget speech 
of May 1610, in hie budget of May 1811% Spencer Perceval claimed
5!>. see Appendix B*
36* Monthly Magazine. 1st March 1811, 197 ( for December figures]
" " 1813.’ 314*
" " 1812, 227.
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th a t the p ro s p e rity  o f the ooim try was increasing* Lord 
L ive rpoo l believed th a t the d is tre s s  in  the manufacturing areas 
was the re s u lt  o f temporary causes which he reg re tte d  because 
o f the Inconvenience caused to  the government’ s attempt to  ra ise  
more taxes* This optimism was not dimmed by th e ir  awareness o f 
the food shortage which was making i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  obta in  
supplies f o r  B r i t is h  troops overseas* For th is  response many 
c r it ic is e d  the a d m in is tra tio n  and came to  blame the c r is is  on 
Perceval and hia colleagues. As th is  c r it ic is m  spread and as 
d is tre s s  continued to  increase, the Whig campaign aga inst the 
Orders in  Council was revived* Instead o f having to  demand 
changes amidst p ro sp e rity  they could now draw a tte n tio n  to  the 
widespread e ffe c ts  o f the slump and p o in t to th e ir  fa v o u r ite  
so lu tio n  to  the c r is is  which was the re-opening o f the American 
market to  B r i t is h  exports: th is  could be achieved only by the
57repeal o f the Orders in  Counoil and the w ithdrawal o f sanctions* 
This c r is is  was p a r t ly  created and was prolonged by economic 
sanctions. I t  revived B r i t is h  opposition  to  the OMere in  
Council a t a tim e when B r ita in  was more vu lne rab le  to p o l i t ic a l  
and economic pressure. The main o b je c tive  of th is  opposition  was 
the removal o f the Orders in  order to  persuade the Americans to  
withdraw th e ir  sanctions. Thus sanctions had both a p o s it iv e  and 
a negative ro le  in  the économie c r is is ;  as a cause and ae a 
8o3-ution to  the slump #
3 1, Annual Register. 1810J W a n d  IBff
J u ly  1810, 83-59*
Wellington
d-otb. Apr 11,1812,
le t  J u ly  1811,353 and 1st March, 1812, 
She_..immlneg, 12th April aiiS 10th Kay 1812.
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In  ï>ublic the members o f Bpencer Peroeval’ a a d m in is tra tio n  were
1o p tim is tic  about the economic c r is is  fa c in g  the country* The
widespread d is tre s s  had n e ith e r produced any p u b lie
acknowledgement o f the  s e v e r ity  o f the c r is is  nor any change o f
p o lic y  towards the United States whose economic coercion was
thought o f as pro longing the slump, Conseg.uontly the government
was accused fre q u e n tly  o f complacency and in s e n s it iv i ty  over
2the p l ig h t  o f the in d u s tr ia l areas* Was th is  lack  o f concern 
in  îpubliô B r e f le c t io n  o f the private opin ions o f ministers or 
d id  they respond by re-assessing the government’ s American 
p o licy?  An answer requ ires evidence o f "the p r iv a te  views o f 
ministers on p o lic y  towards the United S ta tes, on the opposing 
needs o f American n e u tra l i ty  and the maintenance o f British 
m aritime supremacy, and, on th e ir  awareness o f the problems 
created as a re s u lt  o f poor re la tio n s  w ith  the United S tates,
The moat v i t a l  problems fo r  the government were not pure ly  
economic but arose out o f the p o l i t ic a l  and s tra te g ic  needs o f 
B r ita in ;  the e ffe c ts  o f the American-induced économie 
d is lo c a tio n s  upon the B r i t is h  m il i ta r y  e f fo r t  in  the Ib e ria n  
Peninsula, and the p o s s ib i l i t y  and consequences o f a war w ith  
the United S ta tes , which would d iv e r t  a tte n t io n  and resources
1# see pages 135-6, 
2. see page 156*
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away from the s trugg le  w ith  Napoleon. In  genera l, the response o f 
the B r i t is h  government was more f le x ib le ,  less o p tim is tic  and more 
aware o f the problems created by sanctions than would appear in  i t  
p u b lic  statements,
The view© held by B r i t is h  m in is te rs  about the United S tates, as an 
independent na tion  w ith  which ne la tions had been d e te r io ra tin g  
were expressed In fre q u e n tly . Perhaps th is  is  an in d ic a tio n  of 
the re la t iv e  unimportance of the American re p u b lic  in  the 
th in k in g  o f a government whose p r in c ip a l concern in  fo re ig n  
p o lic y  was the strugg le  aga inst Napoleon. W h ils t there is  no 
o v e ra ll u n ifo rm ity  of op in ion , the Tory leaders o f B r ita in  tended 
to  d isp la y  h o s t i l i t y  and a lack  o f understanding about American 
s e n s it iv i ty  towards th e ir  independence and n e u tra l i ty .  In  1808, 
in  the f i r s t  year o f sanctions, the Lord C hancellor, Lord Eldon, 
speaking in  the House o f Lords, showed awareness o f the importance 
o f the United States fo r  B r i ta in  and d isplayed no h o s t i l i t y  to  
th a t country.'^ In  co n tra s t, Viscount Sidmouth, a leading Tory 
outside the government in  1808, thought o f the United State© as 
"a country in  which there is  l i t t l e  a u th o r ity  in  the ru le rs , and 
as l i t t l e  p u b lic  s p i r i t  and v ir tu e  in  the people"^ In  the years 
between 1808 and 1812, there were few expressions o f m in is te r ia l 
opinion about the United S tates, C o n c ilia to ry  gesture© tended to  
be ta c t ic a l w h ils t the general tone remained h o s t ile .  There was 
no favourable view o f the Americans to match the opin ion o f Lord 
L ive rpoo l In  a memorandum w ritte n  s h o rtly  a f te r  the outbreak of
3# US .B ip .,Desp. vl3  Pinkney to  Madison, 17th February,1808.
4. 0ray,S£gjw0j_Jperoe3^
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war In  1812. He f e l t  th a t "The whole of the InhabitantB  o f the
United States are il3.-dlsposed toward Great B r i ta in .  In  th is
all p a rtie s  agree* and they d i f f e r  only in  their degree o f
hatred and jea louey." The view of the prime M in is te r re fle c te d
not on ly h o s t i l i t y  to  the Americana as he went on to  demand
ac tion  to  curb American power, but also the tendency to blame
the United States fo r  the poor re la tio n s  between the two
coun tries . In  e a r l ie r  years th is  h o s t i l i t y  had been blamed on
French in fluence  over Je ffe rso n , but Msdlson was castigated fo r
being the u n w ittin g  to o l o f France because of hi© acceptance
o f the letter withdrawing French re s tr ic t io n s  on American sh ips,
w r it te n  by Oadore in  August 1810* The cabinet regarded American
d ie lik e  of B r ita in  and American a c tion  aga inst B r ita in  as the
re s u lt  o f French ac tion  ra th e r than the consequence o f B r i t is h
6in fringem ents o f American n e u tra l i ty .
While there was obvious B r i t is h  resentment a t th is  American 
hostility, arrogance and a la ck  o f understanding were the most 
common themes in government expraseione o f opin ion 1810-12.^
In  February 1611, Richard Marquis W elles ley, the Foreign 
Secretary, d ra fte d  a le t t e r  to  W illiam  Pinkney, the American 
minister, which revealed h la  contempt fo r  American n e u tra lity *  
Replying to  Pinkney’ s le t t e r  o f 14th January,1811, W ellesley 
contended th a t the v io la t io n  o f Amex»ioan n e u tra l r ig h ts  was 
in c id e n ta l to  the operation o f the Orders in  C ouncil, th a t these
■it la w M in iii.ii*  ■■      ■mil i| , ii    -^^iT— y r r r “ t - T - f v r f i n i n i ^ ■ Iw r iT  n An* ' " rn 'r * , :i$in ,w«-rM » '     i WJJiiii i i in w i i i iiriw w ij< in i |L t1 M il l i i i i^
5* L3Æ,e:7Ppq,l,7vî88,, BM.Add,MBS,38,562, undated memo o f about mid 
1612,
6. Wel3.esley MSB ,BM#Add.MBS * 37*292.Cabinet memo on le t t e r  to  
PlnJmey^ io th December,1810 «
7* Vl8, Russell to  Monroe,3rd Feb. and 9th May,1812,
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v io la tio n s  wore the re s u lt o f French a c tio n , and th a t Great
B r ita in  could not repeal her Orders in  Oounoll to  please the
6.Americans w ithou t any reference to  the conduct o f France.
Blaming Prance was a constant theme in  the exchange between
B r ita in  and the United S tates, A s im ila r  in s e n s it iv i ty  and a
ra th e r p a tro n is in g  a tt itu d e  was seen In  tM  opinions o f Spencer
Perceval, Speaking in  the House o f Common# on January 8 th ,1812,
the premier made claims th a t the government’ s a tt itu d e  towards
the United S tates had been "to o  moderate, too fo rb e a ring " and
th a t he was more to le ra n t towards the United States than to  any 
9other country.*
Amidst th is  general h o s t i l i t y  and in s e n s it iv i ty  on ly  a few 
c o n c ilia to ry  gestures occurred# In  January 1811, Lord Bathurst 
suggested to  Perceval th a t the government t r y  to  exp la in  i t s
10
p o s it io n  to  a l l  those merchants engaged in  the American tra d e ,"
Bathurstp although prepared to  ha c o n c il ia to ry , and u su a lly  the
member o f the cabinet most aympathetic to  the American p o s it io n ,
was not prepared to  s a c r if ic e  B r i t is h  m aritime r ig h ts  to  achieve 
11
peace* ' In  A p r i l  1812, the new Foreign S ecretary, Viscount 
Gastlereagh, s ta ted h is  desire  to  rev ive  amicable re la tio n s  and 
commerce w ith  the United States and rescue the Americans from 
French In fluence* In  so doing, he a lso  s ta ted h is  b e lie f  th a t 
B r ita in  had been f r ie n d ly  to  the United States and th a t the
8*. BM,A&d,M83#37*292# d ra f t  o f le t t e r  to  Pinkney.
Fabllëiï.
9, £Q«£L§£.s, 9th January,1812.
10, W ellesley M8S, BM,AddoMS8,57,295, Bathurst to  Perceval, 2/1/Xl
11, W ellealey MSS ^ BM,Add*MSS,37,292nMemo Of Cabinet * 10/12/10«
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12Orders In  Ootmoll were the re s u lt o f French a c tio n . Like h ie  
more h o s tile  colleagues, he showed mo understanding o f the 
American p o s it io n . During the period of sanctions, such general 
expressions <ùt a des ire  fo r  more amicable re la t io n s  were the on ly  
p o s it iv e  response to  American demands. The government remained 
genera lly  h o s t i le ,  arrogant and in s e n s it iv e , and fre q u e n tly  
regarded the united S tates, not as an Independent n e u tra l n a tio n , 
but as a to o l o f the French Empire,
Sanctions produced no re a l change o f general a t t itu d e  p a r t ly
because the B r i t is h  government thought th a t th is  e f fo r t  a t
economic sanctions had fa i le d .  The Embargo had fa ile d  and had
bean replaced by a much weaker series of measures whose fa i lu r e
was pred icted  by reporta  sent to  the government, a l l  o f which
tended to  show theit sanctions were more harmful to  the United
States tlian to  Great B r ita in ,  In  Ju ly  1810, Francis Jackson, the
B r i t is h  minister In Washington^ had reported a great Increase in
trade and in  American p ro sp e rity  fo llo w in g  the end o f the Non-
In tercourse Act; Im plying th a t this act had hur-t the American 
13economy, Augustus Foster* M e successor, stated h is  b e l ie f  in  
August 18115 th a t the Non-Importation Act had fa i le d  and he 
i l lu s t r a te d  h is  remarks by repo rting  on the d i f f ic u l t ie s  of New 
England merchants who exported food to  the B r it is h  West In d ie s ,
In  h is  vie?/, th is  fa i lu r e  would be compounded by a strong B r i t is h  
stand aga inst A m e r i c a , T h e  adverse e ffe c ts  o f sanctions upon
12, 3632 Oastleraagh to  Foster, 10/4/12, Hq,4,
13» &ILIZ5&PExtract from despatch from Jackson, 10/7/10,
1 4 FO 5/76y Deepatc-h from Foster 5/8/11? boo also same despatch
In'#h:/'60,
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the American economy were brought to  the B r i t la h  government’ a
a tte n tio n  by a le t t e r  which 3%ord M e lv lX la ,passed on to  the
Foreign Secretary in  September 1811* O r ig in a lly  w r it te n  by a
Mr.Hoaaack in  New York to  a fellow merchant in  B r i ta in g Mr^Hope,
the le t t e r  described the economic a it i ia t io n  in  the United States*
Mr.Hoaeack gave a v iv id  d e sc rip tio n  o f the'slump in  the United
States which was ru in in g  the commercial alaes# He blamed th is
on the p o lic ie s  o f the American government hnd f e l t  th a t the
s itu a tio n  would improve on ly  when the Unlte& states government
ended its sanctions p o lic ie s *  He believed th a t a f irm  stand by
15B r ita in  would end the p o lic y  o f economic coercion* Newspaper
reports re in fo rced  th is  flo w  o f in fo rm ation  to  London* In
November 1811, the Galedonian It^rppry s ta ted  th a t sanctions had
hurtî^. the American economy, and in  the fo llo w in g  year, the
Gopplgr^ a strong Tory paper, carried  a re p o rt from Hew York city
th a t business was stagnant, w ith  imny bankruptcies and much
1 Epoverty as a re s u lt  o f poor re la tio n s  w ith  B r ita in *  W h ils t 
these reports  came only from Hew York, the most im portant 
seaport and a F e d e ra lis t c i t y ,  In the absence of reports to  the 
contrary from other part© o f the United S ta tes, together w ith  the 
d ip lom a tic  despatches, they presented the cabinet w ith  in form ation 
to  balance the reports  o f d is tre s s  w ith in  B r ita in *  Optimism 
about d is tre s s  was increased by knowledge o f the adverse reac tion  
o f sanctions in  the United States»
ISS3£3jS..Iaipi®'>»Aâa.MB3.37,296? le t t e r  encloeed. from 
M e lv ille  3 0 /^ V ll.
, 4 m  K o vember ,1611.
Courier. 14 th  Ms rob. 1812.
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P o s itive  evidence about the government’ s views on the
e ffec tiveness  o f sanction© is  ve ry  scanty* The lack  o f concern
f-rem the United S ta tes, the apparent absence ox' any cabinet
d iscussion of the e ffe c ts  o f sanctions, and the determ ination
to  re ta in  the Orders in  Coim cll tend to  show th a t the e ffe c ts
were e ith e r  not s u f f ic ie n t  to  provoke d iscussion  or were
minimised by the b e l ie f  th a t the United States waa a lso being
h u rt*  The im portant cabinet meeting in  Deoamber 1810 d id  not
17re fe r  to  the economic impact o f sanctions."' The few p o s itiv e
sources centre upon Marqula W ellesley, but hi© views and
actions were not fo llow ed by any o f f i c ia l  reaction. In  la te
1810, he wrote to  Wellington, in Portugal, s ta tin g  th a t recent
American measures may requ ire  British r e ta l ia t io n  and he asked
W ellington fo r  idea© on possib le  m il i ta r y ,  naval and p o l i t ic a l
16measure© to adopt* Any re p ly  from W ellington has not been
found. This le t t e r  is  not Bupported by any cabinet d iscussion
or any other m in is te r expressing the need fo r  r e ta l ia t io n  a t
this time. In  the spring  o f 1611, Wellesley wrote to  Foster
th a t a con tinua tion  o f American p o lic y  would b rin g  about B r i t is h  
19retaliation," Again In  January 1812, ju s t before h is
re s ig n a tio n , Wellesley wrote that sanctions were almost as
20injurious as war, " This lone view was not as serious as i t  
appears because the B r i t is h  government did not regard war w ith  
the United States as too harmful,'*'”"  Apart from th is ,  the only
1
19# 324; Wellesley to Foster^.Apr 11 1812, Ho.6#
20. MSS. 37,293; Hotos fov despatch to
Foster, January 1812.
21, &oa belowij pages pQv-P]©.
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other indication of a positive reaction to reduce the effects 
of sanctions is a report that the government was aiding efforts
PP
to smuggle goods Into the United States from Canada*"' Therefore^ 
regarded as more harmful to America, sanctions wore not 
effective enough to force Britain to consider the causes of 
Arne\?1 can grievance •
British etubhoxuimesa was reinforced by the government’s view of 
the nature of American hostility. In hie despatchee^ Jackson 
was the first to draw the government’s attention to the 
wido&pre&d dislike of Britain by the American government and 
people* Commenting on Madison’s administration he felt that 
"it was founded on principles essentially hostile to British 
interests and feels that It must support itself by keeping up 
a constant state of irritation against that country," But 
this feeling would not push Madison into war with Britain*
This view was accepted by Marquis Wellesley In 1811 when he 
wrote that America "Is evidently most hostilely disposed toward© 
this country,"'^' The British government’s view was shared by 
journals such as the admittedly a Tory organ,
which voiced the opinion that the quarrel began with the "advent
QK
of Jefferson*"^^ In addition to Jackson’s comment on the
possibility of war, reports reaching the British government frbm 
the United States tended to imder-rate the gravity of the 
quarrel by idj#ilighting tl)h weaknesses of Madison’s administratiei
22* US. Gone * Be sn, v9. Bea ©lev to Monroe, 2nd and ÿlîi NovTlbll,
23. General Report on USA by Jaelcson, 15/9/10,
24* M e lv ille ,W e lle s le y  PauerB,B55,WelIesley 15/5/11 on the s ta te  
Of "'urope.
25# Q uarte rly  le v le ^  March 1S12« 1-34#
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and the elae of the opposition to it* The role and power of 
the Federalists, as the pro-British party, was observed by 
Jackson in his general report in 1610# Whilst not very strong, 
the Federalists provided an important check on Madison as well 
as acting ae vocal supporters of the British position* It 
was also felt that the existence of the Federalist party in 
Congress helped ton© down British irritation at American 
h o s t i l i t y * T h e  Federalist party showed that Americans were 
not united in opposition to Britain and that the Americans who
v;ere"superior in talent, property and respectability of character”
2Ssupported Britain. The picture of a divided America was 
enlarged by reports of the dislike voiced by American mercantile 
interests of Madison’s administration. In 1810, Jackson had
noted the pro-Mritieh sentiments amongst the mercantile
29community* Hie successor, August Foster, commented on this 
same point in 1012. In his view, the American merchant class 
did not take the warlike noises from the Congress and President 
seriously enough to discontinue the dispatch of Vessels to 
Britain at very low insurance r a t e s . H e  believed also that 
the American people had been so long "amused” by the warlike
31noises of their government that they no longer believed them* 
Combined with this view of the lack of united public support was 
Footer’s view that Madison would bb satisfied with some small
concessions because sanctions had failed and an unwanted war
52 .was the only alternative. Madison’s demands were not serious
 %  5/6^. 7^%Leral"5ep6rt b.v Ject0on.l$7@/loT
2 7# Amual_ ster. 1810, 1 5 2-6 .
28* Fg'"’ General Report by Jackson, 15/9/10* 
2 9 * FO 5/09» Report from Jackson,19/6/10*
30* F d 'S/BEr Despatch from Foster, Feb.1812.
3 1 # FXT'sTSs. Desna toll from Footer, 22/3/12*
3 2 . F0"''f/77. Despatch from Foster, 29/11/11.
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in their effect© on Britain and hi© diplomatic pooitlon v/as 
weak because even the Americans felt that economic coercion 
had failed*
I
In considering their policies on American neutrality and t W
. \
Order© in Council, the British government was influenced, npt
hy a firm and united American stand supported by really effect:
i \
economic ©unctions, but by evidence which suggested that t 
sanctions had failed; that they had less to do with the slump 
in Britain than with the depression across the Atlantic; that 
the United States whilst generally hostile was not united in a 
determined stand against Britain? and that Madison’s 
administration was weak and desperate for a solution which 
would avoid war* In spite of the economic crisis, most of the 
B%»itiah people supported Perceval’s government in its 
determination to maintain British seapower, including the 
Orders in Council. So strong wae this feeling, the American 
charge d’affaire, John Spear Smith, reported to Monroe, that 
most people in Britain would prefer war with the United States 
rather than give up the Orders in Oounoil which defended" the 
liberties of the world”* British merchants, except those in 
the American trade, and the Royal Navy were strong supporter© 
of the Orders* Smith believed that only "necessity or the 
conviction of the manifest impolicy of the present system" 
would bring about a change*^^ Reuben G#Beasel©y, the American 
consul in London, had already reported on the strength of 
British mercantile support for the Orders in Council, and the
33* US «Bip.Deep*vol# , Smith to Monroe,17th October,1811,
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desire for retaliation against the renewal of the Non­
importation Aot,^^ He also felt that British maritime policies
35would not be changed so long as Perceval remained in power.
Evidence of any cabinet discussion on the question of retaining 
the Orders in Oounoil In face of the American sanction© is 
confined to comments made in the margin of a letter drafted by 
Wellesley in reply to a letter from the American minister, 
William Pinkney, in December 1810*^^ Pinkney had asked whether 
the British government would repeal the Orders in Council in 
consequence of the letter from the French foreign minister, 
Oadore, to the United States government conditionally 
withdrawing the Berlin and Milan Decrees. This cabinet 
discussion took place after the onset of the economic crisis 
in Britain, just after the decision of Madison to reimpose 
Sanctions against Britain, but before those sanctions became 
operative. After the Non-Importation Act wae rc-imposed no 
further discussion apparently took place, and the British 
position until the early summer of 1812 was confined to 
public and private statements defending the policy of the 
Orders in Council. In general, the discussion shows that the 
British government did not favour repeal in face of American 
coercion, but that ministers were at least willing to go as 
far as discussing possible changes.
34. UB,#OQï^ 0,.Be©n. vol 9, Beaseley to Monroe,27th September, 1811*
35. U£>.pons.Desp, vol 9, Beaseley to Monroe,iSth February,18X2.
36. WelK'sTev'Ms. BM. Add .MBS. 37,292, Cabinet discussion of a 
lettartoplnkney on 10th December,1810.
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Much o f the cabinet* 8 d locussion centred around the nature o f 
Cadoro’ a le t t e r  to  the United States government o ffe r in g  
co n d itio n a l repeal o f the B e r lin  and M ilan Decrees. Spencer 
Perceval and the Earl o f Harrowby, M in is te r  w ithou t p o r t fo l io ,  
pointed out the co n d itio n a l nature o f the le t t e r ,  and the former 
c r i t ic is e d  the Americans fo r  accepting i t  as an ac tua l repeal 
and as the basis fo r  ra-im posing sanctions on B r ita in *  The 
Earl o f Westmorland, the Lord P rivy  Seal, saw the le t t e r  as a 
t r ic k  to t r in g  about war between B r ita in  and the United S ta tbs. 
B ari B a thurst observed th a t the le t t e r  was so iWrded as to  look 
l ik e  a form al repea l, which would make the B r i t is h  case very 
d i f f i c u l t  to  sueta in . B a thurst was the on ly  member o f the 
Oabinet to  comment on the growing u n p o p u la rity  o f the Orders in  
Council and th a t th e ir  terms and operation were d i f f i c u l t  to  
defends being opposed by those who want no trade w ith  Frahce 
and by those who want no re s t r ic t io n  on trade* Spencer Perceval, 
p o in tin g  out the success o f the Orders in  Council in  fo rc in g  
B r i t is h  goods in to  European markets, sa id th a t he would support 
repeal on ly  when he was assured th a t the B e r lin  and M ilan Decrees 
were f u l l y  revoked# He opposed any change to  favour the 
Americans, b e lie v in g  th a t a f irm  B r i t is h  stand was lass l ik e ly  
to  cause a war w ith  the United States than concessions in  face 
o f coercion* In  th is  view he was supported by the F ir s t  Lord 
o f the A d m ira lty , O.P.Yorke, and by B a th u rs t, the most 
c o n c il ia to ry  o f m in is te rs , who opposed any repeal in  face o f 
American and French th re a ts  eind t r ic k e ry ,  a lthough he was 
c r i t i c a l  o f the Orders in  Council am such# The on ly in d ic a t io n  
o f re co g n itio n  o f p u b lic  d iscon ten t can be seen in  the change o f
— jLÔ9
tactics suggested by the Earl of Westmorland in order to keep 
the Orders In Oounoil# He suggested that the government stress 
the benefits Britain was gaining from the Orders in Council rather 
than the retaliatory principle behind them*
The continued determination of Bpencer Perceval’s administration
to retain the Orêere in Oounoil was reflected in the American
disappointment at the lack of change following the assumption of
power by the Prince Regent who v/as thought to be more benevolent
towards the United States than George III* The firm British
stand was echoed not only in statements in parliament but in the
Foreign Secretary’s instructions to Augustus Foster in Washington.
Wellesley eaid that there could be no abandonment of British
maritime rights. Ha believed that the burden on American merchants
was the result of the actions of the American government. He
Stated that the Orders were designed to protect British trade**^
Lator he disallowed any idea of a partial repeal of the Orders in
Council as far as their operation along the American coast was
concerned*"'’^ Even in face of mounting discontent and opposition
in 1818 there is evidence of tills continued, stand, when even such
prominent Tories aa Bidmouth,Canning and even Wellesley had
turned against the OMers in Council* In a draft of a speech,
dated 11th May, 1812, the day of hie assassination, Perceval
defended the Orders in Council and maintained that they were not
responsible for the loss of the American t rad e , N o w h e r e  is
there any evidence of government consideration of British maritime
policy and its affects on the United States between December 1810
' f y 'ïo'Bmïth ¥ov.ÏSTo 
FsrDrpTBeBp, vol*18; Russell to Monroe,20th Feb*1812*
UB.Dln,Inst.vol 7,Monroe to Russell*6th May,1812.
38* BS7pV3r7,W©lle8l©y to Foster, 10th April 1811,No.1*
39. lpyo*P*545* Wellesley to Foster,28th Jan.1812,Ho,2 (secret),
40. pyceval.lip* BM.Add.MSB*49,177,draft of speech,11th May,1812 
but draft too sketchy to permit further observations on the 
naturo of Perceval’s defence.
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and the final csrlelB of May and Juno 16X2* The public and 
private view© of Perceval’s administration show continued 
support for the Orders in Oounoil in spit© of the economio 
oris is and the vital renewal of American sanctions early in 
1811.
In consMering its policy towax^ds the United States, was the
British government swayed by any awareness of the importance of
the American market for the British economy or by the prospect
of the Americans developing industry in order to make themeolve
more self-sufficlout? These two points were stressed by many
of the government’s opponents in Parliament and in the
hi
industrial areas*
One major report by Jackson, in New York in 1810, on Anglo- 
American trade was capable of more than one interpretations the 
large outflow of goods and ships to Britain after the end of th 
Non-Intercourse Act could be interpreted as an indication of 
British need for American goods or of American dependence on
il 2
trade with Britain*^ Apart from this one exception, despatches 
from the United States did not dwell on the importance of trade 
The government’s information about the importance of the Amerioaii 
marketg, before the evidence of the parliamentary inquiry in 
lay 1812, is difficult to aaeesosî only newspapers and reports iïv 
Parliament, and the evidence of th© previous inquiry in 1808,
41* See below,Ohepter 7*
42. BT 1/52. Extract from despatch from Jackson, 10th July, 1610
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Whatever the extent of this information, the indications of
government views are ooanty and contradictory. In the 
cabinet discussion of December 1810, Bathurst had recognised the 
importance of trade with America; "Added to this, as our trade 
with Europe diminishes, our trade with the United states rises 
in importance: and the trade with other parts of America would 
he seriously intormpted by an American war," No one else took 
up this point# ^ The other source of government opinion was 
Reuben G.Beaseley, the American consul in London, v/ho reported 
In February 1812 that the British government "now boast that v/e 
cannot do without their manufactures" and that, in consequence, 
many merchants expecting an end of sanctions, were preparing 6o 
send goods to the United S t a t e s , T h e  lack of comment and the 
above meagre evidence suggests a general lack of awareness of 
the importance of thk American market for the British economy.
The British government did not display much Interest In the 
growth of American industry and the American desire for 
economic self-muff1eleney until the winter of 1611-12, This was 
in spite of importan* evidence from the united Btatae during 1810 
In September 1610, Francis Jackson commented on the growth of 
American industry as part of his general survey of the United 
States, He related that It was an established and popular 
policy of the United States government to encourage industrial 
growth in order that America be independent of Britain, H© 
qualified his remarks by commenting on the difficulties impeding
43éV/ellealey MSB « BM#Add#MB8,37,292# Cabinet discussion loth 
b S  eS™er,TS 10 *
4 4 9, Beaaeley to Monroe 15th Feb,1812,
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BU oh growth, of v/hich the high coat of labour and the low
ii5quality of American products were the most important# To 
support hla report he enclosed a copy of a paper which the 
American. Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, had 
presented to the House of Representatives on 19th April,1810.
In this he listed the commodities in which American production 
waa folt to bo adequate to meet home demand: this included all 
goods made of timber, and all leather goodfi, soap, earthenware 
and sugar. He then listed those industries which could meet the 
bulk of American demand; iron, cotton goods, and woollens being 
the most prominent# The Secretary also detailed the number of 
cotton mills in production and under construction: 62 In 
production and 25 being bullt#^^
In ©pite of this information there is no evidence of any further
discussion on the matter until two contradictory reports arrived
from Augustus Foster at the end of 1811# In the first, Foster
described the rapid growth of American manufactures, especially
in textiles, and he commented that much of this eucoess was due
to the migration of skilled workers from the West of England.
He also reported that politicians in Washington wanted the
government to aid industry in order that America be free from
economic dependence on Britain# "From every quarter I have
aeooxmte of the rapid progress which the manufacturers are making
il 7in these states, particularly of course cloth and of cotton*#’
Tjsa by ^yâ"cKon7i'’^^ *
FO “ ' ■.......................
47. M
46, W  Gopy of Gallatin’s report appended to above report#
g,Extract from despatch from Foster,26th Nov#1811#
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The effect of this despatch was balanced by his next report 
which made some general comments on economic distress In the
kSUnited States being the result of American government policies* 
The British government’s response was one of suspicion about 
the validity of these reportsg a suspicion which must have led 
to an underestimation of the seriousness of American intentions* 
In January 1812, the Board of Trade criticised the methods and 
depth of Foster’s report on American industry and voiced 
suspicion of the American purpose in giving this information to
liO
Foster* Following this, Wellesley asked Foster for more
information on American industrial growth as he suspected that
the reports of growth were propaganda to influence relations 
*50with Britain* In turn, Foster toned down hie earlier report
by observing that this industriel growth was not too serious
as it was not adequate to supply the demands of the American
peoplej. many of whom were in distress because of the lack of
51supplies from Britain* Ho further communication on this 
topic took place before the outbreak of war* The tone of this 
exchange of views, and the lack of comment on the earlier 
report from Jackson, end the limited period in which such 
matters held the attention of Wellesley, indicates an air of 
complacency on the part of the British government about the 
short-term and long-term effects of American industrial growth. 
Bine© reports were treated with suspicion and the importance of 
the American market was not realised, fear of the loss of the 
American trade did not play any part in the deliberations of
i i— i i K i iH wmi r r T l  iii i  i r n i n n h p m -| i f i i  rnm t. nr»FO 9/^77* Despatch from Foster, 21st D e c ,1 8 llT ^ ^
49# M L«IZS I M atter to  Foreign Secretary,B th Jan,1812,
50# Mayo p3k7 * Wei 1 ©sle.v to  F os te r,1st Feb,1812*
51, BT%/ 0 , E xtrac t from despatch from Foster,23rd  A p r i l , 1812,
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the British government on Its policy towards America* Together 
with the attitude of the government towards American neutrality, 
American hostility and the need to maintain the Orders in Oouncil 
as a major weapon in the war against Napoleon, this complacency 
meant that for the first two years of the depression the 
government did not alter its maritime policy. The mere renewal 
of economic sanctions and their consequent effects on the British 
economy, had not induced the British government to submit to or 
even consider, the American demands.
Did sanctions aggravate any of the important problems faced by 
Great Britain in the struggle against Napoleon sufficiently for 
the British government to become aware of American needs and the 
dangers of continued poor relations with the United States? This 
question can be answered by examination of the impact of 
sanctions upon the problems of the Peninsular War, and then by 
consideration of the views of British ministers on the 
consequences of war with the United States, if the Americans felt 
that their economic coercion was not producing results.
The British government was well aware of the strategic slgnificanc 
of the war in Portugal and Spain and regarded it as the meet 
important form of military aid which Britain could contribute 
towards any European efforts to defeat Napoleon, As such it took 
priority over other areas of military operations and remained in 
the forefront of the government’s deliberations througiiout
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1609-13# Towards the end of 1810 Wellealey, the Foreign 
Secretary, put the British position very Guoointly when he 
observed that Britain had taken advantage of the Spanish revolt 
against Napoleon to send an army which could effectively pin down 
French troops so that the other powers of Europe could build up
Kg
their strength for the next coalition against the French emperor; 
He remarked also, at this time, that the wisdom of the war had 
been proved by the military and political coat to Napoleon,  ^ The 
Secretary of War, Lord Liverpool, denied Lieutenant General 
Stuart, in Sicily, any reinforcements by citing the priority of 
Wellington’s forces over all other e f f o r t s I n  the spring of 
16113 Liverpool assured Wellington that a renewal of war in 
northern Europe would not divert attention and resources away from 
the Peninsula, To reinforce this view of the government’s 
determination to give priority to th© Peninsular War, in August 
1811, Wellesley wrote to the Russian government, whose relations 
with Napoleon were now very low, that the beet way in which 
Britain could help Russia in any war against Franco was to 
continue the effort in Spain where French troop© would be too
preoccupied to be of any value in any French struggle with
56Russia*^'
The value which the British government put on the Peninsular War 
was underlined by the constant reassurances given to Wellington 
that he would be supported in spit© of the considerable military 
and especially financial difficulties which the government was
Eurone ÏÏÏXO,
53. Wellesley MBS. #Add#,M88,37,292,Memo of October,1810.
54. M'verp-qql M^BB, BM#Add,MSB#38,2k3»Liv0rpool to Stuart,6th Dec,
1610.
55. |4yp?pool^ MSB .BM.Add JIBS. 38.325.Liverpool to Wellington, 
llffi April, 1611,
56, Wellesley MBS.BM.Add,.MSS. 37.293.Wellesl©v in note to Russie 
Ibth Angust,1611.
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fa c in g . As e a rly  as December 1809 L ive rpo o l assured W elling ton
th a t the war in  the Peninsula cons titu ted  the greatest m i l i ta r y
and f in a n c ia l e f fo r t  made by B r ita in .  "The expenditure o f
th is  country has become enormous^-, and i f  the war continues we
musib look to  economy. I  do not be lieve  so great a continued
e f fo r t  has been made by th is  country, combining the m il i ta r y
and pecuniary a id  toge ther, as His Majesty is  making fo r
57Portugal and S p a in ..."  ' Again, in  the autumn o f 1810, he
wrote to  W e lling ton  of Perceval’ s tremendous d i f f i c u l t ie s  in
f in d in g  enough money to  finance the war and th a t, serious thougt
th is  was, the government’ s determ ination to  prosecute the war
58remained constant. Further reassurance came in  the %)r in g  o f
1811 when L ive rpoo l wrote;"You Imow our means both m il i ta r y
and f in a n c ia l are l im ite d , but such as they a re , we are
determined not to be diverted from the Peninsula to other 
59o b je c ts ."  Even in  the in c re a s in g ly  d i f f i c u l t  p o l i t ic a l  
s itu a t io n  in  the spring o f 1812, the government remained f irm  
in  i t s  support fo r  a campaign which many o f i t s  opponents 
c r i t ic is e d .
B r i t is h  success in  the Peninsular War was considered e ssen tia l 
to  the s u rv iv a l o f Perceval’ s a d m in is tra tio n  and the government, 
in  consequence, made considerable e f fo r ts  to  dampen c r it ic is m .
In  1811, Marquis W ellesley considered th a t the main 
parliam entary e f fo r t  In  th a t year v;as given to  gain ing support
57. L ive rpoo l MB8.> BM.Add.MSS. 38,2k5,.Liverpool to  W ellington , 
15th December,1609«
58. L ive rpoo l MSS. BM.Add.M88.38,2k5,L iverpoo l to  W elling ton , 
lo th  September,18X0.
59. L iv e rpool MSS.BM.Add.M88.38.2k6,L iverpoo l to  W elling ton , 
11th A p r i l  , l !F l l .
60. W elles ley MBS.BM.Add.MSS.37.296.L ive rpo o l in  Minute o f 
ly th  M ay,l8 lïï,
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for the Poninavilar campaign when ha urged Perceval to make 
olear the ppinolploa behind that campal^ 'cn clear ±n the Bouee of 
OommoBG,^ Wflith a worsening eoonomio sltoKtion^ with general 
etalemata in the war against Napoleon, with the unoertalatle© 
over the futiire of the Tory government as a result of the 
Hogenoy orlGla, aM lacking the support of powerful and able 
Tories as George Canning and TiscouBt Sidmouth, euccess In 
Portugal and gpain wae eseentlal to the survival of perooval and 
hi® colleague©* A not unbiased observer, Jonathan R\iee©ll^  the 
new American representative In London, reported to James Monroe 
that the war In the peninsula kept Perceval’s ministry In power 
at © time of great difficulty, and also noted that the neséle of 
the Peninsular War played an influential role in determining 
the government’s attitude to the United States? these needs 
prevented Great Britain from taking any strong motion against
f.Q
the United B ta toe# The Peninsular War, in ©pita of the
problems which It created, xme of vital military and political 
Bignlficanc© to the British government#
Much of the corroBpondenoe between Wellington and his political 
©uperiora was concerned with problems arising from the cost of 
the war in the Peninsula # In the later half of 1609 and in the 
first Imlf of 1810, especially, all those conecpnecl with the 
cmmpaign were preoocupled with Its cost* In 1810, the total 
cost of the campaign was ^9#110#051# of wMoh some £6,061,033 
was in the form of specie or bille of ©xahange-i provision© and
ercevml
-iy?"..
88. t?S R@HB.vol 16»Sassall to Monroe, 14th Jammry,1812,
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63tran sp o rt costs accounted fo r  the balance. The main d i f f i c u l t y
was not BO much w ith  ra is in g  taxes, though even here not enough
money could be procured, probably owing to the dep rec ia tion  o f
paper currency, the economic c r is is  and the commercial
6Ud is ru p tio n s  u p se ttin g  the sources o f taxes. The greatest
obstacle was the la ck  o f b u ll io n ,  the p o l i t ic a l  e ffe c ts  o f which
in  the form o f the "B u llio n  Report" have been discussed a lready.
There was insufficient bullion in Britain and in Portugal,
p a r t ly  because o f h igh p rice s  and the dep rec ia tion  of paper money,
and p a r t ly  because the d is ru p tio n  o f normal tra d in g  pa tte rns  had
d ried  up the flo w  o f b u ll io n  in to  B r ita in .  Norm ally American
merchants sent the proceeds o f th e ir  sales in  Europe to  London
where the b u ll io n  was used to  obta in  B r i t is h  supp lies . This
created a reserve o f b u ll io n  in  B r ita in ,  on which the government
could draw. This flo w  dim inished as a re s u lt  o f the co in c id e n ta l
65la ck  o f supply and the demands o f the Peninsular War. As
sanctions helped to  create the d is ru p tio n  o f American trade w ith
Europe, they had contribu ted  to  the lack  o f specie in  B r i ta in  by
1810. The government had h igh hopes o f ob ta in in g  considerable new
supplies of bullion from South America as a result of the
upsurge o f trade w ith  th a t co n tin en t. In  th is  hope they were
66disappointed w i6h ln  a very short tim e. The renewal o f sanctions 
would aggravate the problem.
V iscount W e lling ton  was not backward in  making known to  the B r i t is h  
government the adverse e ffe c ts  of the lack  o f specie. In  March 
1810 he complained of the great d is tre s s  being caused to  h is  fo rces
6h* Melville, Wellesley Papers, vol 1,317? V'illiers to Wellesley, 
19th MarchJÏÔ10.
65 see above,PI52,
66. L ive rpoo l MSS,BM.Add.M88.3 8 .2hk.L ive rpoo l to  Graham,Apri l  1810. 
W ellesley MSSTBM.Add.MSS,37* 295.Perceval to  W e lles ley ,h th  
March and 19th A p r i l , 1810.
Perceval MSS. BM.Add,MSS.37,295.Liverpool to Wellington,15th 
June,1810.
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because of the l.-’ck o f b u ll io n  w ith  whi.cii to buy supolies and pay 
the troops* He urged the Treasury to buy b u ll io n  and send i t  to
6"?Lisbon ra ther than le t  th is  transac tion  remain in  p r iv a te  hands. '
The s itu a tio n  was serious enouglp fo r  both W ellington and the
government to  re a lis e  th a t, unless more funds were forthcom ing,
wj.thdrawal o f the B r i t is h  army would be in e v ita b le . This was
c(lfcussed in  the summer o f 1810 and the s itu a t io n  was s t i l l  under 
/ ! 68review when sanctions were renewed in  1811. I t  is  in d ic a tiv e
i’, o f' the government’ s determ ination to support W elling ton  th a t,
// yyn sp ite  of the slump and sanctions, th is  th re a t d id  not
'!A
m a te ria lise . W h ils t sanctions must have contribu ted  to th is  
problem by d is ru p tin g  the normal flow  of goods and b u ll io n  since 
1807 there is  no reference in  o f f i c ia l  correspondence th a t the 
B r i t is h  government rea lised  th a t there was any connection between 
sanctions and the lack  o f b u ll io n . The bulk of the correspondence 
was w r it te n  in  1809-10, before the renewal of sanctions.
Although the problem must have remained acute, judging by the 
few references fo r  1811-12, the renewal o f sanctions d id  not 
s tim u la te  any more correspondence or aggravate en acute s itu a tio n , 
about which the government was w ell' aware, to the p o in t o f 
n o tic in g  the sanctions and tak ing  measures to curb th e ir  e ffe c ts  
on the gold supply. Perhaps th is  re la tio n s h ip  between sanctions 
and the cost of the campaign was too in d ire c t to  e ffe c t any 
reconsidera tion  o f p o lic y ,
èj, L ive rpoo l MSS .BM.Add .lTssT38V2l44 ,Well^ to  L ive rp o o l.
-1 'Mapch ,1010 •
68, L ive rpoo l MSS.BM.Add.MSS.58,2U5.W ellington to  L ive rpoo l,
23rd May,1810.
W ellesley MSS, BM,Add.MSS.37»295.L ive rpoo l to  W ellington,
15tlS June 1810 and Perceval to  W ellesley,23rd J u ly , 1810. 
L ive rpoo l MSB,BM.Add.MSS.38.325. L iverpool to  W ellington,
20th February,1811,
There were few spécifié references to the United States in the 
correspûndonce on the lack of bullion. With one exception# the 
government showed little awareness of American sanctions posing 
any obstacle to the solution of this crucial problem# In June 
1810 Liverpool suggested to Wellington that he might ease his 
financial situation by selling bills to the American merchants wb 
traded with Lisbon in return for their supplies* "The Americans 
who will bring flour to both Lisbon and Oadia would be too 
glad to receive Bills upon England for ItS^^ This was too 
optimistic# Th# American merchants would not take bills as they 
could be used only to buy goods in Britain for ©xpox^ t to the 
United States? the renewal of the Hon-lmportation Act made such
70
bills worthless* gince American supplies were vital and the 
Americans had to be paid in bullion# the financial crisis was 
still acute by late 1611#^^’ Wellington realised that the 
Imposition of Portuguese duties on Imports from the United states 
would stop supplies rather than aid the financial situation and 
seeing that the drain bullion would continue as lotig as the 
Non-Importation Act was in effect, turned over the solution to 
the government*Shortly afterwards, Liverpool suggested that 
the beat long-term solution to and the drain of bullion and 
ensure the flow of supplies was to encourage the sale of British 
manufactured goods to the United states and to Latin America* He 
hoped that the latter market had recovered from the earlier glut 
of British goods* He based his hopes of trade with the United
6 9 * Liverpool M88. BM*Add#MB0#30#325,Liverpool to Wellington 
70* Wood .Wellington Desna tohesl5-6 V/ellin^ton to Charles Stuart
- 25/1 6 7IIT
7 1 # BT 1/6G| * Extract from despatch from Charles Stuart,Lisbon, 
p/Xo/TnT#
7 2 * Wood .Wellington Despatches .h5«"6*Welllngton to Charles Stuart, 
2p/ 10/XX*^
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States on the opinion that the Amorloan® were most anxious to buy 
British goods in spite of s a n c t i o n s # H e  did not think that 
sanctions oould halt sueh a trade because of the widespread domand 
for goods from Britain and, in consequence, he felt no need to make 
any British ooneeeeion© to end sanctions? not realising that this 
would help the financial position of Wellington, and the British 
economy as well, The inconveniences created by sanctions were not 
sufficient to cause any change of policy#
Wellington faced the problem of obtaining sufficient supplies# 
especially of food# and came to rely on the United states as the 
main source of basic essentials such as grain. Poverty and 
devastation in Portugal and Spain, difficulties with contractors 
and manufacturers in Britain#and bad harvests in Britain forced
7/t
Wellington into this position* As early as 1808 the British
government had allowed American merchants to trade directly with 
Portugal From this beginning the army imder Wellington came t 
be totally dependent on Americrui supplies? in the spring of 1812, 
the Duke commented "all thli 
this year on American flour
is part of the Peninsula has been living
The seal© of American trade to Portugal can be assessed by analysis 
of the numbei'S of vessels entering the port of Lisbon in lÔXls the 
only year for which such information is available* Data compiled in
Lisbon for the Board of Trade gives details of the names, numbers 
and cargoes of all ships arriving at Lisbon in 1011s the year during
,21/11/31
to Hont’oe V-v/l/lZ.
75» BT 5/18. Letter to Thomas Baring,12th August,180fl,
7 6 . WQoa.WelllnKton Baauatohes.hl6-7.Wellington to Oraham*8th May,
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which the sanctions were re-imposed. A grand total of 2,121 
vessels entered the port, about two-thirds arriving between 
January and June* Approximately one-third of all arrivals were 
ships flying the flag of the United States* Some 797 American 
ships arrived, of which 513 arrived in the first half of the year, 
The total was suappassed only by British vessels which numbered 
817* Most of the remaining vessel© were Spanish or Portuguese, 
with another h6 flying Turkish or Moorish colours, and only 26 
from the countries of northern Europe*
Over one half oi the British vessels came from ports in the United 
Kingdoms 309 from England, 2k from Scotland, and lh5 from 
Ireland* Most of the remaining British vessels were on short 
voyages from Gibraltar and other Iberian ports* Whilst the 
majority carried foodstuffs in early 1611, in the second half of 
the year, v/hen a rr lire Is were fewer, only a small number brought 
supplies of grain; and this during the months of the harvest*
The cargoes other than grain were very varied* coal, win©, dried 
fish, nm, tobacco and government stores*
A more definite pattern emerges from the analysis of American 
shipping* As American vessels normally of a greater tonnage,
the small British numerical superiority was probably meaningless* 
Of the 797 American vessels, some 587 arrived direct from the 
United Btatea* Another 1U2 had sailed, from ports in Britain and 
Ireland, and only 68 from other countries; like the British 
vessel© tlcj cam© from other Iberian ports* The growing dominance
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of the port of New York was already apparent; lib- of the 587
arrivals from thirty-seven American ports had cleared from Now York*
Some 668 American vessela brought cargoes of grain, of which 566
came from American ports# In comparison only 353 British vessels
had brought grain, mostly from Britain» In addition 104 American
ships had participated in the grain trade from the British Isles#
This data suggests that Wellington was very dependent on American
sources for his food supply, and upon American vessels to bring
those supplies not only from the United States but also from
77Great Britain and Ireland#
The American trade with Spain and Portugal vyas extremely profitable?
the merchants obtaining bullion In payment instead of purchasing
British manufaotures* Augustus Foster reported that this profitable
situation did much to help American merchants accept the
7Ôreimposition of sanctions against Britain* ^ This Important trade 
was not subject to sanction© until the general embargo of ninety 
days which was imposed in April 1812* The possibility of the lose 
of this valuable source of supply, whose importance Wellington 
acknowledged and disliked because of the consequent dependence 
upon the United States, did not disturb Wellington too much*^^ 
Writing to Henry Wellesley in Way 1812, he voiced the opinion that 
the embargo would not work but gave no reason for this assertion#
As a precaution, however, he had taken steps to obtain supplies of 
corn from South America and from Mediterranean countries* In 
spite of this threat, he opposed any British concessions on the
i fr^FT /s^ 'wssj^ jSt ifTTggrmffCTgB? miràêmiB in-----
G#
78# FO 5/76. Despatch from Foster,7th July,1811,
79* Wood #Wplington Despatches# hl6-7, Wellington to Henry 
Wellesley, 10th May, ^
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Orders in Coun oilAlthough he saw the settlement of relations
with the United States as the best solution to his problems,
he would not support any concessions concerning British
81maritime ri^ts. The general’s apparent nonchalance in
face of threats from the United States 1811-12 must have
carried great weight with the British government# In opposition
to him, and only as late as April 1812, Charles Stuart, the
minister in Lisbon, recommended that because of the shortage of
food in Portugal the Orders in Council should be repealed es
82this would end sanctions and release supplies from America,
This was probably an immediate reaction to the April embargo 
and not to sanctions aa a whole, and, whilst it may have had 
some effect on the government, this recommendation would not 
have the prestige and Influence of Wellington behind it.
Wellington’s strong stand on sanctions and the Orders in 
Council must have made the government more sanguine about 
American threats to the logistics base of this vital campaign, 
and reinforced British contempt for the sanctions policy. The 
only official reaction to this dependence on the United States 
v/as that statement by the Earl of Liverpool already noted; 
that the only way to egse the situation was to sell more goods 
to the United State© in spite cf the Non-Importation 
Such contempt for the efficiency of sanctions against British 
trade would not encourage fears for the peninsular campaign where 
sanctions did not even become a reality until the spring of 
1812* Prior to that date, sanctions had exercised an indirect
FST-'TATiL--------------------------*----------------- - ----- -----
81. OP cit. 4 1 5*6 , Wellington to Stuart, 25th October,1811
82. BT 1/64% T ^ t e r  from Charles Stuart, 18th April, 1812,
8 3 . lilverpool MSS. BM.Add.MSS,38,3 3 6 , Liverpool to Wellington, 
21st NOvemberyi811.
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disruptive effect# The embargo of April 1812 m m  followed so 
quickly by war that this, together with the lack of evidence on 
the thoughts of ministers on this subject in May and June 1812* 
make it Impossible to assess properly the effects of the embargo 
on Wellington’s forces and whether it had any influence in 
changing British policy on the Orders in Council. Despite the 
importance of the war to the government * the views of Wellington 
and Liverpool indicate that a change of policy would not have 
occurred quickly# Only external sources such as Henry Brougham 
and Jonathan Russell* neither of whom were impartial* said that 
such was British dependence on American supplies that sanctions 
T/ould have produced a speedy change if they had been operated
Ah
against American trade with the Peninsula. ^ Brougham wae 
motivated by his strenuous opposition to the Orders in Oouncil 
and Russell was* perhaps, conoarned with strengthening the 
morale of his own government when he stressed British dependence 
in the Peninsula on American supplies* He believed that the 
Orders In Oouncil would be repealed only "from a fear alone of an 
immediate embargo or war, which would out off our supplies from 
the armies in Spain and Portugal#"^^
In the long-run the imposition of sanctions on the American grain 
trade to Portugal and Spain would have caused* probably^ sufficient 
distress to this vital campaign to cause a change in British 
policy towards the United States# Because of the importance of 
the campaign for tho Tory government this change might have taken
64* Brcufbam in House of Commons 16/6/12-
US.Dip.Pesp# vol#16* Russell to Monroe,14th January,1612,
85# 18f Russell to Monroe,14th January*1812,
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place much more quickly than the results of direct sanction©
against the British economy which seemed to have so little effect
on the government. In the pro-1832 Reform Act situation, the
British government was more likely to react In the fields of
interest where it normally operated* such as war, than it would t\
the pressures of distress in the industrial areas of Britain*
In imposing sanctions* perhaps Jefferson and Madison tended to be
Ini'luencGd by their ignorance of British politics and more
especially by their experience of American politics. In the
more democratic American republic the mercantile class had a
considerable Influeno© as Federalists or aa Jeffersonians;
witness their sueceseful opposition to the E^ibargo Act 1807-9*
Perhaps they over-estimated the power of economic interests such
as the Inciuatrlalist over the British government in the décision
to concentrate on general action against British exports rather
than employ sanctions against the vital strategic interests of
Britain* The report of Jonathan Russell in January 1812 shows
that James Madison, and Secretary of State James Monroe, were
not kept unaware of the importance of the Peninsular War. While
there is no evidence for the reasons for this failure to
understand the priorities of the British government* Madison
was probably ini*luenced by the needs of American domestic politics
The suocesaful mercantile opposition to the Embargo Act and the
continued dialike of later sanctione w*a© noted* Aa a result,
Augustus Foster reported that:-
"The Middle States are obtaining a very great 
profit on their flour in Pox'tugal and Spain* and 
that the imr.)ortation of bullion from the British 
Dominions in exchange for the produce sent to them* 
/■econoila a considerable proportion of people to
the measures*"86
This suggests either that Madison, remembering the fate of the
Embai*go Act, feared mercantile opinion so much that he dare not 
ëë* FO §/76#&cGpatoh i-rom Fosier, july,*xéil; ' '
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impose sanctions against Britain by allowing American merchants
to make large profits on the grain export trade to tho Iberian
peninsula# Another indication of the strength of opposition
again oomes from Foster, He reported that the embargo of April
1812, as first proposed by Modiaon was "calculated for th©
purpose of producing distress In the Peninsula" and that it
had been defeated in Congress by the efforts of Randolph and 
87
others. Foster also under-rated this embargo by reporting that 
news of its possible passage by Congress had stimulated tho 
export of grain to Msbon.^^
The goodwill oJ. the United States* therefore* was czmcial to the 
British hopes of success in the Peninsula# The indirect effects 
of sanctions on the financial basis of tZae campaign, the lack of 
any serious efforts to impede the flow of supplies to Iberia^ and 
the comparative nonchalance of the British government and 
Wellington when opposed by tZie actual and potential threats to 
the campaign, indicate tliat the United states missed a good 
opportunity to employ économie coercion effectively and quickly, 
Just ae the employment of sanctions against the British economy 
1810-11 did not change the attitude of the British government 
towards the questions in dispute with the Americans, tZie impact 
of sanctions on the vital Peninsular campaign produced no 
apparent change of policy#
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Throughout 1610-12 there were rimours of war with the United 
Btatos, The belligerent "noises" from the other side of the 
Atlantic, and the possibility of war if eanctions failed, were 
dis cue seel in many papers and journals# In general ^ editors 
adox>ted views on the pot^sibillty of war which reflected their 
respective opinions on the government’s maritime policies*
Whig journals feared that hostilities would come if tho 
government retained the Orders in Oouncil and that war would 
harm Britain very much# On the other hand, Tory papers tended 
to support tZi© government, displaying no fear of a v/ar which 
they believed would be much more harmful to the United States* 
Two journals reported the "warlike disposition of the united 
States," The Annual Hegiater saw in President Madison’s 
message to congress in December, evidence of hostility while 
the Gentleman*s Marm®i,ne felt that the contents of Foster’s 
despatches left no doubt as to the warlike disposition of the 
United States* Like many journals, the latter voiced no fears 
of war,^^ In December 1611, the yimes did not envisage the 
possibility of war in the near f u t u r e AnotZier major 
supporter of the government, the Courier felt that, despite 
public agitation, the United States would not declare war,^^
In opposition to them, the Examiner^ a London weekly, expressed
the opinion that was was Inevitable unless tZie Orders in Council
02were repealed#" Rumours of war reached a peak in tlie early 
months of 1610 and, by the spring, had moderated wiien Madison’e 
message had obviously produced no immediate action* Aa the
a89, 1012, 142-3% Gentleman’a Magazine, vol#02,
X79-Ï3F*
90# 3th December 1811#
91# Courier * 2 5th Jemiary 1812#
92# Saminer, 23rd February,1812#
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United States gradually moved towards war, British public 
opinion beeaiae leee oonoerned about an ultimate break with, the 
United States. As William Oobbett remarked :ln his Political 
Register^ the American embargo in April 1812 was a clear 
preliminary to war but tho majority In Britain still felt that 
war waf3 remote* Was this disregard of tho warnings from tho 
Unitad States a reflection of the views of the British 
govo3?nmont? In tuim, did the government’s views on war have any 
effect In altering its rather complacent views on the ©ffoots 
of sanctions?
Elviclonce of government views on war can be derived from three 
major sourcess the pEipers of ministère, American reports of 
British attitudes, and the type of information which the 
government received from Foster on American Intention#, The 
reports from Foster ejq^reaeed a com;placenoy which the Americans 
in London reported was also the main attitude of the government. 
The few indications of private views illustrate a mixture of 
concern and arrogance over the possibility of war.
In 1610 George Osjming had been pessimistic* believing that wn# 
was most probable because of the obstinacy of both sides 
Such pessimism was not evident in the critical winter of 1811-12, 
Foster had reported that war was very unlikely because of the 
mild Aîïiorican reaction to the "President^Little Belt" incident 
and because he believed that the United States* having lost the
94, BM .Add, » 730 » Canning to Huskisson,
January 1810,
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diplomatie initiative, was waiting for a response from Britainj-
"Xt Xb not difficult indeed to pergeive that all hope® 
of the Government are built on a change of policy being 
affected in Hie Majesty’s Government, if not previously 
to the î*epart of tîie warlike attitude of the United 
States reaching EZagland, at least as soon as It shall 
be known there* *"95
In consequence, to an American obaerver, the British government
in  18X2 displayed no apprehension of war, considered it an
improbability, and waa making no preparations for war. In
]}i'ebruary 1612, Jonathan Rub s e l l  wrote to Monro© to say that he
touxloo ld not perce ive  any apprehension on the p a r t o f the B r i t is h  
government a t a poss ib le  rap tu re  and war w ith  the United States?^ 
In  the earn© month, Reuben Beasoley, h is  consular colleague in  
London, reported th a t B r i ta in  v/a© making no prepara tions fo r  vm r,^  
As la te  UB May 1812, on ly  two days before Beroeval’ a aesasslnatlon
Russell reported tZmt there was s t i l l  no apprehension o f vmr nor
was 
99
any p repara tions fo r  ar,^^ Even the removal o f Perceval d id  not
change the s itu a tio n ,
Fo&ter’ a reports  o f Amor lean weatoeea and in a b i l i t y  to  make war
seem to  have had some e f fe c t  on the government’ a a t t i tu d e .
Footer reported th a t the United States government was no t f irm  but
lOC
weak, la c k in g  any in i t i a t i v e ,  and v a c i l la t in g  on the issue o f war.
He a lso presented a p ic tu re  o f the Amor loan In a b i l i t y  to  make
war: "To any man o f sound understanding the absolute want o f means
In  th i©  country to  make war on us Is  so palpable- th a t the very
l o iidea seems almost r id ic u lo u s ,"  ‘ This view found a welcome in
57. !Ê..Ça>3S^negS. vol 9, 'Bsaaoley to Konros,15th X<’Qbr>u!i3?y,1812,
98, Jboi:ip*Bca-p. vol 18, Russell to Monroe,9th Hay 1612,■
99, U8.Bin.Dean, v o l ,16,Russell to  Monroe*8th June,1812,
100, Dec.1811: m.J&m,l6th Jan,1812; FO ^/86.22nd 
May 1812, deapatohea from Foster*
101* FQ ^/79,16th Deo.1811, despatch from Foster,
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tîie B r it is h  government which was perceptible to Jonathan Russell
when ho reported th a t B r ita in  wac d is regard ing  the p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f war because o f the "co n v ic tio n  here o f our to ta l I n a b i l i t y  to  
make w a r , As a re s u lt  the B r it is h  government gave tljo  
impression th a t i t  d id  not oonsldm? th a t the Americans were 
serious when they spoke o f war«^^^
The two American diplom ats in  London f e l t  th a t the government’ s
oomplaoeiacy was being re in fo rced  by the a c t iv i t ie s  o f the ;
F e d e ra lis ts  in  the United S ta tes, and by the  belief th a t New i'
England was so opposed to  war a© to  make any considera tion  of war
1Ôim possible; War would on ly  lead to  the d is ru p tio n  o f the Union, 
This apparent complacency must have been re in fo rce d  by another 
item in  F o s te r’ s rep o rts ; th a t the a g ita t io n  fo r  war was on ly  a 
‘p o l i t i c a l  ta c t ic  by Madison to  help ensure h is  re -e le c tio n  in  
KoV amb @r 1812,^^^
The views o f in d iv id u e l m in is te rs  about the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f war dc 
not seem to  have bean pu.t down on paper. Only Lord W ellesley* 
the Foreign Secretary* made any comwnts* This absence of 
d iscussion would in d ica te  the lack  o f conoera on the p a r t o f 
in d iv id u a l members o f the government. In  January 1812, Wellesley 
expressed some unease a t the lone o f American "n o ise s "fo r V;ar 
and expressed h ie  des ire  fo r  p e a c e , T h i s  concern was sh o rt­
liv e d  fo r  he was soon th in k in g  th a t war eould be avoided by 
making the B r i t is h  case fo r  m aritime r ig h ts ,  fo r  the OMers In  
Council* c le a r ly  and p u b lic ly  known*^^^ Apart from i n i t i a l
Iw* vol.IBÿKUBBfâiruo Monroe, 20th FetmiaryT^IS,
--r «» ww>T|À*7î>j^ :îV-J'y«ff^ îiej|W>u _ ^  f ^  T
103« Ub,0onB,.B6Bp.^ . vol,9, Beaeoley to Monroe,X5th February,1612, 
104* ns+Dep.Desp*^  vol.lB^Husaeil to Monroe.,9th May & 8th June,16 
US.Cdns.ggsp, vol,9, Beaseley to Monroe,15th February,1812, 
105* December,1811, despatch from Foster*
106* WeXlesîoy MSB* BM*Add*M83*37f293fHotes for despatch to Foe
SSmaryTTSllT
107. IgllaalasJaa,BM.Afld,MSe.37,296,Wellesley to Pepoeval 
6th February,1818. '
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uneasinoBB tho rumours o f war e ith e r  Ziad no e ffe c t on the 
government or pro&uood Increased determination to maXntaiai the 
B r i t is h  p o s itio n *  Convinced o f American we&kneea* lack  of determ in­
a t io n , and in a b i l i t y  to  make war, the B r i t is h  government ba re ly  took 
note o f tho American th re a ts  and remained unaware o f the aei»iouaneBS 
with which the Americans themselves were considering  the p o s s ib i l i ty *  
This a tt itu d e  o f complacency was not favourab le  fo r  any rumours o f 
war to  re in fo rce  sanctions and b rin g  about a change In  B r i t is h  
p o lic y *
On the isaue o f whether a war would be wore© than tJie repeal o f the 
Orders in  C ouncil, which would represent the abandonment o f a major 
weapon in  the war aga inst Napoleon, B r it is h  jou rn a ls  tended to  follow 
•their normal political line* The pour^exn a lthough tending to  
think war u n lik e ly ,  conaiderad war would be b e tte r  than tZxe repeal 
of the Orders in Oounoll*^^^ Gentleman’ a Mamsine f a i t  war would
produce no more harm than sanctions which were not a reaeon for 
r e p e a l , N o  leading 7/hi g paper aeeme to have commented on this 
matter. William Cobbett felt that v/ar would not be avoided merely 
toy oMing the practice of improesment and toy repealing the Orders 
in Oouncil, such was the American desire to remove British 
influence from the western hemisphere
The Foreign Secretary desired peace with the United States, provided
war could b@ avoided without any surrender of British rights,honour,
111and maritime principles,* He wrote to Footer deprecating the
J06. 2bth Jamz£i:‘y,l3ïr.
109# gmitleman^ o ,Maga&lno* vol.82,ppl79-18to*
110. Register.X5t.fc February,1812.
111. Wellesley MSS.BM.Add.MSS,37,293. Notes for rtesnotch to Foster,
January 1812,
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idea of war with the American© and eaid that sanction© had bean
*n palmoBfe a© Z i u a ©  w a r * '" '  Considering how l i t t l e  e ffe c t
sanctions had had on. tZie goTomBent/, th is  ataten.e:at im plied th a t
war would bo l i t t l e  more tlian a nuisance, and th a t B r ita in  would
not s a c r if ic e  the b e n e fits  o f her seapower to  remove a possib le
nuisance* Spencer Perooval took a more aeriou© view o f the 
conaequenees o f war, H o B t i l i t la s ,  he be lieved , would be more 
harmful to  B r i ta in  but would not be a© ru lnoita  to  Bx-ltioh 
in te re s ts  as repeal o f the Orders in  Ooimcil and the consequent 
con tinua tion  o f tZxe C ontinen ta l Syetem,^^^ The lack o f any 
o ther obBervatlon© by members o f the government, and the apparent' 
lack o f any cabinet d iscussion^ s tro n g ly  suggests th a t nimoura of 
war* l ik e  sanctions, d id  not induce the B r i t is h  government to  
reconsider It© p o lic ie s  towards the United State©*
Reinforcing this posit ion were the views of Tory leaders upon the
outo^ome o f any war between B r ita in  and the United State©» Whig
and independent observer© t,bought that such a v/ar would harm
B rita in .. In  h i a memoirs, Henry Brougham re ca lle d  th a t iii©
correspondence In  e a r ly  1812 showed evidence o f apprehension in
the manufacturing districts that war would lead to upheaval©
liltamongst the workers* In  re trospec t he may have been confusing 
Luddite  a c t iv i t y  w ith  general d is tre s s  ro e u lt in g  from sanctions 
f o r  no o ther contemporary ©ouroe a ttr ib u te s  such fe a rs , which 
existedp to  war w ith  America * More pen e tra ting  were the
rL 'r~ iiio 3 W ^ ;xwiTam’aTXïïiRfa^êr;’-''m r “«
113. Goi|r|,ag,llrth February 1812, Pôî*ostc1 In Oommono,13th Fob, 
lllu mnpy ferowghem,, Nemolra, rol.S, prj8»13»
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observations of William Oobbett# He thought that war oould mean
the permanent lose of the American market, of the colonies in
Canada, and would put Latin America in the American sphere of
influence* War would aid Napoleon by diverting ships, troops and
115resources away from Europe. The leading Whig paper in Edinburgh,
the Caledonian Mercury, expressed the opinion that war would
116greatly damage British trade.
The British government did not dwell.upon the consequences for
Britain in 1812, and only expressed the occasional opinion of the
results for the United States, Earlier, fears for the prosperity
of British commerce had been expressed. In 1808, Lord Hawkesbury,
shortly to be Lord Liverpool, viewed a simultaneous war against
the United States and France as a serious threat to British trade 
117
and industry, Bathurst, President of the Board of Trade,
considered that war would seriously disrupt British trade.
But such cautionary views were not apparent in 1812. Armed with
evidence from the United States that war could split the Union
because of the strong New England attachment to Britain, the
prime Minister told the Commons that war would be evil to both
sides but more so to the United States because American prosperity
was dependent on trade with Britain, although Perceval would also
be sorry to see the United States "crushed, impoverished or 
119destroyed," Apart from this solitary statement there is no 
evidence of the views of any minister before the outbreak of war. 
Only after that event did a leading minister, probably Liverpool,
ÏÏ5'*'" 'Gobbtetys political Register. B t E  p^ . ' ' ' '
116, Caledohian Mercury. È6t4 ?uïv.1611.
117. Llye r n o o l ,M88.38 *242, Hawkesbury to Lord North, 
9th January,1808*
118, Wellesley MSS. BM,Add*MSS.38,292, Bathurst in cabinet memo in 
December 1810,
119. FO 5/82, Letter from Mr,Foley, via Foster,9th October,1811. 
Oobpett’s Political Register,18th January,1812.
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put h is  views down on paper. He sav/ a g reat advantage fo r
B r i ta in  in  having a war w ith  the United States in  1812.
R ea lis ing  the n a tu ra l s treng th  and wealth o f the United States
would make the Americans a form idable danger to  B r i t is h  in te re s ts
in  the western hemisphere when th a t p o te n tia l s treng th  was b u i l t
up in to  powerfu l armed fo rces,h#  Savoured a war before th is  took
place in  order to  curb the growth o f American power. F a ilu re
would be serious; "Unless the n a tu ra l power o f the United S tates,
th e re fo re , can be e f fe c t iv e ly  and permanently d isabled and
paralysed i t  is  m athem atically evident th a t Great B r ita in  must
sooner o r la te r  be invo lved in  expensive and ruinous watts to
defend her T ra n sa tla n tic  possessions, and must f i n a l l y  lose 
120them. I f  th is  is  tho long-term  view o f a cabinet m in is te r 
a f te r  the outbreak o f war, the complacency before the war becomes 
more d i f f i c u l t  to  e xp la in . Perhaps the serious consequences o f 
war on ly  occurred to  the government when the United S tates, 
con tra ry  to  B r i t is h  expectations, a c tu a lly  declared war.
The complacency o f the B r i t is h  government over the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f
a war in  North America is  confirmed by the la ck  o f d iscussion
over the d i f f i c u l t ie s  which such a war would impose on the armed
fo rce s , and by the la ck  o f preparedness fo r  war. There was no
discussion o f the degree o f v u ln e ra b i l i ty  o f B r i t is h  trade to
a tta ck  by American p r iv a te e rs , or o f the need fo r  naval
reinforcem ents in  North American w aters, and on ly  a l i t t l e  on the
need to  re in fo rce  the army in  B r i t is h  N orth America. Apart from
12Q' 'w e ll es le y  MSST ' '5m #'Âdcl .MSS' .30. 3§2. ‘ Wfet'ed" ' memo. judged ~bv ' 
in te rn a l evidence to  have been w r it te n  a f te r  June 1812. I t  
is  a lso tinsighed but could have been a memo drawn up by 
L ive rpoo l h im se lf.
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the comments o f G .J.Yorke, F ir s t  Lord o f the A d m ira lty , in  1810, 
there is  no evidence o f any re a lis a t io n  on the p a rt o f the 
government o f the e ffe c ts  o f a war on B r i t is h  ^^rength. In  1810, 
Yorke had commented th a t a v/ar "would s tra in  fthe\already f u l l y
À 121employed m il i ta r y ,  naval and f in a n c ia l resources* Perhaps
th is  was the re s u lt  o f weak p o l i t ic a l  leadersh ip  a t\ th e  head o f 
the armed fo rce s , o r preoccupation w ith  the Peninsular campaign,
o r arrogant confidence in  the B r i t is h  fo rc e s , o r th e \re s u lt  o f
\ ' \
the fe e lin g  th a t the Americans were b lu f f in g  o r  were too\weak to  
make much o f an e f fo r t  aga inst B r itâ ln *  I t  was ho t the rë V u lt o f 
having too few fo rces a v a ila b le . In  December 1811, the B r i t is h  
army, which had 153,000 men deployed around the Empire and in  the
Ib e ria n  Peninsula, s t i l l  had 66,000 re g u la r troops a va ila b le  in
122the United Kingdom* Between January 1810 and January 1812, 
B r i t is h  naval s treng th  in  North American waters f e l l  from seven 
s h ip s -o f- th e - lin e  and twenty f iv e  f r ig a te s  to  three s h ip s -o f- th e -  
l in e  and seventeen f r ig a te s .  By J u ly  1812, o n ly  two s h ip s -o f- th e -  
l in e  and nineteen f r ig a te s  were in  those waters out o f a to ta l  
f le e t  o f 261 b a tt le s h ip s  and 236 f r ig a te s ,  less  than h a lf  o f which 
were a t sea,^^^ The th re a t o f war had brought no reinforcem ents 
and war would not place an impossible s tra in  on the Royal Navy, 
considering  the t in y  American naval fo rce*
The p o s s ib i l i t y  o f an American invasion  o f the Canadian co lon ies . 
Upper and Lower Canada( present-day O ntario  and Quebec) had been ^
121. W elles ley MSS. BM*Add*MSS.37,292, Yorke in  Cabinet d iscussion 
be cembar TSlO #
122. Monthly Mamzine. 1st June 1812, p470.
123* ~^ooTs']Ma'a:ag  ^ 1810,p630.
Monthly Maga&ne.1 s t May 1812.
Vane, Oastlereagh Correspondence. V l l l , p p 286-292.
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of some concern to the government since tho first war-acare in 1607,
after the "Chesapeake" incident» In 1607, Cast%ereagZi, as
%
Oocretary for War and the Colonies, had laid down a policy for the 
defence of Canada which his successors largely adhered to up to 
1812» It was a defensive strategy based on the expectation of an 
American invasion which would have to be met by the garrison and 
local militia only. Writing to General Craig, the Commander-in- 
Chief in Quebec^ and to Lord Chatham in 1607, Oastlareagh expected 
the Americans to counterbalance their weaîcness at sea by attacking 
Canada* Craig’s first objective wae to retain the city of Quebec; 
the defence of Upper Canada being left to his own discretion*
War in Europe meant that Craig would not be sent reinforcements in 
time of war? he would have to rely upon the 9,000 regular troops 
of the garrison and the Canadian militia, whose quality was felt V 
to be superior to any American force# Oastlereagh was not 
over-optimistic of the British ability to retain Canada and 
consequently did not want to waste too many regular troops
Between 1807 and 1612 there was very little correspondence upon the 
question of Canadian defence* In May 1810 Lor# Liverpool, then 
Secretary for War and the Colonies, asked General Craig for details 
of the strength of his forces and of the fixed defences of Canada*^^^ 
Craig’s lengthy replies during the course of 1810 conoentmted 
exclusively upon internal unrest amongst the French population of 
Quebec and made no mention of any fear of American invaslon»^^^ 
r§4T''‘"'"c8'Yf/2¥rCastlere^^ Creïg JIst
Vane.Castlereagh Qorresnondenoe. V‘lll,Castlereagh to Chatham, 
31st December ' l8o7#
125* GO 45/22. Liverpool to Craig,12th May 1810.
126, Liverpool M0B* BM *Add *M88 » 38,244,Craig to Liverpool, various 
despa tche^BlSlO.
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Thl$ lack of correspondence did not mean that the government v/aa 
not tmavmre of the Importance of the Canadian colonies# Interest 
lay dormant until the early months of 1812 when the possibility 
of war with the United States loomed larger# far as Canada 
was concerned the proximity of war did provoke ^ome reaction in 
London# Lord Liverpool, In a despatch to General Prévost the new 
commander at Quebec, said that the British government attached 
great importance to the defence of Canada in this tffte of poor 
relations with the United States# Consequently he requested 
Provost to send him full details of the forces available in 
Canada, and to comment especially on the defences of the city of 
Quebec and on the capability of the Canadian m i l i t i a , T h e  
defence of the Canadian colonies, however, remained subordinate 
to the requirements of the war In Europe, In April 1812,
Liverpool sent two regiments to Canada to replace two which were 
to return home# He told Prévost that the two regiments, the hist 
Foot and the 49th Foot, which were being replaced by the 60th Foot 
and the 193rd Foot, could be retained in Canada only if ”there Is 
strong ground to apprehend an immediate rupture with the United
States, that the consequences of that rupture would be the
IPS
invasion of Horth America#" These fears for Canada must have 
been alleviated by the reports of General Brock, the military 
commander in îîpper Canada, In May 1812 to Bathurst, LlV8:rpool*s 
successor# Brock reported the general determination in the 
province to resist an American attack# The defensive nature of 
British strategy was underlined by Brook's efforts with the Indians 
to 8 0 6 that "no just cause of umbrage is given" to the United 
States government#^^^ The concern for the Canadian colonies, the
X5T*"' 'g v e S o o T  ''"fQ     """' ""
128, W  Liverpool to Prévost, 2nd April, 1812#
129# Biokiey# Bathurst Papers# ppl7h-3,Brock to Bathurst,25th May,
1612,
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realisation of European priorities, and the Implied uncertainty 
about the future of Oenada in a war, were seen In Bathurst's 
letter to Prévost after the news of the American declaration of 
war* Bathurst thought the repeal of the Orders in council would 
bring peace and in consequence he asked Prévost to suspend all 
defensive preparations and asked him to keep the forces under 
Brock and Sherbrooke on the defensive to avoid "any premature 
measures of hostility" with the A m e r i c a n s , T h u s  the 
possibility of war with the United States induced some concern 
upon the part of the British governments a concern which 
manifested Itself in a cautious defensive policy In which the 
future of Canada was clearly subordinate to the war against 
Napoleon, This limited concern muet be balanced against the more 
general views of the government upon the possibility and outcome 
of a war with the United States, Ooncern for Canada was not 
sufficient to overcome the complacency in face of American 
demands for war, and the prospect of the possible loss of the 
Canadian colonies did not stimulate any fear of war, nor did it 
reinforce the effects of sanctions which the government was 
happily ignoring.
In general, the American resumption of sanctions in the form of a 
renewed Non-*lmportatlon Act in 1811, which coincided with and 
prolonged the slump in Britain, did not make much impact upon the 
British government. Directly through their mere existence and 
through their operations against the trade, Industry, business end 
working classes of Britain, and indirectly through the actual and
1 3 0. GO A3/2^pBathtirBt to Prevost, hth ^uly,1812.
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p o te n tia l d i f f i c u l t i e s  which they posed fo r  the success o f the 
Peninsular campaign, and through the spectre o f war i f  sanctions 
d id  not succeed, the American attempt a t economic coercion, by 
i t s e l f ,  fa i le d  to  induce any change in  B r i t is h  m aritim e p o lic y  
towards American n e u tra l trad e . The B r i t is h  government ignored the 
e ffe c ts  o f sanctions upon B r i ta in ,  ignored the American case which 
sanctions h ig h lig h te d , and dismissed the long-«^term e ffe c ts  o f 
sanctions and poor re la tio n s  on Anglo-American commerce. Aware o f 
the g reat d i f f i c u l t i e s  fa c in g  W e lling ton , the government t r ie d  to  
a lle v ia te  them and in  doing so showed some awarenWas o f the a c tu a l 
and p o te n tia l obstacles created by sanctions* As the Americans 
fa i le d  to  impose any sanctions d ir e c t ly  on the Pen insu lar trade , 
the small a c tu a l and p o te n tia l th re a ts  were ignored* The government 
d id  not re a lis e  the seriousness w ith  which the Americans desired 
war: a war which would do more than a l i t t l e  harm to  B r ita in ,
Apart from some concern about the far-away and no t ve ry wealthy 
Canadian co lo n ie s , B r i t is h  m in is te rs  were vej&y sanguine about a war; 
they were no t s u f f ic ie n t ly  shocked by American th re a ts  to  change 
th e ir  a t t itu d e  and p o lic y  towards the United S tates* On the whole, 
the American e f fo r ts  tended to  re in fo rce  the Tory government's 
support f o r  the Orders in  Council by increas ing  th e ir  contempt fo r  
a country which resorted to  sanctions and to  th re a ts  o f a war which 
i t  could not f ig h t *  Since sanctions, d ir e c t ly  by themselves o u ld  nol 
achieve the American des ires , the reasons fo r  the eventual and f a i r l j  
suMen reve rsa l o f B r i t is h  p o lic y  on the Orders in  Oouncil must be 
found elsewhere.
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OHAPTSE SEVEN 
THE REPEAL OF THE ORDERS IN GQ0K0XL>I812
By the winter months of 1811-12 Britain mas in the depths of the 
slump with high unemployKiont, lack/of'orders for the factories, 
food shortages, high prices, low wages and much "distress" in the 
industrial areas. As the Tory government remained, complacent the 
political response to this situation came from Whig politicians
and from businessmen in the worst affected areas, \%he Whigs
1..
and their business allies saw a close connection between the 
depression and the government'a maritime policies and,consequently, 
believed that prosperity could be restored by changing those 
policiesf and especially by the repeal of the Orders in Oouncil, 
Created at the height of the depression, the renewed opposition 
to the Orders in Council prospered and made its influença felt 
because of the essential background of widespread misery in the 
industrial regions such as Lancashire and the English Midlands,
Earlier parliamentary opposition to the Orders In Oouncil :in
1806-9 had been the result of the Embargo Act, This movement had
failed partly because of the lack of widespread business and
political support but mainly because the Embargo Act had failed
to cause great commercial difficulties for Britain,^ Without a
slump the movement had failed to generate sufficient political
opposition to change the maritime policy of a Tory
administration, Since 1809 the critics of the Orders in Ooimoil 
had been quiet, Oircumstanoas were not conducive to success: a
1, Alexander Baring, inquiry,... (1808),pph-5
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re tu rn  to  p ro s p e r ity  1809-10, much weaker sanctions, and the 
re la t iv e  s trength  o f Spencer Perceval'® adm in is tra tion#  Other 
issues were adopted by the a r is to c ra t ic  Whig leaders as means o f 
a tta ck in g  the T o ries , The Walcheren debacle, the la ck  o f m il i ta r y  
success In  P ortuga l, the O atholio question , and the u n ce rta in tie s  
and o ppo rtun ltiea  o f the Regency were o f more d ire c t  in te re s t to 
parliam enta rians and o ffice -seeke rs  than the in t r ic a c ie s  o f 
commerce and in te rn a tio n a l law* The economic d ec line  from la te  
1810, poor harvests, and the renewal o f sanctions produced a 
depression by la te  1811 s u f f ic ie n t  to  rôinvègorat© an o ld  cause 
which would demonstrate a re la tio n s h ip  between the Orders in  
Council and the slump, Alexander Baring and the o ther leaders o f 
the abo rtive  movement o f 1808-9 re-emerged to  g ive o rgan isa tion  and 
d ire c t io n  to  the new campaign*
Leadership o f the movement came from Whig members o f the House o f 
Commons who had a p a r t ic u la r  in te re s t in  re s to r in g  trade w ith  the
Q
United States# Of these, the two most prominent were Alexander 
Baring, o f the merchant banking fèrm o f Baring Brothers which 
handled not on ly  the accounts o f many American merchants but a lso 
o f the United States government i t s e l f ,  and, secondly Henry 
Brougham, a member from L ive rp o o l, the p o rt th a t was most dependent 
on the tra n a -a t la n t ic  trad e , Others included Samuel Whitbread and 
many members from bad ly affected constituencies. Hot a l l  Whig 
members wholeheartedly supported the cause: some opposed concessions 
to  the Americans w h ils t  others saw the panacea as a re tu rn  to  
hard currency* The great a r is to c ra ts  who led the Whigs, such as 
Lords G re n v ille ,Urey,Auckland, EraJilna and Lansdowne, played an 
2, Orouaet, L»économie Bffltannlaue^... pp827-8.
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Important role in opposing the government as they had done earlier* 
They seem* however, to have lacked the dynamism of Baring and 
Brougham : not directly affected politically or economically, to thee 
the Orders In Connell was just on© more stick with which to berate 
the Tories* Important moral ©uppox*t came from Tories v/ho were 
disenchanted with the government ; George Canning, Lox*d Wellesley 
after his resignation in February 1812, and Vlsooimt Siciraouth who 
had serious doubts about the propriety of the Orders In Council 
as they affected the United States*^
Outside parliament the moat prominent and vocal opponents of the
Orders in Council were drawn from three g r o u p s . T h e  industrialiste
of the North of England and the Midlands, but not so much those
from London or Scotland, expressed considerable anxiety about the
economy and were not slow to come forward to testify to the
extent of the depression and to support the case which Baring and
Brougham presented to parliament* They had a strong interest in a
return to prosperity and mahy were dependent upon the American
market * Allied to them war© the merchants end bankers, usually
from outside London again, who were engaged in the American trades
the great commercial Interests of London remained opposed to ropealf
Finally, the cas© against the Orders in Oouncil waa voiced in many
Whig journals such as the Edinburgh Review and the Examiner* The
pen of Alexander Baring had earlier produced a massive casa against
6the Orders In Oouncil which was re-issued * Even the mere 
coverage of distress, riots, high prices and the parliamentary 
debates of 1812 in the Tory newspapers must have added publicity
Gentleman'b Magasine. vol*82,p372,Sidmouth in Lords,28th Feb#
,2*
4* Crouset, op c:lt*p813*
UB«Oon.B*Besp*vol*9.Beaeeley to Monroe,27th September, 1811* 
5* Se© Withessee and Evidence at Parliamentary Inquiry on the 
Orders in Oouncil of May 1812 - discussed below*
6* Baring, An Inquiry into the Causes and Gonaecmenoes of the
Orders in Oouncil*1608.second edition,1812.
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about the Orders In Oouncil and the depression.
Unlike the abortive opposition of 1808-9# that of 1611-12 had a
7wide popular base and a much stronger political position. A wide 
range of businessmen and industrialists had been affected by the 
slump and were vocal and more aware of the nation's problems than 
in 1808. Business opposition to the Orders in Council was no 
longer confined to those who would gain immediate commercial 
advantage from repeal, eiioh as Baring himself. Unity and publicity# 
dynamism and leadership cam© from the alliance of Brougham and 
Baring at a time when the political position of the government was 
weaker: Perceval could no longer command the allegiance of all 
Tories. The principal new advantage was the widespread depression 
which had been caused partly by sanctions and was being prolonged by 
the reimposition of the Non-Importation Act* Ooncern for the 
results of the depression and the ability to exploit the situation 
were the decisive advantages in 1812.
The United States had imposed economic sanctions in order to force 
Britain to respect her neutrality by desisting from the practice of 
impressment, which was the most serious Infringement of American 
sovereignty, and by repealing the Orders in Council and other 
barriers such as the "Rule of 1756". sanctions# through the 
depression in Britain# had helped to create a movement which v/as 
dedicated to the restoration of British prosperity and the ending 
of sanctions by repeal of the Orders in Council only. Although 
specific evidence is lacking for this concentration of attention 
on the Orders in Council# some tentative suggestions can be made*
7* Be© list of witnesses at parliamentary inquiry below.
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Sine© the fa i lu r e  o f the Embargo Act# the United States 
government had concentrated i t s  d ip lom a tic  e f fo r ts  on the removal 
o f the Orders in  Council* Th© issue o f impressment, toeing lees 
easy to  compromise# was ra re ly  mentioned and no re p e t it io n  o f th< 
"Chaeapeak©" in c id e n t h ig h lig h te d  the problem. Together w ith  th( 
widespread b e l ie f  In  the wealmess and lack  of in i t ia t iv e  o f 
President Madison, v/hich many reports  from the United States 
encouraged# th is  must have encouraged the view th a t on ly a p a r t ia l 
concession* auch as repeal o f the Orders In  C ouncil, would toe 
necessary to  end sanctions and open the American market* Of a l l  
the government'e m aritime measures, the Orders in  Oouncil were 
the most vu ln e ra b le . Hot enshrined In  le g a l decis ions o r 
precedents such as the "Rule o f 1756", they appeared less 
necessary to  the war e f fo r t  than impressment. The governmentés 
reasons fo r  issu in g  them, re ta l ia t io n  aga inst Franc© and 
commercial advantage fo r  B r ita in  were open to  considerable 
debate about th e ir  u t i l i t y  in  the strugg le  aga inst Napoleon, The 
la rge -sca le  issue o f tra d in g  lloenoea had undermined the basis 
o f the government's ease. The Orders in  Council ware connected 
more d ir e c t ly  w ith  trade and p ro s p e rity  and, th e re fo re , were 
much easie r tè  id e n t i fy  w ith  the slump. The commercial b e n e fits  
o f th e ir  removal could to© more e a s ily  re la te d  to  the re s to ra tio n
A
o f p ro s p e rity . Repeal could reopen trade w h ile  the affaet©  o f 
an end to  impressment on commerce were less easy to  fo re ca s t, 
and most Whigs, in  any case, [ f aveu-re&-the-re t© ïH ^n-of 
-4îftp-res©ment~on'”^ommaBC0-Ji’;E©.m_1.0Ba-ea©y—to-#oreeast'p—®-nd'-moBt 
.% % g y ^ ira n y -o a a ^  favoured the re te n tio n  o f impressment a© the 
main method o f m ain ta in ing  naval manpower. The m ercan tile  and
8* Gx’ou^et, op © it , ppBlG,822-3*
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shipping oligarchies of London supported the Orders in Oouncil,
and it is possible that this led the rising industrial class
outside London and the merchants who f e l t  excluded to see repeal
of the Orders in Oouncil as a blow against the oligarchies in the
name of fre e  trade, A staunch Tory newspaper, the Times believed
th a t the manufacturing in te re s ts  wanted repeal because they could
not Influence the re a l cause o f their troubles, the French 
9Decrees, The apparent concentra tion o f e f fo r t  aga inst the 
Orders In  Oouncil supports the opin ion o f Jonathan Russell that 
the opposition  was moved not bo much by the wrongs done to the 
United State© as by the harm done to  B r i t is h  trade by sanctions#^ 
R estoration o f B r i t is h  p ro s p e rity  ra th e r than l i k in g  for the 
Americans was the ot>poBltion*a main motive and th is  was seen in 
the case against the. Orders in  Oouncil which was presented to 
parliam ent and p u b lic .
A concern for the united states and an acceptance of the
American view of neutral rights were not themes in the argument
f o r  repeal o f the Orders in  C ouncil, In  h is  pamphlet In  1808*
Alexander Baring had pra ised the n a tio n a l u n ity  and p rid e  of the
11American people#’ * In  1809 Samuel Whitbread f e l t  th a t the United
States had an In lie ren t power to  make B r ita in  a match fo r  the rest 
IPo f th© world#* “* Such views were p a rt o f the f i r s t  campaign but 
no s im ila r  p u b lic  statements emerge from the second campaign# 
Perhaps more ty p ic a l o f Whig views was the p r iv a te  comment of 
Lord Brskina in  1811# W ritin g  to  Lord Grey, he voiced a dislike
Russell to  Monroe,20th March,1812. 
pl26«
April 1809, Whitbread in ConiraonB,3r<l
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Of the American form o f government which was tempered on ly by h is
3 3greater d ls l lk e  o f the B r i t is h  government# ' This lack  o f
enthusiasm fo r  the  United States d id  not prevent a reco gn ition  o f
the b e n e fit o f American fr ie n d sh ip  and commerce. W h ils t the la t t e r
was stressed, the general need fo r  good re la tio n e  was o ften  im p lied*
Lord Grey urged c o n c il ia t io n  in  1610 because the United States was th
on ly  tra d in g  power remaining outside Napoleon's c o n t r o l I n s t e a d
of c o n c il ia t io n  the Whigs argued th a t the Orders in  Coim cil had been
responsible fo r  t.h4s general d e te r io ra tio n  in  re la tio n s  w ith  the
United States* In  1611, Lo.t*d Auckland wrote " th a t we have n e a rly
d riven  the United States in to  a s itu a tio n  embarrassing to  our
subsistence# d is ru p tin g  to  our commerce, and irre vo ca b ly  fa ta l  to
IBsame o f our m anufactures." L ike  h is  colleague© Auckland was 
concerned p r im a r ily  w ith  the e ffe c ts  on B r i ta in  o f such a 
d e te rio ra tio n #  Only Baring made a b ig  plea fo r  the .âmerlcane when he 
said that the Orders in  Council were a s e lf is h  means o f advancing 
B r i t is h  commerce a t the expense o f American n e u tra l trade.
The Whig argument© were concerned e s a e n tia lly  w ith  B r i t is h  p ro s p e rity  
and wore fre q u e n tly  negative in  th e ir  approach to  the su b jec t. They 
stressed the adverse economic e ffe c ts  o f the OMers In  Oouncil: the> 
d ire c t  e ffe c ts  in  loss  o f trade , the unemployment and d is tre s s  in  
the manufacturing regions and the in d ire c t e ffe c ts  o f the cu rren t 
and p o ss ib ly  permanent lose o f a valuable export market. They
the so c ia l and p o l i t ic a l  unrest in  Britain and saw the
13. Grey MOB. ErsIrXna to  Grey, 5th September,1811.
14. 3S^ a l  ^ * plhSpGrey in  ï^rds#13th  June,1810*
15. i#â8%AucEI&nd to  Grey, 25 th  September, 1611*
16. G qw ler%' l|.th March, 1812,Baring in  Gommons,3rd March 1812*
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our© fo r  B r i ta in 's  ©oonomic i l l s  in  the re s to ra tio n  o f trade w ith  
the United s ta te s • This oottld be achieved by repea ling  th© Orders 
in  Council in  the hope th a t the Americans would then remove th e ir  
sanctions. T he ir aim was negative in  concentra ting  upon the repeal 
o f B r it is h  maritime reg u la tion s  and the American sanctions played 
an im portant negative ro le  in  being the obstacle to  p ro sp e rity  
whose removal was sought# U nlike  the Tory a dm in is tra tio n  they 
displayed much less concern about p reserv ing B r it is h  m aritim e r ig h ts  
in  the s trugg le  against Napoleon* They f e l t  the Orders in  Oouncil 
to  be in e ffe c t iv e  in  th a t s trugg le  against what they considered to  
be an in e ffe c t iv e  C ontinenta l Bystem and, th e re fo re , the repeal o f 
the Orders in  Oouncil would make l i t t l e  d iffe re n ce  to  the war 
e f fo r t  except by encouraging the re s to ra tio n  o f B r i t is h  p ro sp e rity  
and am ity w ith  the Americans* P lacing domestic peace and w e ll-be ing  
before th© war against Napoleon, they o ffe re d  no a lte rn a tiv e  means 
by which B r ita in  could defea t Napoleon's e f fo r ts  aga inst B r i t is h  
trade . In  th is  and in  th e ir  opposition  to  the expense o f the war 
in  Portuga l and Spain, the Whigs showed themselves to  be more 
in tro ve rte d  than the T o ri as fo r  whom the wai' had the g reatest 
p r io r ity #
The M ilgo countered the government' b claim  th a t the Ordere in
Oouncil were an e ffe c tiv e  re ta l ia t io n  against France w ith  two
re la ted  arguments: f i r s t l y  th a t the Orders in  Council were designed
3 yto  promote B r i t is h  commercial in te re s t, and secondly, th a t the 
Orders In  Council had made the Continenta l System e ffe c t iv e  by 
ru in in g  B r i t is h  trade and Industry»^^ Much more immediate and much 
stronger and more e ffe c tiv e  was the theme th a t the Orders in
   mil#1 /.  Goupier. h th  March 1812,Baring in  Gommons, 3rd March 1812,
18. b o trrp îr, 29th A p r i l ,  1812,Lord S tanley in  Gommons on 28th 
A p r i l : ”"a view supported by a p u b lic  p e t i t io n  from London, 
reported in  the Monthly Magazine.1s t A p r il, l8 l2 ,p p 2 8 1 -6 *
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Council were responsib le  d ir e c t ly  fo r  d is tre s s  and depression*
In  speeches and in  p r iv a te  correspondence the Whigs re ite ra te d
th is  co ns ta n tly  and th is  argument received widespread
acceptance throughout the country. As e a r ly  as June 1811,Lord
Auckland voiced hi© opin ion th a t the economic d is lo c a tio n  had been
19caused by the Orders in  Council# In  February 1612, in  a
debate in  the House o f Commons, Alexander Baring c ite d  the
widespread m isery and d is tre s s  a© p roo f o f the bad e ffe c ts  o f the
PoOrders in  Council «" Two months la te r ,  Loré S tan ley, In  a 
la te r  debate in  the Commons, repeated th is  argument by blaming
P“\the Orders in  Oounell fo r  the d is tre ss  which was so p reva lent*
Related to  the general d is tre s s  was the loss  o f trade caused by
the Orders in  C ouncil, th is  lose being the main cause o f d is tre s s *
Lord Lanedowne said th a t a vast trade w ith  the United States
had been destroyed because o f the government's e f fo r ts  to
e lim ina te  the Bm all-scale trad© between th© United State© and 
22France. The loss o f the American trad© broug;ht about an o v e ra ll
loss because South America and Canada could not provide s u f f ic ie n t  
?3compensation." As a re s u lt  o f the slump numerous complaints were 
sent from the manufacturing d is t r ic t s ,  v/hich Samuel Whitbread 
and o the rs  brought to  the a tte n tio n  o f P a r l i a m e n t . A l l  blamed 
the Orders in  Council fo r  causing th© m isery to  the general 
exclusion o f o ther arguments, thus making more e ffe c tiv e  th is  
major them© in  the Whig case against the Orders in  C ouncil, As 
e a r ly  as June 1811, p e t it io n s  from P a is ley and Glasgow had blamed 
the economic trouM es on the government's m aritim e p o lic y .
19 "   .... - - ' *“
20. |iOJ|iâj^»^4th Fobruapy,3-812, Baring in  Commons, 13th February,
1q x2 .
21. V0l.82,p6U9,IiOrd StanlQy,28th April,1812,
82. aentlemerQ Hagaglns.vol.82,p371.Iiarisd.OYjne in Loras,28th Feb.
1812, and Boote Magaaino.March 1812,pp.219-222#
23. Baring, IhqulryT*# . . 1812.Brougham in  Commons, 16th June, 
1812.
id in Commons,3.3th Feb. 1812* 
.Petition of 8th May,lSll#
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Even more In f lu e n t ia l*  in  A p r i l  1812, the London Common Council
sa id th a t the d is tre s s  was the re s u lt  o f the dec line  in  in d u s try
brought about by the Orders in  Oouncil and the consequent closure
o f the American t r a d e . ’ From L ive rp o o l, one o f the worst
a ffec ted  areas, there came a p e t i t io n  in  May 1812 which a t tr ib u te s
d is tre s s  to  the Orders in  Ootmeil: a view supported by the London
Weekly Examiner. T h e  argument th a t the Orders in  Council had
brought about economic d is lo c a tio n  by ensuring the closure o f
the markets o f the United S ta tes, and th a t repeal would resto re
p ro s p e r ity  by re-opening these markets was the most cons is ten t
theme in  the evidence presented to  the parliam enta ry  in q u iry  on
28the Orders in  Council In  May 1812,
W h ils t the re la tio n s h ip  between economic hardship and the Orders 
:1b Gouneil was a poten t short-term  argument, the Whigs d id  not 
neg lect to  p o in t out. the long-term  e ffe c ts  on the B r it is h  economy 
o f continued poor re la tio n s  w ith  the un ited  S tates. Brougham 
recognised the v i t a l  importance o f the United States as a 
consumer o f B r i t is h  exports and fo re ca s t th a t, unless the Orders 
in  Council were repealed, massive unemployment would take place as 
In d u s tr ia l is ts  released men now re ta ined  on the expecta tion  o f 
repeal and a renewal o f tra n s a tla n tic  commerce. This would create 
a mass o f men who would be hungry, r io to u s  and s e d i t i o u s , T h e  
Monthly Review a lso  f e l t  th a t the United States was the best 
customer o f B r i t a i n , L o r d  Lansdowne thought th a t the Orders In 
Council were a permanent b a r r ie r  to  am ity w ith  the United States: £ 
view a lready expressed by the Caledonian M e r c u r y , M o a t
267 Courier, 18th April71812,report of meeting of 17th April,
2%. May 1812.
28, Details of this inq.ai*ry are given below,
29* Baring, Inquiry,-,. y. 2nd,Ed,1812,Brougham in Commons»16,6,1812
30, Monthly Revlew7 May-August, 1812,#59.
31, bourl February X8X2,LanBc1owne in Lords;
Gaiegonlan Morcur^ v.18th September,1811*
p e rs is te n tly , the Whigs voioed concern a t the permanent damage 
which could he don© to  B r it is h / tra d e  i f  the ban on trans­
a t la n t ic  trade encouraged American economic s e lf -s u ff ic ie n c y ,
"AOBaring had given voice to  th is  fe a r as e a r ly  as 180Ô,* And 
even the Times expressed some concern in  1810* Just as the 
government d isplayed some in te re s t in  the gx^ov/th o f in d u s try  in  
the United States a t th is  time as a re s u lt  o f reports  from the 
United S tates, the Whigs used th is  development- as p a rt o f th e ir  
argument against the Orders in  Council* In  h is  speech In th e  
House o f Lords on February 28 th ,1812, Lord Lansdowne statpd th a t 
the Orders in  Oouncil had d riven  the Americans to  create ^.ÿ^ir 
own in d u s tr ie s  which were now exporting  sueeessfu lly  to  M rbpe.
This would do permanent damage to  the tra d in g  p o s it io n  of.
B r i ta in . '  . S h o rtly  a fte rw ards, Baring took up th is  theme;
American in d u s try  was a long-term  th re a t to  B r ita in  ahd he\ \ '
\'taeliQvsd th a t B r ita in  had mors to  fe a r  from the "manufacturps o f
35 ■MaeeachufBsetts" than from French ind u s try ,"" '
i
More immediately, the th re a t o f v;ar was taken bp by the Whigs who 
f e l t  th a t war was in e v ita b le  and harmful* In  tho second e d itio n  
o f h is  pamphlet, Baring argued th a t v/aa the in f a l l ib le  consequence 
o f the re te n tio n  o f the Orders in  C ouncil, and th a t such a war 
would not be b e n e fic ia l to  B r ita in ,  The Eciinbumh Review was 
convinced o f the ruinous consequences o f war which would compound 
the d is tre ss  a lready created by sanctions* L ikew ise, the 
Examiner f e l t  th a t war was in e v ita b le ,"  More independent o f the
 T — '—  --- -------------T'l---------1 n  ---1 T - r irTi —  "^ri— i r i rratirfrrrn'TimtTTrrfu- ■rriK ithtutt i n i M m v # ii'im n  niniiiri^ n n m u  «« m  ■■ ■ iiiiwigmwwiMMi
ydm Baring, I n q u iry * . , *  I80o, Baring in  Commons,1st A p r i l ,1808, 
35# Times, 2 ls t  J'une TalO•
3k* Courier# 29th February, 1812, Lanadovme in  Lords, 28th Feb*
Ga 1 edpnla.v\ Merourv» 2nd March 1612*
35 * Ammal Rep3'^ef%'"T612 ,plhO *
% th March 1812, Baring in  Commons on 3rd March,
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movement, W illiam  Gobbett a rr iv e #  a t the same conclusion In  1812?^
Amongst the re s u lts  which the Whigs expected to  obta in  as a re s u lt  
o f repeal was the end o f d is tre s s  and an end to  the considerable
shortage o f food as soon as American supplies were obtainable
38again# But the most Im portant re s u lt  was expected to  be the ond
o f American sanctions. Before and a f te r  repoal o f the Orders in
Oouncil, the Whigs hoped th a t th is  B r it is h  a c tio n  would induce the
United States to  withdraw i t s  sanctions* This would reopen the
trade routes and the United States market to  B r i t is h  exports' and,
in  th is  manner, res to re  B r ita in  to  economic h e a lth  by enabling
American orders fo r  goods to  be accepted and by re s to r in g  emplcymen
39
to  many workers. I t  would a lso  avoid a d isastrous and unnecessary 
war w ith  th© United S tates, This whole argument was based hot ' 
ju s t on the re a lis a t io n  o f the importance o f the American market 
f o r  B r ita in  but a lso  on the hope th a t the government o f the United 
States would respond, to  th is  repeal* th is  hope was not voiced as 
fre q u e n tly  as the assertions against the Orders in  Oouncil but th© 
whole ease aga inst those re g u la tio n s  would be voided i f  th a t hope 
were not f u l f i l l e d .  The Whigs ju s t managed to  ob ta in  repeal throng* 
these arguments, which wore repeated fre q u e n tly  before the 
parliam entary in q u iry  in  May 1812, before news o f the M ieriean 
d ec la ra tion  o f war was received in  B r ita in ,
31
38*
1812,
39# C ou rie r. 29th A p r i l , 1812, Baring in  Gommons, 28th A p r i l .
Ji®p«£y.. 27th ffwne, 1812.
Ju ly  1812, pp213-233.
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The American sanctions were not mentioned fre q u e n tly  by themselves 
but there was a reco gn ition  in  the Whig arguments, whether 
e x p l ic ity  o r Im p l ic i t ,  o f the dual ro le  o f sanctions* Sanctions 
had been caused by the in tro d u c tio n  of the Orders in  Council and 
they had closed the v i t a l  American market to  B r i t is h  exports.
More n eg a tive ly , the removal o f sanctions, which the Whigs f e l t  
could be accomplished only by repea ling  the Orders in  Oouncil, 
would resto re  p ro s p e r ity  by reopening the market. Sanctions 
the re fo re , were the most im portant in fluence  in  the campaign 
aga inst the Orders in  Oouncil,
As the opposition  to  the Orders in  Oouncil grew in  strength  and 
vo ice in  the e a rly  months of 1812, the p o s itio n  o f the Tory 
a dm in is tra tio n  became weaker as the economic depression continued 
to  deepen in  con trast to  the government optimism, w ith  r is in g  
unemployment and high food p r i c e s A t  f i r s t  determined to  
re ta in  h is  maritime p o lic y , in  these months, the p o l i t ic a l  
p o s it io n  o f Perceval de te rio ra ted  and some signs o f concession 
began to  appear. Throughout 1811 the government had re jected  the 
argument th a t the suspension of the French decrees against the 
United S tates, as o u tlin ed  in  Cador^’ s le t te r ,  v/as s u f f ic ie n t  
grounds fo r  repea l. While p r iv a te ly  wanting repea l, the Foreign 
Secretary, Lord W elles ley, and h is  colleagues f e l t  th a t the French
action was too conditional, unproven and not effective enough to 
warrant a drastic change in p o l i c y . T h i s  public position v;as 
maintained at first, with government refusals to consider change
40. Bee: Appendix B fo r  food p rices*
41. W ellesley in  d ra ft  le t te r ,p th  January 1811.
Bathurst to  Foreign O ffic e , 28th J u ly ,1611.
— 234 —
and a great re luctance to  have the mattei* diecuBsed in  Parliament* 
Perhaps th is  v/as a s ign  o f P erceva l's  goowlng in e e c u r ity .^ ^  
Perceval continued to  enjoy the support o f Tory newspapers and 
jo u rn a ls . The Courier f e l t  th a t B r ita in  must not g ive up i t s  
r ig h t  o f r e ta l ia t io n  ju s t  because o f n e u tra l p ro te s ts  as th is
Il %
would ham  the honour and se c u rity  o f the country. The ^Imea
believed th a t the Orders in  Council were "w ise and p o lit ic # ^ ^
Despite t i l l s  support and the government' b de te rm ina tion , the
p o l i t i c a l  s itu a t io n  changed as the government began to  show
signs o f re tre a t as c r it ic is m  grew? much o f which was d irec ted
against Bpenoer Perceval h im se lf who was regarded as the main
45Obstacle to  repea l.
In  the e a r ly  p a rt o f 1612 the cond ition  o f the economy and o f the 
people In  the manufacturing areas was dramatised by a se ries  o f 
r io ts  in  the North o f England which had to  be suppressed by troops 
Th is , toge ther w ith  the arguments o f the Whigs, and the la te r  
Qvideno© from  businessmen a t the parliam enta ry  Anqulry in  May 
must have had some e ffe c t  in  drawing the government's a tte n t io n  
to  the serious cond ition  o f the country# Newspapers reported 
some tw en ty -e igh t major d isturbances, m ostly in  Y orksh ire , 
Derhyohire and Nottinghamshire in  the f i r s t  fo u r  months o f 1812*
Ho such repo rts  had appeared during  1811. The r io ts  continued in
46May and Junes about eighteen being reported . V lh lls t Luddite  
a c t iv i t y  was held responsib le  fo r  many o f the r io t s ,  n ub ile
and the re fu sa l to  hold an In q u iry  in to  the operation o f the 
Orders in  Council.
43. C p u r ^ ^  10th March,1812,
44. T £ ï |  B JTÊth Ap r i  1 ,1B Î  2,
ho. g|sQ_ema.ll’_a l a gaglne.. v o l . 82, p268, Sr.Curwen In  the Corainone,
1 3th Pehruai\y, 18T 2T  
46. Figures based on newspaper rep o rts , see Appendix D*
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opinion felt that the depression, with Its lack of work and high 
food prices was aj"or""dEuse""Many saw political conspirators
ji A
as the main inspiration of the riots. While the government gave 
some credit to the conspiracy theory, it was aware of the economic 
causes* In  February 1812, the Home Secretary,Richard Ryder,felt
th a t the r io ts  in Nottinghamshire had been nnm to  the co llapse of 
the South American market, and Oastlereagh, s h o rt ly  to  become
Foreign Secretary, said that the r io ts  vo.-re mainly the result of
h q
distress.
Against th is  background o f depression and v io le n t s o c ia l unrest 
the government underwent some s ig n if ic a n t changes which made a 
recons idera tion  o f the Orders in  Council more possib le* A t the 
end o f January 1812, Lord W ellesley resigned from the Foreign 
Office because he f e l t  th a t the government was not ■whole-heartedly 
supporting the m il i ta r y  e f fo r ts  o f h is  b ro th e r In  the Peninsulas 
but th is  is  more l ik e ly  the p u b lic  reason fo r  a f i t  o f pique from 
th is  laay and conceited man. The loss o f such a prominent member 
o f the cabinet must have weakened the short-te rm  p o l i t ic a l  p o s it io n  
o f the government. The res igna tion  o f W elles ley, however, d id  
help pave the way fo r  a change in  p o lic y  toy removing from office 
the man associated w ith  the d ip lom atic  defence o f the Orders in 
Council in n ego tia tions  w ith  the United S ta tes, and by hi© eventual 
replacement by Castlereagh a more skilled and f le x ib le  m in is te r, 
and by f  cro ing Spencer Perceval to  t r y  and broaden the base of his 
administration by making successful overture# to  Lord Sidmouth 
and h ie  fa c tio n *  Perceval d id  so re lu c ta n t ly  tout h ia  approaches
m2,p3i2_.
^  Caledonian  Mercury,16th A p r i l , 181^
3.st Meroh 1812,pl87.
  ^  .....----- ' i * --------   ■ -  TfirrirriTtiritiiniiiriiiTnriifiiOi
.2.
i+9. .m a e rg ë g fs m ^ m B T p p ^  te  m  the commons,14th  Feh.iaP
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war© an indication of hi© awareness of hi© weakening parliamentary 
position as opposition to the Order© in Council, mounted
Ab Henry Addington, Sidmouth had been premier between the two
administrationB of William Pitt., A .former fpoaker of the House of
Common©, he had served in Pitt*© cabinet 1804-6 and In that of
Lord Grenville 18o6-7. He had not been a member of either the
Portland or Perceval administrâtions but remained outside as the
leader of a valuable but small group of Tories* After Wellesley's
resignation he had begun to demand office for himself and
51.follower© such as Nicholas V'anslttart* S.tdmouth had disapproved
of the application of the Orders in Oouncil against the United
sp
States, " In his negotiations with Pe.rc0Val, places for himself
and his group p and the future of tlie Orders In Gouneil were the
main subjects under discussion,' The evidence Is too thin to ©Eiy
whether 81dm ou th acl'.ually demanded the repeal of the Orders in
Council as a condition of hi© entry into the govornmenb*, It eeems
that Sidmouth felt that If the operatlonp but not the principles
of the Orders in Oouncil were changed by tho abandonment of the
extensive licensed trade with Europe^ then, the United States
would give up sa.net.lone* Britain he thought, should propos© to
give up the Issue of licences If the American© would reopen their
54ports, Perceval agreed with this view* On these terme, in April
1812y Viscount oidmouth became Lord President of the Council* 
Outside the government it was felt that Sidmouth had joined the
53. April,
Pel lew, vol, 3 pPP74-^ 5 g Sidmouth to Perceval and Perceval
to B1 dnou thTTÿth îfe r c h 1612,
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Cabinet on co nd ition  th a t the Orders in  Council were to  be re laxed. 
W ith th is  change In  the cab inet, re lu c ta n tly  accepted by. Perceval, 
i t  was f e l t  th a t the government was more l ik e ly  to  be f r ie n d l ie r  
towards the United S tates, A change o f p o lic y  on the Cf4ers in  
Council seemed more poss ib le . Whether the in fluence  o f Sidmouth 
would have hastened repeal cannot be assessed, fo r  s h o rtly  a f te r  
h is  en try  in to  the cab inet, the most d ra s tic  and dramatic change o f 
a l l  took places the assassination o f Spencer Perceval on 11th May,
A fu r th e r  in d ic a tio n  th a t the government was moving g radua lly
towards repeal came on A p r il  21st, when the B r i t is h  government made
a p u b lic  d e c la ra tio n  o f the cond itions under which i t  would repeal
the Orders in  C ouncil, Repeal would take place when the
government received evidence th a t the B e r lin  and M ilan Decrees had
been a u th e n tic a lly  revoked. The government f e l t  th a t th is  was
s u f f ic ie n t  proof o f i t s  desire  fo r  more amicable re la tio n s  w ith  the
United S tates, but Jonathan Russell re jec ted  i t  as merely an e f fo r t
to  p lacate  p u b lic  op in ion in  B r ita in ,^  Hopes o f a government
re tre a t,  however, were dashed tem pora rily  by the i n i t i a l  government
response to  the French re p ly  to  th is  d e c la ra tio n . France
published the St,C loud Decree, dated the 28th A p r i l ,1811,a nn u lling
the operation o f the B e r lin  and M ilan Decrees in  so fa r  as they
59a ffec ted  the United S t a t e s . ^  In  re p ly , Castlereagh re jected  the 
decree as u n sa tis fa c to ry  and a "d isg ra ce fu l t r i c k " ,  and would give 
no opin ion on the con tinua tion  o f the Orders in  Council against the
55, US,Dip,Deep,' v o l ,18 ,Rus s e ll  to  Monro©,20th  March.l51g.  ^
Z e ig le r, op c i t .p303.
56, US,D ip,Desp. v o l .1 8 ,Russell to  Monroe,9th A p r i l , 1812.
67. do u r le r72^nd April,1812s US,Dip,Deep, v o l .18,Russell to  Monroe, 
22nd A p r i l , 1812.
58. FO 5/90 Castlereagh to  R usse ll, 21st A p r i l , 1812; Russell to  
C astlereagh,25.4 .1812, UB,Dip,Desp,18.R usse ll to  Monroe, 
26.4.1812.
59. Scots Magazine, May 1812,p390.
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60United States, The adverse initial response may hrve been the 
result of Caatleneagh' 0 un?/:U.lingness to commit the administration 
to a change of policy In the middle of negotiations about forming 
a mm  ministry after the death of Perceval, The response probably 
did not create too much dismay amongst the opponents of the 
Orders in Gouneil who had, by this time, been successful In 
forcing Perceval to concede to their demands for a parliamentary 
inquiry into the effects of the Orders in Council. In May 1812, 
before and after the death of Perceval, the evidence before this 
Inquiry, headed by Henry Brougham, was strongly supporting the 
arguments of the Whig critics of the Orders in Oouncil. Before 
considering tiiie, one further indication of the weakening 
position of Perceval and hie colleagues comes from a Whig source. 
In April 1812, Lord Grenville felt that the prince Regent was 
becoming less than enthusiastic about Perceval and the Orders 
in Council because he was "thoroughly frightened" at the flow of 
petitions describing conditions in the manufacturing districts. 
Perceval was being attacked fey the opposition, becoming leas 
secure In his own party, and unsure of royal support, but all 
this did not make him change hia views on the need for the Orders 
in Council*
The Parliamentary exchanges over maritime policy revealed the 
theme of initial government obstlna&y and arrogance, then slow 
retreat, and finally concession of the opposition's demande for 
an inquiry. On February 7th,1612, Lord Liverpool was able to
6 0.Examiner.2kth May 1812,Castlereagh in Commons on 22nd May. 
"6ourI^ :23rd May,l8p*
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diem lss a reqiieot by Lord I^-nsdowiie fo r  a debate on the e ffe c ts
o f the Orders Isi Oouncil* ” When Samuel Whitbread, on l^ th
February, took not© of the many complaints against the Orders In
Council from the manufacturing d is t r ic t s  and asked the government
to  make p u b lic  th© papers on the nego tia tions  w ith  the United
S tates, he was defeated toy 136 votes to  23 vote©g a government
m a jo rity  o f 113# By 28th February, however, debate in  the House
o f Lords was conceded, w ith  a leng thy clash between Lansdowne and
Bathurst In  which Oidmouth intervened to  oppose an in q u iry  a t
present because the m atter v/as the subject o f d ip lom a tic
n e g o tia tio n s . *’ Concession in  the House o f Commons fo llow ed on
3rd March in  which debate the Tories were successful in  re je c tin g
Brougham's motion fo r  an in q u iry  by 216 votes to  144s a government
m a jo r ity  o f on ly 72*^^ A f te r  the advent o f Biclmouth and Gestlereag
to  o f f ic e ,  a f te r  the d ec la ra tio n  o f 21ot A p r i l ,  amidst depression
and r io ts ,  end a f te r  a. p e t it io n  from the c i t y  o f L ive rpoo l was
debated on 27th April « a p e t i t io n  which blamed the Orders in
Gouneil fo r  causing d is tre s s  toy c los ing  the American market -
Perceval gave way on Brougham’ e request fo r  an in q u iry  on 28th
A p r il*  Perceval conceded the in q u iry  tout d id  not commit h im se lf
to  the repeal o f the Orders in  Council i f  they were found to  to©
among the causes o f d is tre s s , While th is  success was the re s u lt o.t
constant Whig pressure, it was felt that Perceval gave in because
he feared lo s in g  support w ith in  h is  own p a rty  i f  the numerous
66p e tit io n s  from d is tressed  areas were Ignored. Obtain ing a 
parliam enta ry platform from which to  a ir  th e ir  views and present
627 Gmirler FebmVryi
6 3* Courier^14th February,1812*
64* Gourler* 29th February,1812*
qemtîeman’s Maga0in©* vol*82,p371 
65* 0 our 1er *1Tth ¥areh~~l¥l2 *
66. Courier» 29th April«1812.
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th e ir  evidence against the Orders in  Gouneil wao a major ta c t ic a l 
v ic to ry  fo r  Brougham and h is  associates, and a strong IndLo'M on 
o f growing government weakness.
The committee, o f which Henry Brougham was the most prominent 
member began to  hear evidence on A p r il  29th. Between th a t date and 
June 3rd i t  heard evidence from q to ta l  o f 101 w itnesses. 
Considering th a t the committee began work the day a fte p  Perceval 
g£iV0 h is  re lu c ta n t approval and th a t the m a jo rity  o f w itnesses In  
the e a r ly  days came from the Midlands and North o f England, th is  
was an in d ic a tio n  o f the e ff ic ie n c y  and determ ination o f Brougham 
and h is  supporters, E igh ty -th ree  witnesses gave evidence against 
the Orders in  Ooimoll and on ly eighteen te s t i f ie d  in  favour o f 
the government• B re g u la tio n s . Out o f th is  to ta l  o f e igh ty  th ree , 
twenty nine came from the Midlands, f i f te e n  from Yorkshire, some 
twenty fo u r from Lancashire and Cheshire, and the re s t cam© from 
places as far apart as G loucestersh ire ,Scotland and the United 
S ta tes. T h ir ty  o ix  were te x t i le  m anufacturers, in c lu d in g  one 
senior Liverpool m ag is tra te , twenty e ig h t were manufacturers in  
o ther in d u s tr ie s  eueh as metal goods and D otte ry , one o f the 
latter being Joelah Wedgewood? o f the remaining n ineteen, thirteen 
were merchants engaged in  the transatlantic trade, and the re s t 
were brokers and shipowners. The con trast between th is  group o f 
witnesses and the supporters o f the Orders in  Council was complete. 
F ifte e n  out o f “Ghe eighteen were from the C ity  o f London, two were 
from Lancashire, and one from Scotland. The lone Scot was a 
te x t i le  manufacturer, ICirkman F in la y , and the re s t were merchants
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6?and shipowner G, The new mamfao tie ring  clasB o f the North o f
England and the Midlands was ranged aga inst the entrenched
m ercantile  olaas o f London.
In  general the evidence from the manufacturers am p lified  the 
charges m'- cle in  parliam ent aga inst the Orders in  Couxiell by g iv in g  
s p e c if !G evidence of the cond itions In  the in d u s tr ia l towns end 
counties, end by showing how widespread was the b e lie f  th a t th© 
.Orders in  Oouncil were the p r in c ip le  cause o f the d is tre s s . They 
provided not on ly testimony of the extent o f the slump and the 
views on the Orders In  Oouncil bu t a lso fo re ca s t fu r th e r  economic 
dec line  i f  the Orders in  Council were not repealed* They put forward 
opin ions about the poss ib le  exten t o f the recovery which they 
believed would occur a f te r  repea l.
From Birmingham, Thomas Attwood described how the Orders in  Council
had helped close American p o rts  and stated th a t since the is s m  o f -
these regu la tions  th© trade o f Birmingham had declined  considerab ly.
D is tress he sa id , was the re s u lt  o f the Orders In  Council and the
68consequent closure o f the American markets. From Rochdale, W illiam  
Hastings a lso declared th a t the d is tre s s  v/es the re s u lt  o f the lose 
o f the American market, but he was b i t  more re lu c ta n t to  "'Ut the 
f u l l  blame on the Orders in  Oouncil. L ikew ise, James Ryland gave
h is  opinion th a t the closure o f the American market was the d ire c t
■?cre s u lt  of the government’ s m aritime p o lic y .' Many witnesses d e ta ile d  
the extent o f unemployment and p o te n tia l unemployment once 
manufacturing fo r  stockholding cam© to  an end, and most attributed 
th e ir  losses to  th e ir  in a b i l i t y  to  expert to  the United Btatea.
The Importance o f th is  market was recognised by Thornes Attwood when
from' % iG .' ' p f S r e s '
68. .p p l-15g Attwood was High B a i l i f f  o f Birmingham, a banker 
and mânufa o tn re r .
69. PP 1612.p206: Hastings, a woollen manufacturer,Rochdale.
70. II- 1812,p49; Rylond,leather goods manufacturer,Birmingham.
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he stated his belief that the Americans would, have purchased
71"almost the whole surplus manufacture of England." This was 
underlined by another Birmingham manufacturer,Richard Bpooner, 
who believed that, with an annual export of .B.I million of goods 
from the Birmingham area to the United States, that the American 
market was more important to the prosperity of hie city than the
72
homo market* On© side effect of the decline in exports to the 
United States was the flood of goods into the home market, causing,
eaid Josiah Wedge?/ood, losses to those usually producing for the
73home market.
Long-term fears about the future prosperity of the British export 
trade to the United States were expressed frequently. Thomas 
Potts, Richard Bpooner and John Bailey all felt that if sanctions 
remained in force, th© growth and expansion of American industry 
would be encouraged ♦ This long-term threat would become more
serious if the United State© were to impose a protective tariff
according to Thomas Withington of Manchester and John Jaffray of 
75London, Agreeing with them, Thomas Kinder, a merchant with 
experience of the United Btatea, thought that American industrial 
growth would be stopped only if th© Orders in Council were 
repealed and British goods allowed to flow westward once more,^^
tTT
i*PP35»38,13B| Pot ta, Birmingham merchant in U,B. trade-•V-*- Æ  g A W  U U  I I l f  f l ik v A  W A J C -U i U
Bailey, manufacturer of steel goods, Sheffield.
75# PP 1812.PP290.340s W ith ing ton , Manchester merchant.
Jeffrey, exporter in 0,3. trade,Loadon.
76. PP I812 .pp446-9s Kinder was in  America,1804-9.
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Joseph Shore, chairman o f the Birmingham Chamber o f Commerce,
Vv»as c r i t ic a l  of the Orders In  Council fo r  th e ir  lack  o f success
77in fo rc in g  B r i t is h  exro rts  in to  the mark its o f Europe. In  
con trast goods and orders fo r  the United States were awaiting 
shipment upon the l i f t i n g  o f sanctions. Many manufacturers 
te s t i f ie d  to  having large orderfoooks o f goods which could foe 
sent immediately to  the United States when the sanctions were 
l i f t e d .  The repeal o f the Orders in  Council and the consequent 
end oi' the Ifon-Importo t io n  Act would release a flo o d  of good
73
which would res to re  employment and p ro sp e rity .
Looking to  the consequences o f repea l, Thomas Milward thoiaght thi- 
th is  would cause the re-opening o f trade , w h ile  W illiam  Thompson 
o f Leeds was more s p e c if ic  in  saying th a t the re-opening o f the 
American markets would end the widespread d is tre s s  and m isery. 
Echoing these sentiments a London merchant, John F ry , f e l t  th a t
I “PQrepeal would resto re  the country;balance o f payments. In  
th is  fashipn Brougham e ffe c t iv e ly  marshalled witnesses who blamed 
the depression and distress upon the Orders in  O oancil, stressed 
the ira'Dortance o f the American market, and saw the re-opening o f 
th a t market a f te r  repeal as the key to  any re tu rn  to  prosperity 
in  B r ita in .
Opposing them pro-government witnesses such as Kirkman F in la y , tin 
Chairman o f the Glasgow Chamber o f Commerce, d id  not dwell on the 
merit of the American market# Conceding the exten t o f d is tre s s , 
7T. pp" 1'6T2.p£s .
W illiam  Whitehouse, n a i l  manufacturer from West
Bromwich was the f i r s t  o f many to  give such testimony^ 
79. PP 1812.ni l 2; lilward,B irm ingham  spoon manufacturer. 
PP l5Tg,p2351 Thompson, broadcloth manufacturer,Leeds. 
“;2j,,ph732 F ry, London merchant.
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they blamed th is  on the C ontinenta l System and on the g lu t in  the
South American market. This contrad ic ted  the government view
that the Orders in Ooimcil had promoted exports to Europe. Such
points muBt hcve weakened rather than strengthened support for
Perceval. F in ley  and h is  fe llo w  witnesses such ob John Gladstone
o f L ive rpoo l and S ir  Alexander Mackenzie from Canada, dwelt on
vjhat they considered to  be the adverse e ffe c ts  o f any repea l.
Repeal would stimulate direct American trad© with Europe, and
especially in  the c o lo n ia l ca rry ing  trad e , undercut B r i t is h
export prices in Europe„ and most of a l l ,  a id  France, They
f e l t  th a t repeal would not indue© France to  scrap the Continenta l 
AnSystem. These fe a rs  had some m erit but the p o s it io n  o f the 
witnesses was undermined by th e ir  e a r l ie r  concessions and 
co n tra d ic tio n s , and by the lim ite d  nature o f their backgrounds; 
the great merchants o f London. Perhaps, most important, for 
ob ta in in g  a hearing for views in  favour o f the Orders in  Council 
was th e ir  111-fortune in  the tim ing  o f th e ir  evidence.
The in q u iry  which held hearings between A p r i l  29th and June 3rd 
was given the evidence aga inst the Orders In  Council f i r s t ,  and 
the pro-government testim ony came a t the end o f the in q u iry , from 
May 27th onwards. Public interest would n a tu ra lly  be h igher in  
the e a rly  days o f any in q u iry , there fore  g iv in g  a g reater 
p u b lic i ty  advantage to  the opposition*© case. The la te r  part o f 
the in q u iry  was overshadowed by the death o f Bpeneer Perceval 
and the consequent c r is is  in  which a search for a new, etebl© end 
popular a d m in is tra tio n  was ca rrie d  out. Before May 11th, the day
'-l-81~5ia (GloastOiia),
—  2i|5 "*
o f Perceval*B eiseaBSinati-on, evidence from th ir ty - th ro e  
witneeBos, a l l  aga inst the Orders in  C ouncil, had been heard w ith  
the f u l l  a tte n tio n  of press and Parliam ent. Between thea and 
21st May when L ive rp o o l’ s a d m in is tra tio n  was defeated In  a vote of 
confidence, a fu r th e r  thirty f iv e  opposition  witnesses hod given 
their evidence. The long and complicated search fo r  a new 
government d id  not end u n t i l  8th June, during  which time nub ile  
a tte n t io n  was d ive rte d  to  the p o l i t ic a l  c r is is .  S ixteen fu r th e r  
opposition  witnesses were heard between22nd May and 25th May 
and on ly  between May 27th and June 3rd d id  the supporters o f the 
Orders in  Ooimcil have the opportun ity  to  present th e ir  case. Thus 
the ease fo r  the Orders in  Council was obscured as w e ll as being 
undermined by the uncertainty about the p o l i t ic a l  composition of 
the new governments an a d m in is tra tio n  which might w e ll withdraw
A]the Orders in  Council anyway. Although Brougham observed th a t 
the assassination o f Perceval speeded up I l ls  in q u iry  by d iv e r t in g  
the a tte n tio n  o f p o l i t ic a l  leaders elsewhere. I t  also aided him
82by undermining and obscuring support fo r  the Orders in  C ouncil. '
The assassination o f Spencer Perceval on 11th May not on ly  
overshadowed the parliam entary in o u iry  but a lso news o f the
American n ine ty-day embargo, the seriousness o f which was not
8 ”5considered. Most im portan t, i t  in s t itu te d  a month-long 
p o l i t ic a l  c r is is  which made p o s it iv e  government in e ffe c t iv e  a t a 
time when the evidence before the in q u iry  was revea ling  th©
For d e ta ils  o f th is  chronology se© Appendix F.
82, Henry Brougham, Memoirs. v o i,2 ,p l6 ,
83. Times* 13th May
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malevolent e ffe c ts  o f the Orders in  Council^ and when the 
Americans were f in a l l y  moving towards war. As war drew nearer 
there was no B r it is h  government to  take authorativ©  decisions#
The pre-occupation w ith  the p o l i t ic a l  c r is is  a lso  dampened and 
put in to  perspective  the l i t t l e  rea l in te re s t which B r it is h  
p o li t ic ia n s  had in  the a f fa ir s  o f the United States#
Whether repeal o f the Orders in  Council would have come i f  
Perceval had l iv e d ,  la d o u b tfu l, given the re luctance with which 
he accepted Lord Sldmouth, w ith  which he authorised a parliam entary 
inq u iry^  and h is  personal and p o l i t ic a l  id e n t i f ic a t io n  as the 
author and p r in c ip a l supporter o f the Orders in  C ouncil, In  h is  
papers there are notes fo r  a speech, dated the day o f h is  death.
Ah
in  which he continues to  defend the Orders in  C ouncil. The
sudden removal o f Perceval, together w ith  the dramatic evidence
before the parliam enta ry in q u iry , might have brought about a
speedy repea l; L ive rpoo l la te r  ind ica ted  th a t he was w i l l in g  to
leave the fa te  o f the Orders in  Council to  the outcome o f the
in q u iry , which is  h a rd ly  the view o f a staunch supporter o f the
86Orders in  Council# Instead, the a d m in is tra tio n  o f L ive rpoo l 
which, had temporarily replaced th a t o f Perceval, f e l l  a f te r  a 
vote o f no confidence, put forward by M r.W ortley on 21st May, was 
passed in  the Commons# There fo llow ed a. period  o f intense 
nego tia tions  between YOiigs, Tory fa c tio n s  and the Prince Regent 
fo r  over two weeks, during  whioh time no e ffe c t iv e  decis ion  could 
be taken#
. - a8S..BH.Adcl.MSS.toa77. draft of Bweech Ma.v.idl2.
85. Examiner. % th  June, 1812, L ive rpoo l in  Lords,6 th  June#
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The dieeuesions over a now government brought out the contrast
between the membars o f Parliam ent, such as Brougham, who
represented the new manufacturing areas and who were concerned
about the economy and about the United S ta tes, and the more
o lig a rc h ic  and aristocratic leaders o f the Whig and Tory p a r t ie s .
I t  a lso wae an in d ic a tio n  o f the Ignorance anâ contempt which
leaders o f both p a r tie s  had fo r  the American©, During W ellesley’ ©
e ffo r ts  to  form a government, and then during  Lord Moira’ s ta lk s
w ith  the Whig leaders,Grey and G re n v ille , to  form an a d m in is tra tio n ,
the s ta te  o f the economy, the Orders in  C ouncil, and the prospect
o f war w ith  the United States were ra re ly  mentioned, W ellesley
and h is  associa te , George Canning were in te res ted  in  concession©
to  the C atho lic  popu la tion  and the prosecution o f the Peninsular
War, W ellesley concentrated upon these two points and ignored what
he regarded as matter© e ith e r too d iv is iv e  o r o f less  urgency,
George Canning, w h ils t against any abandonment o f B r i t is h  maritime
r ig h ts , deferred a l l  d iscussion about the United States and the
Orders In Council as being too le g a l is t ic  and complex fo r  any
66speedy dec is ion . A lthough Lord M oira, who tr ie d  to  form an 
a dm in is tra tio n  in  e a r ly  June, regarded the C a tho lic  question and 
the d ispute w ith  the United States as the most important issues, he 
thought th a t the fu tu re  o f the Orders in  Council should be s e ttle d  
by the evidence produced by the parliam entary in q u iry . Therefore, 
he concentrated on Spain and the C a t h o l i c © . T h e  a r is to c ra t ic  
Whig leaders displayed l i t t l e  in te re s t in  the American question in  
these negotia tion© j and concentrated, a t f i r s t ,  on proposing 
BoT Rose.D:
21st May by W elles ley,
87. Grey,MBS.Minutes o f Meeting with Moira and G re n v ille ,6 th  June; 
Wellealev M88.BM,A.dd,PJ88,37,296.Molra to Wellesley,23rd May,
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eonceesions to the C atho lics  and demanding an end to th©
88Peninsular War, When a c tu a lly  approached to  form a government,
the main Whig in te re s t was not on ly  in  securing s u f f ic ie n t  cabinet
poste fo r  themselves but aleo in  ob ta in ing  co n tro l over the
o ff ic e s  o f the roya l household so ©0 to  gain the ear o f the
Prince Regent. F a ilu re  to  obta in  these concessions ended any
e f fo r ts  to  bring the Whigs in to  the governments something which
AQMoira f e l t  the Yifhlge themsolvee had pre-determ ined. With th is
fa i lu r e ,  the Prince Regent bed no choice but to  ask Lord
L ive rpoo l to  form an a d m in is tra tio n ; a f te r  a long delay which
onBldmouth f e l t  had caused great inconvenience. A t no time 
in  these leng thy neg o tia tio ns  was there any d iscussion o r any 
sense o f urgency about s e t t l in g  the fa te  o f the Orders in  Council 
o r in  determ ining fu tu re  re la tio n s  w ith  the United S tates.
On i t a  fo rm ation  on June 8 th , the L ive rpoo l m in is try  was
regarded as weak and unpopular. One Whig newspaper looked upon
i t  as an ^ a f f l ic t io n  upon the ,coun try , being the re s u lt  o f a weak
91prince  and a co rrup t Parliament,** Lord L ive rpoo l encountered noi
on ly Whig oppos ition  but a lso a lack o f Tory un it;; since he had
refused to  e n te rta in  the idea o f In c lud ing  Y /ellesley and Ga.toing
92in  h is  cab ine t. While L ive rpoo l recognised the weakness o f 
his position, he f e l t  th a t he had the support o f the country.
This confidence must have played i t s  p a rt in  delaying u n t i l  Juno 
and J u ly , e f fo r ts  to  increase the government’ s p o p u la r ity ,
la y T
Grey MBS,Grenvil i e  to  T ,G re n v ille ,1 2 th  May, and Grey & G re n v ill 
to  WellÔBley,24th May.
89. Grey MSS,G--p©v to  Y /e lles ley,3 rd  June : Auckland Jo u rn a l. IV .G ren v il 
to  Auckland,6th JunesWelles ley  MBS.BMTÂdgUMBBlf? .297.Moira to  
Wellesley,1st June.
90.W ellesley MBS. BM.Add. MSB.37.297.Sidmouth to  Prince Regent,
2oth May.
91 .Examiner. Ih th  June,1812.
92 .CTveriTool MB B . BM .Add. MS8. 3 f. .L ive rpoo l to  26.5.1812
9 3 . S Z § 2 E # C E 7  BM,Add,MSS.38,326,L ive rpoo l to  Wellington,' 
loTbTiïï^,
C e rta in ly  i t  seems to have delayed any cl eel s i o b on the Orders 
in  Councilj, bo there is  no evidence o f any cabinet d iscussion 
o f the fu tu re  or these regu la tions between June 8th and June
(X  vv vv 0 ^  c «
16th, when th e ir  co n d itio n a l repeal vms atce@im.tad by OastXereagh. 
In  the M iddle o f a Gommons debate on the re s u lts  o f Brougham’ s 
in q u iry . Confidence, but perhaps more important, re luctance to  
f in a l l y  abandon the Crâers in  Council must have played i t s  part? '^*'"
The repeal o f the Orders in  Oouncil was not unexpected. Jonathan 
Russell expected repeal when he wrote th a t " the e ffe c t o f our 
embargo, the evidence before parliam ent occasioned by these 
Orders, and the change o f m in is te rs  i t s e l f ,  a ffo rd  both cause and 
co lour for th is  proceeding«**^“^  He d id  not see how the Orders 
in  Council could be maintained contra ry to  the evidence before 
parliam ent o f the importance o f the American trade fo r  B r ita in .
There is  one b r ie f  piece o f evidence which suggests th a t the 
government d id  decide on repeal before June l6 th  and which shows 
no signe o f the re luctance and equivocation seen in  a l l  the 
re s t o f the evidence. In  a foo tno te  to  a despatch to  Foster on 
June 17th, the Under-Seoretary o f State a t the Foreign O ff ic e , 
air,Ham ilton, ©aid th a t the government had not acted qu icker on 
the St,C loud Decree and repealed th© Orders in  Council because 
o f the u n ce rta in tie s  which lasted  from the death o f Perceval to  
L ive rp o o l’ s confirm ation  in  o ff ic e  on June 8 t h , This does
95, us, D ip, Desp,v l8 . Russell to  Monroe,25th May,1812,
96. F l8 , Russell to  Monro©,13th June,1812,
9$, fe y q ,pgBlToastieraagh to  Foster,17th  June; foo tno te  by 
Hamilton,
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Bot explain the contemporary evidence of reluctance, the delay 
until Jane 16th, the circum©tances of Castlereogh’s announcement, 
the conditional repeal and then the forced decision on complete 
repeal on June 23rd, Despite the evidence of the parliamentary 
inquiry, the popular dislike of the Orders in Council, the 
weakness of Liverpool’s ministry, the Tory government remained 
stubborn to the end.
This reluctance is underlined by the manner of Castloreagh’b
annoimeement on June iSth vjhen, probably In fear of an adverse
vote in th© Commons’ debate on the inquiry’s findings and a
renewed political crisis caused him to make public the "suspension
90of the Orders in Council in the middle of the debate,* Although
he admitted that Mr,Brougham had made out a grag© case of nationa!
distress as affecting our manufactures* end that there was
reasonable ground to believe, that if the American market was not
opened within a limited period, the pressure would increase*
Castlereagh’s main reason was different, lie based hie case for
suspension on th© St,Clouci Decree which he had rejected In lay
and suspended the Orders in Council on condition that the United
States withdraw her sanctions and make representations to France;
this was a very reluctant acknowledgement of the important role 
99of sanctions. The use of the St,Cloud Decree, the use of 
"suspension" rather than "repeal", and tho ignorance of the 
details of the Orders in Council and of the American case which
Brougham, %emqira .II, ppl9-2C>,
; Gourij^,17bh June, 1812
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Garstlereagîi and other m inister©  displayed in  the debate a l l
p o in t to  a re lu c ta n t decis ion  taken h a s t i ly  during  the debate,
Government weakness overcame reluctance, and this situation became
even more apparent in  the complet© revocation o f the Orders
in  Council on June 23rd , On June 19th, E a rl F lta w lllla m  had
pointed out to Bidmouth th a t revocation o f the Orders in  Goimcil
had to  be absolute I f  the ac t was to  a id  the mamrfeicturers who
were ready to  export £12 m illio n s  o f goods to  the United States
w ith in  a week,^^^ On the same day, Baring pressed Castlereagh
fo r  c la r i f ic a t io n  o f the co nd ition a l nature o f the repea l.
Finally the Foreign Secretary announced complete and uncond itiona l
repeal because the word **suspension" d id  not appear In  the
Non-Im portation A c t, This was an in d ic a tio n  o f the weakness,
i n i t i a l  ignorance and des ire  to  end sanctions and gain p o l i t ic a l
strength as this announcement was mad© long before the United
States would even receive news o f the e a r l ie r  co n d itio n a l 
102suspension,
Government weslmesB and the fore© o f p u b lic  opin ion was apparent 
in  contemporary d iscussion of the causes o f repea l. The government 
based the defence o f th e ir  decis ion on the p re v io u s ly  re jected  
St,Cloud Decree* On June 17th, Gastlereagh wrote to  Foster th a t 
co n d itio n a l repeal was th© re s u lt  o f the St«Cloud Decree and was 
an e f fo r t  to  te s t the s in c e r ity  and In te n tio n s  o f the American 
and French Governments,' Lord. L ive rpoo l repeated th is  assertion  
in  the House o f Lords on June 24th when he a lso denied th a t repeal
““ zr'fl " " ^ '"1'“ ' -------- “tPl----- -I I ' I r  "I ' I  1— I— rf-nntn~~rliT-rTi h it i 'ivitii lTri->['iariirwiiinHT>üiiiiiniw>iiiMni— ii^iH»ln^iiH »100, PellewpSidmouth Correspondence*pp85-6,P it^ w lllia m  to  SidmcuH
19th June,T8l2,
101, OpurlCT,20th June,1812,
102* 2l».th June, 1812; Annual R eg is te r. 1812.^151.
103* Ma£0,pp38l-2,Castlereagh to  P oste r,17th  June^1812,
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wa© a recognition of errors In -oast policy; he warned that the
1 0 4
government still had th© option of reviving the Orders in Council,
Jonathan Ruesell thought that tho government’s argument was weak
and that the real cause of repeal was the American sanctions
which had produced an Intolerable degree of distress amongst 
logmanufacturers. In Scottish papers* the opinion was th© 
Oastleroagh had given way "on account of the general distress
106
of th© country" and wae trying to re-establish trade with America, 
The Times felt that repeal had prevented a war with the United
3 O'?States which had been Inevitable," The Monthly Review saw 
repeal as a voluntary recognition by the government of past 
errors in policy and that repeal had, bean caused by the change 
of government and by the realisation of the toad economic effects 
of the Orders in Coimeil; the hasty abandonment of which cast 
doubt upon the earlier claims for the maintenance of British 
maritime r i g h t o , M o r e  scathingly* the Examiner saw repeal as
"" ^  aiiiMa'iifci oiiÉHi ■!! I «Il ■■ in —
part of a series of concessions being made by the weak Liverpool 
ministry to stay in power. It was the "final achievement of 
these ghosts of a ministry before the laughter of their 
o p p o n e n t s . On a more personal level* credit was given to
110
Henry Brougham as the successful leader of the movement for repeal.
Whatever the views of the government or its critics, the repeal 
of $h# Orders in Oouncil came too late to avoid war with the 
faitcâ States, Despairing of a successful sanctions policy* on
3L04. O ourie r* 25th June *1612,
105, tJS, Dip .Desp ,v l6 , Russell to  Monroe,31st Junepl812,
106, June 1812; Scots Magasine,June 1812,
107, Times,25th June 1812,
108, Monthly Review, Mav-AuKUst, 1812 ,pp372-^ 4*.
109, E ^B n e F T^TRtJime 18 i  2,
110, Grey MSS.William Hoacoe to  G-reys30th June 1812.
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Jim© let. President Madison had asked Congrese fo r  a declaration 
o f war against B r ita in  on the grounds th a t B r i t is h  maritime 
p o lic y  had been infringing on American sovere ignty. The House 
o f Representatives agreed on Jim© 4 th , the Senate on June 17th, 
and Madison signer! the d ec la ra tion  o f war on the 18th? two 
days a f te r  Gaetlereagh*s co n d itio n a l repea l.
The Hon-Im portation A c t'of 1811-12 and i t s  predecessors played 
a considerable ro le  in  the success o f the campaign to  remove 
one major source of grievance to  the Americans? the Orders in  
O ouncil, The Act prolonged an economic c r is is  which had been 
brought about p a r t ly  by the Embargo Act and the Hon-Intercouree 
A ct, The slump was e ssen tia l to  a successful movement aga inst 
the Orders in  Oouncil from the ranks of the Whigs and 
manufacturers. The importance of the American export market was 
emphasised by i t s  c losure as a re s u lt o f sanctions, and the 
Whigs were able to  us© th is  to  show how the Orders in  C ouncil, 
the main cause o f sanctions had created d is tre s s  and how 
p ro s p e rity  could be restored by a repeal which they hoped would 
end sanctions. They put over th is  p o in t o f view in  parliam ent, 
and in  the press, and e sp e c ia lly  through the device o f a 
parliam entary in q u iry , the time and re s u lt  o f which was c ru c ia l 
to  the success o f the campaign. The in q u iry  provided sweeping 
evidence to  a weak and unpopular government o f the bad economic 
© flee ts  o f the Orders in  Council and of sanctions. The in q u iry , 
tnrough i t a  evidence, generated s u f f ic ie n t  opposition  to  b ring
— 25^4-
down the government unless the Orders were repealed. In an 
effort to maintain pov»ei?p and knowing the extent of the 
distress caused by sanctions, and the unpopularity of the 
Orders In Ooimeil, the govermaent reluctantly gave way to the 
demands of their opponents and abandoned a crucial part of 
their staunchly defended maritime policy; but only this part. 
This process of sanctions operating against the government 
to effect the removal of the American grievances through 
economic upheaval and popular pressure, however, was too Glow 
for American patiences So the United States, at the moment 
of the greatest success for sanctions, declared war on 
Great Britain* The repeal of the 0.rd©re in Council was the 
malm result of the sanctions policy, Economic coercion had 
worked after five years of hesitant application when the right 
political and economic conditions had prevailed In Britain,
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OBAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
SANCTIONS.SUCCESS OR FAILURE?
The American policy of economic canotions was devised 
President Thomas Jefferson as a peaceful solution to the 
difficult problems posed by the American position as the 
most important neutral trading nation on thk seas during the 
Napoleonic Wars. This policy was designed to uae the 
commercial power of the United States to protect the commercer^ 
neutral rights, independence and sovereignty of the United 
States from the maritime policies of France and, more 
especially, Britain. In the eyes of Jefferson, such maritime 
policies as Impressment the "Rule of 1756" and the Orders in 
Gounoil were infringements of American sovereignty. The 
problem could not be ig;n.ored because of the siss© and 
prosperity of the American merchant marine and because of the 
nature of the struggle between Franc© and Britain. Lacking; 
an adequate navy, fearful of war, Thomas Jefferson, and hie 
successor, James Madison, imposed sanctions between I806 
and 1812. Such coercive measures were enforced intermittently 
and with various degrees of severity, varying from a complete 
baa on American shipping to action against the export trade 
of Britain, according to American domestic political pressures, 
This lack of consistency made enforcement more difficult and
success 10S0 easy to obtain.
The commercial links between Britain and the United States 
were strong and were becoming increasingly vital as Britain’s 
fight against France intensified, Britain became dependent 
on the United States and was, therefore, vulnerable to 
American coercion in three ways. Least important, Britain 
required supplies from .America. Overall this was not as 
Important as the other two, but in terms of individual 
commodities, Britain needed American cotton,‘and, after 1808, 
American grain supplies for the war in the Ibèrian Peninsula, 
Secondly, the United States was the most important single 
national market for British exports; a dependence which 
became of greater importance as the Continental System made 
the export trade to Europe more difficult. Finally,Britain 
needed the us© of American tonnage. American ships 
dominated the transatlantic trade and were used to a 
substantial extent on other British trade routes. Britain 
therefore, was vulnerable to sanctions. Consequently it 
might have seemed in 1007 that Jefferson could expect with 
some degree of confidence that Britain would quickly succumb 
to coercion in the form of the Non-Importation and Embargo 
Acts,
In the short-term, failure seems to have been the outcome of 
Jefferson’s experiment. In 1809 the ISmbargo Act, and the 
original Non-Importation Act with it, were replaced by th© 
much weaker Non-Intercourse Act, Britain still maintained 
her maritime policies. Although the withdrawal of American 
shipping from th© high seas caused some disruption to the
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British economy, it did not promote any change in British 
policy because of the British success in finding alternative 
export markets; in particular Latin America. British 
cotton requirements were met from stockpiles and other foreign 
sources such as Brazil and India. The lack of American ships 
was alleviated by American evasions and by a reduced British 
need as the American market was closed, and by some changes 
in trade with Europe, As a result, distress in Britain was 
comparatively small and short-lived. It was not this lack of 
success but American internal opposition, from the seaports of 
New England and the Middle Atlantic states, which bi»ought the 
Embargo Act to an end; an apparently futile end.
The effort at coercion in 1808-9 did play an important part in
the eventual success of sanctions. The &arge prosperous and
growing American export market was replaced by exports to
newer but less stable and less prosperous markets such as
Latin America which, in the long-run, could not sustain the
same scale of British exports as the United States could. The
realisation of this, together with the hard financial losses
of 1810, precipitated the slump of that years a depression,
the existence of which was essential to the success of
sanctions. These new markets had encouraged frantic
speculation by merchants anxious to recoup losses incurred in
America and Europe, The news of the South American losses
burst the speculative bubble, was a great blow to business
confidence, and accelerated the onset of the slump. Also
sanctions, while affecting British prosperity little, in 1808,
had raised the spectre of British vulnerability and the
seriousness of the consequences of sanctions in the eyes of 
many businessmen and Whigs. Thin enccr.r'"-; grr' ■
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opposition to the government’s maritime policies* which olthoupK 
it did not succeed, never forgot tho. potential perils 
revealed In 1808, They director theiÀ efforts at removing 
the threats of sanctions by campaigning for the repeal of the 
Orders In Council, The existence of thië^ '^body of opinion made 
the generation of an opposition movement dui»lhg the slump of 
1810-12 much easier. The iWbargo Act, therefore, had these 
two long-term consequences.^
Y
Sanctions, even in the fo.rm of the Non-Intercourse Act,-'made a 
further contribution to the depression of 1810, As one major
reason, together with the Continental System, for the gewral"'
\
uncertainty and instability of international trade at this\time 
economic coercion upset the normal channels of Interna11onai, 
payments. This caused not only growing losses to American 
merchants but also cut down on American ability to buy British 
©xj>orta. This continued even when sanctions were lifted 
1810-1611. The unsettled balance of payments situation 
contributed to the growing disquiet in Britain over the 
increasing; depreciation of the currency. This anxiety coincided 
with the onset of the slump in the summer of 1810 and heightened 
the recession toy further undermining business confidence,
Th© depression of 1810-12 was cmcial to the success of American 
economic sanctions. Causing widespread unemployment, high priceg 
social distress and business losses, it created a favourable 
economic climate In which such économie coercion could work. As 
the most Immediate cause had been the financial losses In export
markets opened os alternatives to the g t - ' , ta.,
closure of the American market by the Non-Impo1.t'o*'' A h
in 1811 could not be compensated in the same way ?s in 1808. 
Sanctions helped cause and prolong the slump. The distress 
provided the political climate in which the Whigs could rise 
up against the government’s maritime policies and do so with 
popular supporlî this time* since they could draw a link 
between these maritime policies and the slump. Thus began 
the successful campaign against the Orders in Council,
.Anierican sanctions played two complementary roles In this 
slump. They were an important long-term cause and* in a
negative sense, they were seen as the solution to the
depressiono The removal of sanctions by changes in the 
maritime policies of Great Britain as they affected the United 
States would end the slump* claimed the Whigs in their 
campaign against the Orders in Council,
The positive effects of the continued imposition of various 
degrees of sanctions on the British government were not 
really discernable until 1812, Until then, the British 
government upheld its maritime policies and refused to abandon 
the Orders in Council because of the American opposition. 
Arrogance and contempt characterised the government’s response 
to sanctions. This attitude was encouraged by the apparent 
inability of sanctions to cause great harm to the Brltish 
economy before the winter of 1812; by the needs or the war 
against Napoleon which the government regarded as the first 
priority; and by the views of the government on sanction© and 
on the Americans. Neutral© who demanded rights* unclear in 
international law, were looked upon as pro-French, and as
X
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coimorcial rivals who were making a profit out of their 
neutrality. Sanctions were seen as part- of Prench-lnsp1red 
American hostility towards Britain. They were regarded by the 
government as weak and ineffective* as the tools of a weak and 
divided nation of no military or naval consequence. Indeed, 
British ministers felt that sanctions harmed the American economy 
more than they did the British one. The slump in Britain and thi 
news of the growth of American industry did not change such 
opinions. While the government was aware of the importance of 
American ships and trade, and American-generated bullion, for 
its most important military enterprise, this did, not induce any 
concessions to the American point of view; all they did was to 
prevent British retaliation for the imposition of sanctions.
Just as sanctions were seen as ineffective and. more harmful to tkc 
United States, the Tory ministry was not swayed by the nrosrect 
of war with the United State© if sanctions failed. The threat 
of wa:r did not nroduce any change of maritime policy. 3o the 
effect© of the sanctions policy were delayed by the atubborness 
of the British government* Though these considerstIons of war an 
the Peninsula may have had some cumulative effect in the decision 
to repeal the Orders In Council, there is no evidence that they 
played an Important role before June 1812.
The most immediate reasons for the success of th© campaign 
against the Orders in Oouncil were the growing weakness of the 
government in the early months of 1812, and against a background 
of continued slump, the increasingly vocal and articulate and 
popular opposition to the Orders in Oouncil, The reeignction of 
Wellesley, the advent of Sidmouth, the death of Perceval with
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the consequent month-long political crisis outo of aU\'cU 
emerged a miniotry under Liverpool were the maia 
of government weakness. The Liverpool ministry was anxious 
for popularity and concerned, about avoiding any further crisis. 
It was now & government prepared to sacrifice the Orders in 
Oouncil to ensure political survival. Ae the government 
retreated* the opposition gained ground and reached its 
ultimate peak in the parliamentary inquiry of Me,y 1812 in 
which the relationship between the Orders in Oouncil and the 
slump, and the beneficial consequences of the removal of 
sanctions* were stressed. Under such pressure the 
government gave way just es the American government finally 
despairing of sanctions declared war. The success of the 
campaign against the Orders in Council was the result of 
sanctions. American coercion helped to create the 
depression in which the Whigs could attack the government 
successfully. The direct links between maritime policy* 
sanctions, the slump * and the return to prosperity, were 
highlighted by the economic effects of sanctions* and 
publicised by the Whigs* brought about a desire to encourage 
the removal of sanctions by changing British policy. Sanctions 
by playing a positive and a negative role, were the long-term 
cause of the repeal of the Orders in Council,
Contrary to American feeling in 1612, sanctions were 
Buceessful, although this was overshadowed by the outbreak of 
war between the tvra countries. This achievement,however, must 
be put in perspective. It was a qualified success; only the 
Orders in Council had been repealed. The British government
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did not abandon the prineinleB behind the Orders in Council, 
only the methods by whl#h euoh principles were enforced against 
Americm shipping. Impressment ’remained as an important 
violation of American neutral rights, partly because Britain was 
not divided on the necessity for impressment as it was on the 
Orders In Council, and partly because the United Btates government 
had not pressed this question strongly since the flashpoint of 
the "Chesapeake" incident in 1897. The Rule of 1756, although 
now of less importance, and the laeues of blockade and 
c ont mband rema ined.
This qualified suooees of the sanctions policy, however, must be 
matched against the limitations of the American efforts at 
économie eoareion. Not only were they imposed intermittently and 
in varying degrees of severity, but also, mit11 1811, they were 
employed Indiacrlminately against the whole British economy.
Until the 1811 Non-Importation Act was directed against British 
exports to the United States, coercion waa not selective enough 
to achieve speedy success, although its effects were cumulative 
enough to lay the essential foundations for the comparatively 
quick success of the Non-Importation Act. Perhaps as a result of 
transposing American political pressures into British politics, 
in their planning, Jefferson and Madieon relied largely upon the 
IndlGcriminate and widespread us© of coercion, and made little 
effort at concentrating upon areas of vital interest to the Tory 
ministry such as the American grain trade with the Iberian 
Peninsula. Therefore, considering the limitations Imposed on the 
application of sanctions by the Americans themselves, the repeal 
of the Orders in Gounell was a creditable success for the policy of 
economic sanctions.
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The history of .American economic sanctions against Britain 
between 1806 and 1812 leads to some general ooncluBions about 
the requirements for a ©ncceBsful sanctions policy. Through a 
proper und e r s ta nd1ng and knowledge of the victim country*s 
economy and politics, sanctions should bo focussed directly 
on the areas of graatest vulneriIillty: selective rather than 
undiscriminating. For success within a fairly short period of 
time, sanctions ought to be imposed within a favourable 
economic and political climate? against a country with s woak 
government, a strong opposition., and with economic difficulties 
and social tensions. The country which imposes sanctions must 
have faith and patience In its policy as the employment of 
economic sanctions Is not swift. Once Imposed, they must also toe 
enforced consistently and firmly If they are to be effective.
Such requirements were naturally not apparent to the innovators 
of such policies on an international scale, Jefferson and 
Madison, and, as a result* humiliation and impatience obscured 
the growing possibilities of success from sanctions and led to 
the war which sanctions were designed to prevent. Unnecessary 
because of the success of sanctions* and largely inglorious in 
execution, with a few exceptions, the war did do what sanctions 
failed to do? restore American self-resnect, confidence and 
independence. Sanctions achieved their limited results after 
five years of hesitant operation, but too slowly for the 
United States*
Appendix A r. Notes on the Use of Trade Statistics
The pur}.)Çïoe of these notes Is to point out some of the 
/difficulties encountered In using the commercial data in the
/ third apd fourth chapters.
There arp two obvious points of difference between the British 
and/Amei'/ican information: the employment of two currencies whose
/"I
ra^ea of exchange are not imown* and the use of different fiscal
/
y/mrs. The American year ends on September 30th (I.e.1801 Is
/^ear ending 30/9/01) while the British year ends on January 5th
j (i.e. 1801 is year ending 5/1/02), Hence direct comparisons 
' for the same year are difficult.
Not all primary sources agree on the same data, but where they
do they have been combined into one table, Generally the 
differences are small and different sources reveal the same 
patterns of change and the same relative importance of differing 
sectors.
Two different sets of figures ere available for Ajr.erican
Imports. The government figures show the VALUE of "imports
paying duty ad valorem" (mainly manufactures) and the VOLUME 
of all other goods, and do not give total values or voluines -
this infoma.ti03'> has had to be gathered from a wide variety of
sources.
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British source© give two different ©ete of figures. Values are 
given at "official values" - that normally usetl by the
government - and at "real values" - an alterne tive m-thod In ust
from 1803# "Official values" were "based on prices fixed at the 
end of the 17th century and, therefore, do not reveal the true 
value In the 1800*0, As they were widely used for a long time 
they have considerable use in indicating changea in volume as 
the cash value is fixed artiflcally. They are not subject also 
to price changes due to inflation, "Real values" are usually 
higher and represent the actual cash value, but they are not 
available before 1803 and are subject to inflationary pressures,
British importa and. exports are not directly comparable as 
imports were overvalued and exporte undervalued. The value of 
imports included cost-price, shipping and, handling charge© up 
to the point of entry, while the value of exports only showed 
the cost price, the other charges being left out. The result is
that the balance of trade was more favourable than it would
appear from a straightforward comparison of official import end 
export figures.
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Prices in Britain 1609-12.
The nricee given in the following table are the monthly prices of 
a quarter of wheat in London. The table has been constructed, from 
monthly prices given in each Issue of "Gentleman’s Magazine" and 
"Annua1 Register"
m 1810 1811 1612January W i o d ■ w - W i l d .
Februa ry 98/5c1 99/lld 95/- 105/ia
Ma rch 9k/6â lOS/36 92/73 113/ia
April 92/kû lOb/lld 88/76 128/iia
May 90/3Û 110/ld 88/96 133/76
June aa/8a 9 86/96 133/ioa
July 88/8d llij./“ 87/W 146/-
August 9V3d 116/sa 91/16 155/“
September 101/93 ii6/2a 96/W 132/96.
October io®/ioa 101/16 100/46 110/16
November ioi/9a loi/ia 105/56 128/86
December 102/96 95/lld 106/8d 121/-
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; Vessels entering Lisbon 1311
w»,4iUNMer<W'wiew.wertaviaw.itww#Ni^wiwi>
Nationality Total
MH MMW MiUH
Jan- June1 " O r W a M2a
British 817 572 245 British Isles 
Iberian Ports 
U.S.A.
Medlterranean 
IT e w.f ound land 
Other Ports
512
187
1
39
72
3
Ameri can 797 515 284 U.S.A.
British Isles 
Iberian Ports 
Mecli terranean 
Other Ports
587
142
38
9
21
Portuguese 320 150 170 Iberian Ports 
Brazil % Azores 
M edi te rranean 
British Isles 
U.S.A.
Other Ports
75
140
41
50
7
6
Spanish 116 80 36 Iberian Ports 
British Isles
105
11
Turkish/Arab 46 26 20 Medi terranean 46
German States 25 20 3 Mostly Britain
Sweden 1 1 0 Ireland 1
Source?
261-278
189-198
Maroh
April
May
«June
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s RiotB and Dleturbenoe^ 1612
Month Number
January 4
February h
k
16
6
Looation & Number
Notts* & Derby k
Notts & Derby 3 
Yorkshire 1
Derbyshire 1
Yorkshire 2
Lancashire 1
Yorkshire ?
Lancashire k
Cheshire 2
Birmingham I
Carlisle 1
Cornwall 1
Yorkshire 3
Lancashire 2
Cheshire 2
Notts* 1
Carlisle 1
Yorkshire 3
Lancashire 2
Elsewhere 1
Cause & Number
Luddite
Luddite
Luddite
Unknown
Luddite
Food prices 
others
Luddite
unknown
Luddite
Unknown
Sources;
Compiled from news reports in the Courier
1onthlF Ma m zine 
Examiner
Gentleman* s MamEiine
1
7
3
5
k
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on the Orders in Council
Analysis
&r@8
Midlands
Yorkshire
Lanoasîil re
Cheshire
Leicestershire
Cli ou ce a t © r ©h 1 re 
London - Spitalfielda 
London - City 
Scotland 
North America
I&r, âSBGai
29
15
20
li
3
1
3 
3
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0 
15
1 
0
"iLgr
national 
Manufactureras Metals & othereRS
Merchantss
Textiles
In II,S, trade 
Other trades
36
13
6
8:3
0
1
0
17
16
Sources PP 1612
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Bate
The Parliamentary Inquiry & The Political Oriels
A ClironolOCT of Events 1812
Inquiry avsnta Polltloal Kymti
April 28 Perceval grant© inoulry
29 2 wltnesae©
30 5 tt
May L 6 #
5 13 f}
6 2 99
7 If. 99
11 1 witness Perceva1 a esa seina ted
13 8 witnesses Attempt to broaden
Tory ministry under
Ik 9 99 Liverpool
15 11 99
20 7 99
21 Fall of Liverpool Govt
22 3 99 Rejection of 8t$01oud.
25 13 99 Negotiations on new
(all above for repeal) Govt, until June 8th,
27 2 99
28 3 99
June 1 k 99 (Madlson'e War Message
2 6 99
3 3 99
(all against repeal)
6 Failure of negotiations
with the Whigs
8 LiV8FpooX 00Vt,formed
16 Debate on the Report and Oastlereagh's announcement
of conditional repeal of the Orders In Council,
18 American Declaration of war*
23 Unconditional Repeal of the Orders In Council,
Source©3 PP 1812 and newspaper account© of the political crisis.
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The Papers of the followingg 
Henry, 3rd Earl BATHURST;
Thomae ORENVILLH;
OharleSg 2nd Bari GREY;
William HD8KT8B0N;
2nd Earl of LIVERPOOL;
Gnenoer PEROEVAL ;
George ROSE ;
Nloholae VAM8ITTART ; 
Richard, Marquis WELLESLEY
British Museum, on loan from P.R.O, 
B.M, Loan 57, volumes 3-5,
General & Political Correspondence.
British Museum, Add,MSS hi,852; 
hi,853; hi,858
Dept, of Palaeography,University of 
Durham.
Boxes 5,14,21,32,35,39,50A,58,59.
British Museum, Add,MSS.38,738, 
36,759; 38,760.
Brit1&h Mu©eum, Add,MSS•38,190-489t 
38,564-581;
private letters - 38,191|38,193. 
official coprea,- 38,242-248 
letter books - 38,325-328 
official papers - 38,360-362 and
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supplementary - 38,566; 38,571
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British Museum Add,MBS, 42,773
British Museum, Add,MSS,31,230
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general politics - 37,295-297.
2. Government Records (American)
Archives of the Department of State (National Archives,Washlngton).
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2. Diplomatic Despatches, Great Britain 1791-1906,volumes 12-18,
3. Consular Letters, London, 1790-1906, volume 9.
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American Economie Sanctions against Britain, 1806-1812.-
Summary of Thesis
As the most important neutral maritime nation in the wars of the Preneh 
Revolution and Napoleon, the United States endured much abuse of its 
neutral rights as Britain and France tried to iise the considerable 
commercial power of the United States as a weapon against each other. The 
failure of American diplomacy and the lack off a strong navy caused Thomas 
Jefferson to impose economic sanctions, using American commercial strength 
in order to win their respect for American neutrality and independence.
The first efforts at coercion apparently failed. The weak Non-Import- 
—ation Abt of 1806 and the much more radical Embargo Act of 1807 were 
swept away in 1809 as a result of American mercantile protests against the 
effects of sanctions upon the American economy. The Embargo Act also 
seemed to have failed against Britain, Though some economic dislocation 
was caused, this was overcome by the British development of the Latin 
American market. The failurefof the Embargo Act increased the scorn with 
which the British government viewed the American position. In 1809, an 
even weaker measure, the Non-Intercourse Act, was imposed but it was re- 
-voked in 1810.
In the long-term, however, these early efforts at sanctions had a 
cumulativeeffect which laid the foundàtions of future success. The Embargc 
and Non-Importation Acts had encouraged British trade with Latin America: 
a market less able to sustain a growth of British exports aad much more 
speculative than the North American market. The repercussions of this 
weakening of the base of British trade were not felt until the summer of 
1810 when the losses sustained in Latin America precipitated a depression. 
The actual and potential effects of sanctions helped to create a Whig 
opposition movement against the government's maritime policies. Though 
unsuccessful, the basis for a stronger movement was laid. In addition, 
the Non-Intercourse Act, together with the Continental System and inflatior 
created a general uncertainty in British international trade which made iff 
more difficult to weather the depression of 1810,
This slump was essential for the ultimate success of sanctions. The 
cumulative effect of earlier sanctions had helped cause the depression, 
the imposition of an effective Non-Importation Act early bin 1811 lessened 
the possibilJ:ty of a quick recovery, and in the consequent Whig carçpaign 
against the gritish government sanctions become linked politically with
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the restoration of prosperity. The Whigs argued that the re-opening of 
the American market would restore prosperity and that the only way to 
achieve this was to end sanctions by revoking the Orders in Council, the 
essential and controversial part of the government *s maritime policies* 
With this argument, against a background of growing economic an^ social 
distress, the opposition to the Orders in Council policy grew rapidly in 
the early months of 1812, The movement became strong enough|to force the 
govemmmnt to agree to a parliamentary inquiry on the subject.
This concession was the first major indication that the British govern- 
-ment was responding to the pressures created by sanctions. Until then 
the government had remained contemptuous of the United States, had not 
been overly cohcerned about the economic dislocations cauéed by Sanctions, 
and was little moved by the possibility of war with the United States if 
sanctions were to fail. The belief that the sanctions were more damaging 
to the American economy, and that the war against Napbleonjjftmust take 
priority dominated government thinking. Only the growth of opposition, 
combined with the increasing parliamentary weakness of the government in 
1812 led to concessions being made in order to keep the government in 
power* The parliamentary inquiry, the assassination of Spencer Perceval, 
and the consequent emergence of a weak administration under Lord Liverpool 
after a month-long erisis, anxious to avoid futther crises £ind achieve 
popularity, produced the atmosphere in which concessions to American 
economic pressure were possible. To remain in power, Liverpool revoked 
the Orders in Council in June 1812, One of the main aims of sanctions had 
'been achieved, but, coincidentally, despairing of success from sanctions, 
the Americans declared war on Britain to protect their neutrality.
Sanctions were a qualified success. Directed widely against the whole 
British economy for limited periods, instead of being directed in strenfeÿh 
against points of greatest vulnerability, sudh as the Peninsular campaign, 
sanctions achieved a success comensurate with the effort involved.
